Geraldine Caldwell v. Michael J. Astrue , 261 F. App'x 188 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 7, 2008
No. 07-12595 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00340-CV-W-N
GERALDINE CALDWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(January 7, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Geraldine Caldwell appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). On appeal, Caldwell argues that: (1) the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to consider and state what weight she gave to a state
probate order of civil commitment; (2) the ALJ erred when she failed to explain
what weight she gave to two medical opinions; (3) the ALJ erred by discrediting
the opinions of two treating psychiatrists; and (4) the ALJ’s combined errors result
in reversible error.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 6, 2003, Caldwell applied for DIB and SSI. She alleged in her
application that she suffered from hypertension and acute psychosis with
depression. She stated that the disability onset date was June 17, 2003, the date on
which an ALJ had denied her previous application for DIB and SSI. After a
hearing, the ALJ denied her benefits on November 3, 2005. The Appeals Council
denied her subsequent request for review, and, consequently, the ALJ’s decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. See Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Caldwell then filed suit
in district court, and the district court affirmed the ALJ.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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We review a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Probate Court Commitment Order
Caldwell first argues that the ALJ erred because she failed to state what
weight she gave to a state probate court order of civil commitment. While we
agree with Caldwell that the ALJ is required to “state specifically the weight
accorded to each item of evidence and why [she] reached that decision,” Cowart v.
Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981), the ALJ’s failure only constitutes
reversible error if it created an evidentiary gap that caused unfairness or clear
prejudice. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
Caldwell was committed for less than two weeks, from August 31, 2001
until September 10, 2001. As the district court recognized, the psychological
expert that the ALJ consulted examined Caldwell’s records from August 2001 to
the date of the hearing. The ALJ adopted the expert’s testimony that Caldwell’s
condition had improved significantly since August 2001. Accordingly, the ALJ’s
failure to explicitly state the weight that she gave to the commitment order did not
create an evidentiary gap, and Caldwell’s first argument fails.
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B. Weight Given to Medical Opinions
Caldwell next argues that the ALJ erred when she failed to explain what
weight she gave to the opinions of Dr. Kenneth Warren, an examining
psychologist, and Dr. Scott Bell, an examining physician.
An ALJ’s failure to state with particularity the weight given different
medical opinions is reversible error. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam). When, however, an incorrect application of the
regulations results in harmless error because the correct application would not
contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings, the ALJ’s decision will stand. See Diorio v.
Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983).
1. Dr. Bell
The ALJ consulted a vocational expert (“VE”) to help her assess Caldwell’s
residual functional capacity. In response to a hypothetical question based on an
individual with specific limitations similar to Caldwell’s, the VE testified that such
a person would have few restrictions beyond an inability to perform complex and
varied tasks but could perform light, unskilled jobs such as production assembler,
cafeteria attendant, and machine tending operator. Caldwell argued before the
district court that the ALJ erred by not including Dr. Bell’s findings in the
hypothetical limitations that she presented to the VE. Dr. Bell had seen Caldwell
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for a consultative physical examination in relation to Caldwell’s previous
application for benefits on February 6, 2003. His examination notes indicated that
Caldwell had no relevant “visual, communicative, or work place environmental
limitations,” but he recommended in his physical capacities evaluation that
Caldwell only “occasionally” work around “fumes, noxious odors, dust, mists,
gases, or poor ventilation” or around moving mechanical parts.
We agree with the district court that the ALJ’s failure concerning Dr. Bell’s
opinions was harmless error because the application of Dr. Bell’s limitations would
not have changed the result. Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that
Caldwell had the residual functional capacity to perform jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. The job of production assembler, as normally
performed in the national economy, requires no exposure to moving parts,
humidity, atmospheric conditions, toxic or caustic chemicals, or “other
environmental conditions.” Department of Labor, Selected Characteristics of
Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 706.687-
010 (1993). Thus, because the limitations that Dr. Bell highlighted would not
affect Caldwell’s ability to perform one the of jobs that, according to the VE, is
appropriate for Caldwell and exists in significant numbers in the national economy,
the ALJ’s failure to discuss the weight she gave to Dr. Bell’s findings was
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harmless.
2. Dr. Warren
The ALJ’s failure to state what weight she accorded Dr. Warren’s opinion
was also harmless. The record includes a Psychiatric Review Technique form and
Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form, both completed by Dr.
Warren on January 9, 2004. The ALJ mentioned Dr. Warren’s findings, but did
not state what weight she gave them. The ALJ explicitly stated, however, that she
gave substantial weight to the testimony of Dr. Doug McKeown, citing that his
testimony was generally consistent with the record. Dr. Warren’s findings do not
contradict Dr. McKeown’s testimony.
Dr. McKeown testified that Caldwell had a moderately impaired ability to
maintain “concentration in persistence and pace for periods of time up to two
hours.” Dr. Warren similarly suggested that Caldwell would need a break every
two hours. Both Dr. Warren and Dr. McKeown agreed that Caldwell could
perform simple tasks. The doctors also agreed that Caldwell’s medical records
showed that she had improved with treatment. Dr. Warren recommended that
Caldwell be restricted from “close personal contact with the general public,” which
is consistent with the ALJ’s finding that Caldwell could perform the jobs of
machine tender and production assembler. Moreover, Dr. Warren’s opinions do
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not otherwise contradict the ALJ’s findings. Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to
state what weight she gave to the opinions was harmless error.
C. Discredited Medical Opinions
Third, Caldwell argues that the ALJ erred by discrediting the opinions of
two treating psychiatrists, Dr. Mark Livingston and Dr. Josue Becerra. The
testimony or opinion of a treating physician must be given substantial or
considerable weight unless there is “good cause” for not doing so. Lewis, 125 F.3d
at 1440. “Good cause” exists where (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not
bolstered by the evidence, (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding, or (3) the
treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his own medical
records. Id. The ALJ must clearly articulate, however, the reasons for giving less
weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and the failure to do so constitutes
reversible error. Id.
In her opinion, the ALJ explicitly rejected the assessments provided by
Dr. Livingston and Dr. Becerra, stating that she discredited their opinions because
they were inconsistent with their own treatment notes. The psychiatric records
from South Central Alabama Mental Health, where Dr. Livingston and Dr. Becerra
treated Caldwell, indicate that her mental status was “normal” and “appropriate,”
and that she consistently experienced no acute symptoms. On May 18, 2004, the
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psychiatric records indicate that Caldwell’s mental health status was “well
maintained.” On August 10, 2004, the psychiatric records reflect that no changes
needed to be made to Caldwell’s treatment. On January 18, 2005, the records
indicate that the psychiatrists discontinued Caldwell’s Wellbutrin treatment and
that she was “doing well.” The records also indicate that Caldwell’s progress
toward her treatments goals was consistently rated as “good,” and the most recent
record shows that Caldwell’s progress was rated as “excellent.” The latest
psychiatric record, May 17, 2005, indicates that Caldwell’s memory, attention
span, and impulse control were good. The psychiatrist noted that Caldwell’s
mental status was normal, her behavior was normal, her affect was appropriate, her
thought process was clear, and her thought content was normal.
Unlike those records, the residual functional capacity questionnaires that
Livingston and Becerra completed for Caldwell on March 3, 2004 and May 31,
2005, respectively, both describe Caldwell’s limitations as “mild,” “moderate,”
“moderately severe,” and “severe.” Thus, substantial evidence supports a finding
that the treatment records from South Central Alabama Mental Health contradict
the medical opinions listed on the doctors’ questionnaires. Accordingly, the ALJ
did not err.
D. Combined Errors
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Caldwell lastly argues that the combination of errors results in reversible
error. Because the ALJ did not commit any material errors, we disagree.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible
error. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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