Paul E. Krebs v. Aviation Constructors, Inc. , 179 F. App'x 627 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 05-17181
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Non-Argument Calendar ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ May 4, 2006
THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket No. 04-03011-CV-MHS-1
PAUL E. KREBS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AVIATION CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(May 4, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Paul E. Krebs (“Krebs”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
partial summary judgment and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Appellee, Aviation Constructors, Inc. (“AVI”). In the district court, Krebs asserted
a state-law breach of contract claim, as well as claims based on the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., following his
termination from his position as a company vice president.
The court determined that Krebs’s written employment contract is
unenforceable under Georgia law because it does not contain terms essential to an
employment agreement–compensation and duties. Krebs contends on appeal that the
district court erred in its interpretation of Georgia contract claw. We find no error in
the district court’s determination. The contract at issue in this case lacked sufficient
terms to make it enforceable under Georgia law. See Weill v. Brown, 29 S.E.2d 54,
57 (Ga. 1944) (holding an employment contract with indefinite terms of
compensation, duration, and duties to be unenforceable and stating that, for an
employment contract to be enforceable, “‘the nature and character of the services to
be performed and the amount to be paid therefor must be of such a character that it
can be ascertained.’”) (quoting Mosteller v. Mashburn, 12 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Ga. App.
1940)).
Krebs also contends that the district court erred in concluding that Krebs’s
termination was not motivated by a desire to deprive him of ERISA-covered
employment benefits. ERISA forbids termination of an employee for the purpose of
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depriving him of ERISA-covered benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. To survive
summary judgment on a claim based on this section, a plaintiff must provide direct
or circumstantial evidence of the employer’s specific intent to deprive him of benefits
by terminating him. Clark v. Coats & Clark, 990 F.2d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 1993).
No direct evidence of specific intent exists in this case, so Krebs was required to
show (1) that he was entitled to ERISA benefits; (2) that he was qualified for his
position; and (3) that the circumstances surrounding his termination give rise to an
inference of specific intent. See id. Assuming arguendo that Krebs made a sufficient
showing in the district court to warrant this inference, the burden then shifted to AVI
to articulate a legitimate business reason for terminating Krebs. See Gitlitz v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 559 (11th Cir. 1997). And, because
the written employment contract was unenforceable as an employment contract, the
reason for termination did not need to be one permitted by this written employment
agreement. AVI articulated a reason unrelated to Krebs’s ERISA benefits–that he
failed to comply with a directive of senior management–and Krebs did not
demonstrate that this reason was pretextual. Accordingly, we conclude that the court
correctly determined that Krebs put forth insufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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