United States v. Fidencio Estrada ( 2008 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ___________________________________
    JANUARY 7, 2008
    NO. 06-13836           THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    __________________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 05-00070 CR-T-23-MAP
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    FIDENCIO ESTRADA,
    a.k.a. Fidencio Estrada-Guerra,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ___________________________________
    (January 7, 2008)
    Before BLACK, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Fidencio Estrada (“Estrada”), a permanent resident of the United States, and
    Rafael Pacheco (“Pacheco”), an agent with the United States Customs Service in
    Florida, agreed that Estrada would pay bribes to Pacheco in exchange for checking
    records on Estrada in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (“TECS”)
    and arranging visas for Estrada’s family. Estrada was found guilty by a jury of
    conspiring to bribe a public official, conspiring to launder money, five counts of
    bribery, and ten counts of money laundering. Estrada now appeals arguing that
    there was insufficient evidence at trial to convict him on several counts, his
    convictions should be overturned because they were based on inadmissible
    hearsay in contravention of Crawford v. Washington and impermissible character
    evidence in contravention of Fed. R. Evid. 404, the prejudice connected with the
    introduction of certain evidence outweighed the probative value of that evidence,
    and the district court erred in finding that Pacheco was a “public official holding a
    high-level decision making or sensitive position.” For the reasons explained
    below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    Factual Background
    In December 2000, Estrada was driving near Houston, Texas when a state
    trooper stopped him for traffic violations. The trooper arrested Estrada for driving
    without a license and insurance, and searched him, finding Pacheco’s business
    2
    card.1 When the trooper inquired why Estrada had Pacheco’s card, Estrada first
    answered that he did not know Pacheco, but later said they were friends. The
    trooper then left a message for Pacheco asking him to call if it was important that
    Estrada had Pacheco’s card. Pacheco returned the call and told the trooper that
    Estrada was a “huge” informant and demanded that the trooper “let him go now.”
    Pacheco also told the trooper that if any money was discovered in Estrada’s car, it
    should be considered “legit,” because Estrada was “not a crook . . . not a doper.
    He is an informant. He is a goat rancher[.]” The trooper felt something was
    wrong. He told Pacheco that he would release Estrada, but instead booked him
    and called his supervisor. The supervisor called a sergeant in the narcotics
    division, who called Pacheco again. This time Pacheco said that Estrada was a
    “very very good” informant of his who had assisted in “many, many, many cases”
    and had provided information in “numerous investigations.”
    After conducting a more thorough investigation, it was discovered that
    various family members and friends of Estrada in the Mexico-Texas border area
    had sent Pacheco several thousand-dollar-plus wire transfers while he was in
    1
    Previously, on August 14, 2000, a Texas trooper stopped a car occupied by Estrada, his
    brother Eradio Estrada, and a third man. During a consented search, the trooper found
    approximately $75,000 in a portfolio inside a brown paper bag. All three denied ownership of
    the money.
    3
    Tampa, Florida, and stationed in Puerto Rico. Pacheco had cashed these transfers
    and deposited most of the money in his personal bank accounts, keeping some in
    cash.
    On February 3, 2000, Santos Ramiro Maldonado (“Maldonado”), Estrada’s
    acquaintance, sent $1,400 through Western Union from Houston, Texas to
    Pacheco in Tampa. Maldonado testified that Estrada gave him money to send to
    someone in Florida.2 It was also discovered that on February 15, 2000, Pacheco
    accessed the TECS3 to check for records on Estrada. He searched for Estrada
    under two aliases and viewed records for those aliases in the NCIC database,
    which lists outstanding warrants against a person.
    On February 25, 2000, Maldonado again sent $1,400 to Pacheco in Tampa,
    from Rio Grande, Texas via Western Union. Pacheco deposited the money into
    his personal checking accounts a few days later. Then on April 2, 2000, Raul
    Razo (“Razo”), another of Estrada’s acquaintances from Mexico, sent Pacheco,
    who was temporarily stationed in Puerto Rico, $1,500. Razo testified that Estrada
    gave him the money to send to someone in Puerto Rico. Pacheco cashed the
    2
    On the same day, Pacheco picked up the money in two checks, and cashed them at the
    transfer point. He then made two deposits of $700 each into his personal checking account.
    3
    TECS is a system of databases used for criminal investigations and it is illegal for law
    enforcement to use the TECS for personal reasons. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West 2007).
    4
    checks at the transfer point.
    On May 2, 2000, Pacheco contacted a customs agent he knew who was
    stationed in Mexico, to help get visas for Estrada and Estrada’s family. Pacheco
    commented to the agent that Estrada was an informant who had been “extremely
    productive” for Pacheco’s agency in Florida. The agent told Pacheco that he
    needed a memorandum documenting Estrada’s assistance. Pacheco sent him a
    handwritten note. The agent responded that the note was unacceptable and that he
    needed a memorandum from Pacheco’s supervisor. Pacheco then sent a
    memorandum made by him, not his supervisor. In return, the agent communicated
    to Pacheco that Estrada and his family needed to go to the agent’s office in
    Mexico with the pertinent documents so that he could recommend that they
    receive visas. Estrada’s family members showed up, but Estrada did not. Pacheco
    told the agent that Estrada was in Florida and would come in later. On May 19,
    2000, visas were issued to Estrada’s family members. The agent later learned that
    Estrada was already a permanent resident of the United States.4
    On September 1, 2000 and October 11, 2000, an individual showing Eradio
    Estrada’s (“Eradio”) identification sent $1,000 to Pacheco through Western Union.
    4
    If this information had been known, it would have weighed against granting Estrada’s
    family members visas, because relatives of permanent residents are likely to abandon their
    country of residence and join their permanent resident relative in the United States.
    5
    Pacheco cashed the first check and deposited the second into his personal
    checking account. On September 14, October 11, and December 12, 2000,
    Pacheco again conducted numerous TECS queries regarding Estrada.
    On November 27, 2000, an individual showing Manuel Ortiz’s (“Ortiz”)
    identification5 sent $1,800 from Angleton, Texas, to Pacheco in Tampa through
    Western Union. Pacheco cashed the check and deposited $1,700 cash into his
    personal checking account. Ortiz was later found with Estrada’s contact numbers
    on him.
    At trial, an agent with the Bureau of Immigration Customs Enforcement6
    testified that Estrada was not and never had been an informant for the United
    States customs agencies. In February 2005, a grand jury in the Middle District of
    Florida indicted Estrada for conspiring to bribe a public official, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 201; conspiring to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h);
    five counts of bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201; and ten counts of money
    laundering. A jury found Estrada guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced
    him to forty-one months’ imprisonment, to be followed by thirty-six months’
    5
    This same identification was used in December 1999 to send $1,500 via Western Union
    to Pacheco in Tampa.
    6
    This is one of the successor agencies to the United States Customs Service.
    6
    supervised release.7 This appeal follows.
    Discussion
    I. Estrada’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Based on Insufficient Evidence
    We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the
    sufficiency of the evidence de novo, and view the evidence “in the light most
    favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices
    made in the government’s favor.” United States v. Ortiz, 
    318 F.3d 1030
    , 1036
    (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
    Estrada argues that the United States did not introduce direct evidence in the
    form of eyewitness testimony or sufficient circumstantial evidence to connect him
    7
    Pacheco was convicted in a separate proceeding for conspiracy to commit bribery of a
    public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); being a public official receiving and
    accepting bribes in return for being influenced in the performance of his official duties in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(2)(A)(B) and (C) (Counts 2 through 6); knowingly engaging in
    misleading conduct toward another person with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent
    communication to a law enforcement officer of the United States regarding the commission of a
    federal offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (Count 12); conspiracy to commit money
    laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 13); money laundering in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 (Counts 14 through 23); unlawfully accessing restricted federal
    computer databases for financial gain and in furtherance of other criminal acts, including bribery,
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B) (Counts 24 through 29); obstruction of justice in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a), 1503(b)(3), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 30); and false
    statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (Counts 31 and 32). He was sentenced to 87
    months’ imprisonment as to counts 2- 6, 12, 13- 23, and 30; and 60 months’ imprisonment as to
    counts 1, 24-29, 31 and 32; all such terms to run concurrently. Upon release from imprisonment,
    Pacheco will be on supervised release for a term of 36 months as to counts 1-6, and counts 12-
    32; all such terms to run concurrently. Pacheco is also to pay $2,700 as a criminal monetary
    penalty and is personally liable for a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of $17,400.
    Pacheco was not called as a witness in this trial of Estrada.
    7
    to the bribery transactions. We disagree.
    The United States provided direct evidence in the form of eyewitness
    testimony from Maldonado and Razo, linking Estrada to the Maldonado and Razo
    transfers. In addition, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish a
    pattern of bribes from Estrada to Pacheco that occurred (1) from Western Union
    offices (2) near the Texas-Mexico border (3) for amounts of at least $1,000 (4)
    sent by Estrada’s friends and family members (5) directly to Pacheco wherever he
    was stationed. The Eradio and Ortiz transfers fit this pattern. The transfers came
    from Western Union offices near the Texas-Mexico border and were for amounts
    similar to the previous bribes. The transfers were sent by persons close to Estrada.
    Both Eradio and Ortiz were found with Estrada’s contact numbers. Estrada was in
    the car with Eradio when the trooper found $75,000 that triggered the September
    TECS check on Estrada. Finally, the money transfers went directly to Pacheco.
    This pattern provides strong circumstantial evidence that Estrada was directly
    involved in the Eradio and Ortiz transfers as well as the previous transfers.
    Therefore, Estrada was properly found to be directly connected to all the bribery
    transactions.
    II. Evidentiary Rulings
    We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See General Elec.
    8
    Co. v. Joiner, 
    522 U.S. 136
    , 141-42, 
    118 S. Ct. 512
    , 517 (1997). Estrada argues
    that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights as set forth in Crawford
    v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    (2004), and abused its discretion
    under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) by admitting the TECS records and NCIC screen
    images into evidence. However, the only entries the jury saw were those
    contained on the pages published during witness testimony.8 Furthermore, only
    one of the pages of the TECS exhibits was published to the jury and it contained a
    single purportedly prejudicial entry: “[S]ubject is an associate of Bruno Amador
    Pena-Trevino. Estrada Guerra is suspected of narcotic trafficking.”
    The Confrontation Clause does not apply in this situation because it “does
    not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
    truth of the matter asserted.” 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59
    n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 
    n.9
    (citation omitted). Because the entry was not admitted for its truth, but to show
    the jury exactly what Estrada was purchasing with his bribes to Pacheco, Estrada’s
    argument cannot prevail. The fact that the entries existed was introduced to
    establish Estrada’s motive for the bribery. The district court explained this to the
    8
    At the end of trial, the United States voluntarily offered to withhold the original TECS
    exhibits, suggesting that the court send back for jury deliberations only those pages that were
    already published to the jury or that it withhold the exhibits unless the jury asked for them. The
    court instructed a court officer not to take the exhibits back to the jury for deliberations. The
    United States brought the original exhibits to the counsel table to avoid any portion entering the
    jury room. The jury never asked for the exhibits.
    9
    jury and specifically instructed them that they could not consider the TECS entries
    for their truth, but solely for their existence. Consequently, Estrada suffered no
    Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation and his Crawford claim fails.
    Estrada’s 404(b) claim also fails because the district court did not admit the
    TECS entry for its truth. Rule 404(b) excludes some evidence of “prior bad acts”
    because the evidence can be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant by putting his
    character into a questionable position instead of proving his current crime. See
    generally Old Chief v. United States, 
    519 U.S. 172
    , 181-82, 
    117 S. Ct. 644
    , 650-51
    (1997) (state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law because it
    weighs too much with the jury as to prejudge one with a bad general record and
    deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge). However, the
    district court specifically instructed the jury that it should not consider the entry
    for its truth. Pursuant to the court’s instructions, a reasonable jury would not have
    used the entry as evidence that Estrada actually had committed a prior bad act. See
    Francis v. Franklin, 
    471 U.S. 307
    , 324 n.9, 
    105 S. Ct. 1965
    , 1976 n.9 (1985).
    Furthermore, the TECS entry was not excludable under Rule 404(b) because
    it was intrinsic evidence attributable to Estrada’s current offenses. Rule 404(b) is
    not applicable “where the evidence concerns the context, motive, and set-up of the
    crime and is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an
    10
    integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the
    story of the crime for the jury.” United States v. Smith, 
    122 F.3d 1355
    , 1359 (11th
    Cir. 1997). Estrada ordered others to send large amounts of money to Pacheco, in
    order for Pacheco to provide Estrada with TECS information. If there had been no
    information on the TECS system involving Estrada, or the information was not
    harmful to him, there would have been no reason for Estrada to continuously send
    money to Pacheco. It was logical for the Government to show the jury that there
    was some information about Estrada in the TECS system that Estrada would be
    interested in, regardless of its truth. Under these circumstances, the evidence was
    admissible under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Paskett, 
    950 F.2d 705
    , 708 n.3
    (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence of defendant’s past money laundering was
    admissible under Rule 404(b) because money laundering activities were motive
    for the alleged bribe and hence “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the government’s
    proof of the charged offense and necessary to complete the story of the crime”).
    Thus, the TECS entry was properly admitted and there was no error.
    Estrada also argues that the district court abused its discretion under Rule
    404(b) by admitting testimony about the traffic stop during which, pursuant to a
    consented search, the trooper found approximately $75,000 in the car in which
    Estrada was riding. Because this evidence triggered subsequent bribes to Pacheco,
    11
    it is intertwined with Estrada’s crimes and admissible to paint the whole picture of
    his offenses. We find no abuse of discretion in these evidentiary rulings.
    III. Sentencing Enhancement for Bribery of an Official in a “Sensitive” Position
    We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de
    novo. See United States v. Jordi, 
    418 F.3d 1212
    , 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Estrada complains that the district court should not have applied a guideline
    enhancement for bribery of a public official in a “sensitive” position, arguing that
    Pacheco was not a “high-level decision-maker” pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
    2C1.1(b)(2)(B) (2000).9 We conclude that the district court correctly enhanced
    Estrada’s advisory guidelines offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2C1.1(b)(2)(B)
    (2000). That section requires the district court to increase the offense level if the
    offense “involved a payment for the purposes of influencing an elected official or
    any official holding a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” The
    9
    The 2000 edition of the sentencing guidelines was used to calculate the PSI report. In
    2004, the text of § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) was amended and became § 2C1.1(b)(3), which now provides
    that the enhancement applies “[i]f the offense involved an elected public official or any public
    official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1(b)(3). Although
    the new § 2C1.1(b)(3) does not contain the requirement that the offense involved “a payment for
    the purpose of influencing” an official, it did not alter the phrase “high-level decision-making or
    sensitive position,” which is the language at issue here.
    Further, the 2004 amendments to the application notes of former U.S.S.G. §
    2C1.1(b)(2)(B) were intended to clarify the meaning of “high-level decision-making or sensitive
    position.” See U.S.S.G. Amend. 666. It is well-settled in this Court that amendments to the
    guidelines commentary are clarifying amendments and that clarifying amendments to the
    guidelines apply retroactively. United States v. Armstrong, 
    347 F.3d 905
    , 908 & n.6 (11th Cir.
    2003).
    12
    commentary gives as examples of an official holding a “sensitive” position– “a
    juror, a law enforcement officer, an election official, and any other similarly
    situated individual.” U.S.S.G. Amend. 666 (codified at U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3)
    (2004), comment. n.4(B)). Pacheco was clearly a “law enforcement officer.”
    Therefore, because the evidence at trial established that Estrada bribed a law
    enforcement official who had access to sensitive information, the district court did
    not err in applying the U.S.S.G. §2C1.1(b)(2)(B) (2000) enhancement.10
    IV. The “Reasonableness” of Estrada’s Sentence
    We review sentences for unreasonableness. See United States v. Booker,
    
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). We also normally review a claim of substantive
    unreasonableness by reviewing the sentence in its entirety with deference in light
    of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Williams, 
    456 F.3d 1353
    , 1363 (11th Cir. 2006). However, Estrada did not object to his sentence as
    unreasonable in the district court. In this Circuit, if a defendant is offered the
    opportunity to object at sentencing and fails to do so, “objections to the sentence
    will be waived for purposes of appeal.” United States v. Jones, 
    899 F.2d 1097
    ,
    1103 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morrill,
    10
    The district court enhanced the guideline offense level because Pacheco was in a
    “sensitive” position as opposed to a “high-level decision-making position,” and Estrada bribed
    him precisely because of his position.
    13
    
    984 F.2d 1136
    (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). As an exception to waiver, “we will
    only consider [sentence] objections raised for the first time on appeal under the
    plain error doctrine to avoid ‘manifest injustice.’” United States v. Newsome, 
    998 F.2d 1571
    , 1579 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Neely, 
    979 F.2d 1522
    ,
    1523 (11th Cir. 1992)). The government argues that plain error review should
    apply because Estrada did not object to his sentence as unreasonable in the district
    court. This Court has not yet applied plain error review to a question of
    reasonableness of a sentence. We need not decide here whether or how plain error
    applies because, even under a reasonableness standard, Estrada’s sentence appeal
    fails.
    Estrada mainly argues that it was incorrect for the district court to have used
    the advisory guidelines range it did when applying the sentencing factors set forth
    in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 because it incorrectly calculated that range by enhancing
    Estrada’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) (2000). We rejected this
    argument in part III above.
    Thus, the only remaining argument is that based upon the testimony of
    several family members that Estrada was a “good man,” the court should have
    sentenced him to less time because he needs to provide for his family financially.
    We disagree. “The weight to be accorded to any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
    14
    committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” 
    Williams, 456 F.3d at 1363
    . The trial court heard the witnesses, evaluated the testimony, and carefully
    considered all of the surrounding circumstances. The forty-one months’ sentence
    was not unreasonable.
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    15