Michael Lewis Ivory v. United States ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-11506 JANUARY 9, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 05-08041-CV-H-S & 89-00074-CR-S
MICHAEL LEWIS IVORY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(January 9, 2008)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Lewis Ivory, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion challenging the denial
of his motion for return of seized property.
Ivory previously filed a motion for return of seized property, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), in which he asserted that he never
received notice of the forfeiture of his property and was not afforded a forfeiture
hearing. The district court denied that motion, and we affirmed because the record
contained two civil docket sheets showing that Ivory had received notice of the
forfeitures.
Ivory then filed the present Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the district court’s
judgment denying his motion for return of seized property. The district court
denied the motion because it was time-barred, and also because Ivory was asserting
the same contention in the Rule 60(b) motion that he had made in his earlier Rule
41(e) motion.
In this appeal, Ivory contends that the district court erred in finding that his
Rule 60(b) motion was time-barred, arguing that he was proceeding under Rule
60(b)(4), which requires only that a motion challenging a void judgment be filed
“within a reasonable time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). He argues that the district
court’s forfeiture judgment was void because he never received proper notice of
the forfeiture, and for that reason the district court could not have commenced a
2
lawful forfeiture proceeding. He reiterates his contention that the documents that
had been relied upon in the earlier proceeding are insufficient to demonstrate that
he received notice of the forfeiture, and he maintains that he should have been
granted an evidentiary hearing.
We review de novo a district court’s application of the law of the case
doctrine. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters,
430 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). Under that doctrine, both district courts and
appellate courts generally are bound by a prior appellate decision in the same case.
Alphamed, Inc. v. B. Braun Medical, Inc., 367 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 (11th Cir.
2004). The doctrine operates to preclude courts from revisiting issues that were
decided explicitly or by necessary implication in a prior appeal. Luckey v. Miller,
929 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1991). The law-of-the-case doctrine bars
reconsideration of an issue that we previously decided unless: (1) there exists new
evidence that is substantially different; (2) controlling authority since has made a
contrary decision of the law applicable to such issue; or (3) the decision was
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. United States v. Escobar-
Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997).
Because we held in Ivory’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 41(e) motion
that he had received sufficient notice of the forfeiture action, and no exceptions to
3
the law of the case doctrine are applicable, the district court did not err in finding
that the doctrine precluded review of Ivory’s claims raised in his Rule 60(b)
motion, which were based on his contention that he received insufficient notice of
the forfeiture proceedings.
AFFIRMED
4