Reinaldo Jimenez-Perez v. Warden Donald Bauknecht , 180 F. App'x 896 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                    FILED
    ________________________         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    May 19, 2006
    No. 05-14652                  THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-00093-CV-3-MCR-EMT
    REINALDO JIMENEZ-PEREZ,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    WARDEN DONALD BAUKNECHT,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (May 19, 2006)
    Before DUBINA, CARNES AND HULL, Circuit Judges
    PER CURIAM:
    Reinaldo Jimenez-Perez (Jimenez), proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition for writ of habeas corpus. We
    affirm.
    We review a denial of habeas relief under § 2241 de novo. Skinner v.
    Wiley, 
    355 F.3d 1293
    , 1294 (11th Cir. 2004). Jimenez contends that the Bureau of
    Prisons has incorrectly interpreted 
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (b)(1), which sets forth
    guidelines for awarding service of sentence credits for good behavior. It provides:
    [A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1
    year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the
    prisoner’s life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s
    sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each
    year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of
    the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of
    Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary
    compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. . . .
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (b)(1) (emphasis added).
    According to the BOP’s interpretation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (b)(1), “term of
    imprisonment” means time actually served. Therefore, an inmate may earn good
    conduct time (GCT) credits based only on the time actually served and not on the
    sentence imposed.
    In Brown v. McFadden, 
    416 F.3d 1271
     (11th Cir. 2005), we considered
    precisely the same argument that Jimenez makes here. 
    Id.
     Brown involved a
    prisoner’s challenge to the BOP’s interpretation of § 3624 based on the argument
    that GCT should be calculated based on the length of the sentence imposed. Id.
    2
    Although we noted that the district court was “arguably correct” in finding that the
    plain language of § 3624 supported the BOP’s interpretation, we elected to follow
    the decisions of other circuits. Id. at 1273. Those decisions held that the language
    of § 3624 is ambiguous, but the BOP’s interpretation is reasonable. Id. These
    were our holdings:
    (1) 
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (b)(1) is ambiguous and does not unambiguously
    support either argument; that a federal prisoner should get good time
    credit of 54 days for each year he is sentenced to imprisonment, or
    that a federal prisoner should get good time credit of 54 days for each
    year he actually serves in prison;
    (2) Even though the statute is ambiguous, the BOP’s interpretation of
    the statute that a federal prisoner should get good time credit of 54
    days for each year he actually serves in prison is reasonable and
    therefore is due to be affirmed; and
    (3) The rule of lenity is inapplicable because of the BOP’s reasonable
    interpretation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (b)(1).
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    Jimenez contends that we should reconsider Brown in light of the Supreme
    Court’s decisions in Clark v. Martinez, 
    543 U.S. 371
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 716
    ,(2005), and
    Leocal v. Ashcroft. 
    543 U.S. 1
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 377
    , 160 (2004). “Under the prior panel
    rule, we are bound by the holdings of earlier panels unless and until they are
    clearly overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Swann v. S. Health Partners,
    Inc., 
    388 F.3d 834
    , 837 (11th Cir. 2004). The prior panel rule applies here because
    3
    Brown has not been overruled by an en banc panel or by the Supreme Court. See
    
    id.
     Clark and Leocal were decided before Brown and cannot overrule it.
    Also, Clark and Leocal do not specifically address the issues raised by this
    appeal. See Leocal, 
    543 U.S. at
    12 n.8, 8–13, 125 S. Ct. at 384; Clark, 
    543 U.S. at 380
    , 125 S. Ct. at 724. Therefore, Brown controls, and we affirm the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-14652; D.C. Docket 05-00093-CY-3-MCR-EMT

Citation Numbers: 180 F. App'x 896

Judges: Dubina, Carnes, Hull

Filed Date: 5/19/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024