USCA11 Case: 21-14192 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14192
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,
As Trustee for $3,160,000 The Med Clinic Bd,
City of Mgm-1976 E 1st Mortg Rev Bonds
(Oaks Partners 2 LLC Proj), Series 2010A
and $590,000 The Med Clinic Bd,
City of Mgm-1976 E 1st Mortg Rev Bonds
(Oaks Partners 2 LLC Proj), Taxable Series 2010B,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER F. BROGDON,
CONNIE B. BROGDON,
BROGDON FAMILY LLC,
USCA11 Case: 21-14192 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 21-14192
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00231-MHT-SMD
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Brogdons seek to invoke the defense of laches. But
laches is an equitable defense, and under Georgia law, parties may
not deploy equitable defenses against legal claims like this one. We
affirm.
I.
Although this dispute has a long history, only a few facts are
relevant to this appeal. In 2013, Wells Fargo Bank (as trustee for
several bonds) first sued Christopher F. Brogdon, Connie B.
Brogdon, and the Brogdon Family LLC. See Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. The Medical Clinic Bd. of the City of Montgomery – 1976
E., No. 2:13-cv-00003 (M.D. Ala. dismissed Aug. 1, 2017). Wells
Fargo sought to enforce a guaranty agreement that the Brogdons
had signed related to a bond indenture agreement.
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21-14192 Opinion of the Court 3
While this case was ongoing, the SEC sued the Brogdons for
securities fraud in New Jersey. See SEC v. Christopher Freeman
Brogdon, No. 2:15-cv-08173 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 20, 2015). In
connection with this suit, the New Jersey district court appointed a
monitor to help preserve the Brogdons’ assets and use them to
repay investors. It also stayed actions by the Brogdons’ creditors—
which included Wells Fargo. As a result, the Alabama district court
stayed Wells Fargo’s 2013 suit, which was later dismissed without
prejudice. Eventually, the New Jersey litigation ended for the
Brogdons, and they were ordered to disgorge almost $37 million
plus interest.
Just a few months later in April 2020, Wells Fargo sued the
Brogdons again. And once again, it sought to enforce the guaranty
agreement. The Brogdons had signed an amended guaranty
agreement in 2017 “to avoid any question” that they remained
liable for the relevant debt. When Wells Fargo moved for
summary judgment, the Brogdons countered that it had waited too
long—both to bring this suit and to respond to certain
communications with the monitor in the New Jersey case. These
delays, they argued, drove up their costs and justified a defense of
laches.
The district court rejected this theory. It stated that under
Georgia law, laches is available only in suits in equity, not for
actions at law like the one here. And even if laches were available,
it found that the Brogdons had not shown harm from the alleged
delays. They now appeal.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14192
II.
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.,
662 F.3d 1292,
1314 (11th Cir. 2011).
III.
Georgia recognizes the common law defense of laches, also
known as prejudicial delay. Collier v. State,
307 Ga. 363, 374 (2019).
In fact, it has codified the defense: “courts of equity may interpose
an equitable bar whenever, from the lapse of time and laches of the
complainant, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his
legal rights.” O.C.G.A. § 9-3-3.
For our purposes, the key word there is “equitable”—laches
is an “equitable doctrine not applicable” to actions at law. Jones v.
Douglas Cnty.,
262 Ga. 317, 320 (1992) (quotation omitted). The
rule that laches “cannot be applied to actions at law” is a “well
established notion” in Georgia law. Marsh v. Clarke Cnty. Sch.
Dist.,
292 Ga. 28, 29 (2012); see also Hasty v. Castleberry,
293 Ga.
727, 729 (2013); Stuckey v. Storms,
265 Ga. 491, 491 (1995).
Although a limited exception exists for mandamus actions (which
are “quasi-equitable” in nature), this exception is irrelevant here.
Marsh,
292 Ga. at 30.
Laches is unavailable to the Brogdons because this is an
action at law, not in equity. Wells Fargo seeks only money
damages under a guaranty agreement and attorneys’ fees, which
makes this an action at law. See Kenerly v. Bryant, 227 Ga. App.
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21-14192 Opinion of the Court 5
746, 748 (1997). Nowhere have the Brogdons contested this
characterization.
Instead, they offer a single case—Redfearn v. Huntcliff
Homes Association, Inc.—against the “well established” Georgia
law reserving laches to equitable actions.
271 Ga. 745 (1999). But
the Supreme Court of Georgia has already rejected this identical
maneuver: “Contrary to appellants’ contention otherwise,
Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn. did not abrogate this
fundamental rule.” VATACS Grp., Inc. v. HomeSide Lending,
Inc.,
281 Ga. 50, 50 (2006) (citation omitted). Instead, the “sole
issue” in Redfearn was whether the court had equity jurisdiction,
and the decision “did not, however, overrule the sound principle
of law that the equitable doctrine of laches is not applicable to an
action at law.” Id. at 51.
In short, because this is an action at law, the equitable
defense of laches has “no application here.” Hasty,
293 Ga. at 729.
For that reason, we need not address the Brogdons’ argument that
a jury must hear issues of material fact related to the defense of
laches.
* * *
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Wells Fargo.
