Kelvin Frazier v. James R. McDonough , 264 F. App'x 812 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 6, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-13986
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00273-CV-3-LAC-MD
KELVIN FRAZIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 6, 2008)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kelvin Frazier, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis (“IFP”), appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his § 1983
action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim. After
review, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.1
I. BACKGROUND
A. Allegations in the Complaint
Frazier is an inmate at the Santa Rosa Correctional Institution in Florida.
We recount the allegations in his pro se complaint.
Frazier filed an administrative grievance against a prison guard, Sergeant
Hilburn. In response, Sergeant Hilburn took away Frazier’s dayroom privileges.
Frazier filed another administrative grievance, asserting that Sergeant Hilburn’s
actions were in retaliation for the first grievance.
Frazier learned that Sergeant Hilburn was telling other guards that he was
going “to get” Frazier for filing grievances. Frazier filed additional grievances
asserting that Sergeant Hilburn was threatening to retaliate.
While Frazier’s grievances were pending, Sergeant Hilburn wrote a
disciplinary report charging Frazier with disorderly conduct.2 On the same day,
1
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d
1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Sergeant Hilburn’s disciplinary report stated that as Frazier was exiting his cell,
Sergeant Hilburn directed Frazier to unroll his towel so it could be searched. Frazier became
agitated and began yelling at Sergeant Hilburn in a loud voice. Sergeant Hilburn told Frazier to
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Sergeant Hilburn told Frazier he did not care about the grievances Frazier had filed
and that Hilburn could “get” Frazier any time he liked. Prison officials denied
Frazier’s grievances initially and on administrative appeal, concluding that
Frazier’s allegations were unsubstantiated.3
After a hearing, the prison disciplinary team concluded that Frazier was
guilty of disorderly conduct. As a result of Sergeant Hilburn’s disciplinary report,
Frazier spent thirty days in disciplinary confinement; lost radio, canteen, visitation,
library, dayroom and phone call privileges; and suffered mental and emotional
distress and depression. The disciplinary team also refused to give him 23 days
worth of time credit. Frazier filed a grievance claiming that the disciplinary team
had refused him time credit in violation of prison rules and in retaliation for his
filing of other grievances. This grievance was also denied.
B. Relief Sought in the Complaint
In his complaint, Frazier alleged violations of the First, Eighth and
calm down and return to his cell. Frazier became more disorderly and moved his arms around.
Sergeant Hilburn again ordered Frazier to return to his cell, and Frazier complied.
3
Particularly, the form denying Frazier’s first grievance states that, during an interview,
Sergeant Hilburn stated that Frazier had failed to follow dayroom rules by talking while inmates
were still being “pulled for dayroom” and that Frazier was returned to his cell and received an
“unsat” rating. The denials of subsequent grievances stated that Sergeant Hilburn claimed he did
not threaten Frazier and that he wrote a disciplinary report because Frazier had become
disorderly and was “hollering” at him, conduct that other officers also witnessed. Investigating
officials concluded that the disciplinary report was warranted and not retaliatory.
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Fourteenth Amendments. Frazier made no claim for physical injury. Rather,
Frazier sought monetary damages for mental and emotional distress, depression
and psychological suffering. Frazier also sought punitive damages and “such other
relief as may appear that Plaintiff is entitled.”
A magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation (“R&R”),
recommending that Frazier’s complaint be dismissed pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The magistrate judge concluded that Frazier’s claims were
barred by the statutory physical-injury requirement contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e). Frazier filed objections to the R&R. The district court adopted the
R&R and dismissed Frazier’s complaint. Frazier filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Frazier argues that his complaint states a claim of First
Amendment retaliation.4 Under the First Amendment, a prison official may not
retaliate against an inmate for exercising the right of free speech. Farrow v. West,
320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). The prisoner can establish retaliation by
demonstrating that “the prison official’s actions were the result of his having filed
a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Id. (quotation marks
4
Frazier’s appellate brief makes only one passing reference to his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims and does not present any argument with respect to them. Thus, these claims
are abandoned. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003);
Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989).
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omitted). An inmate states a First Amendment claim where he alleges he was
retaliated against for filing a grievance. See Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d
1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal of retaliation claim and noting
that if the appellant establishes on remand that he was disciplined for filing a
grievance then he will have raised a constitutional issue). An inmate may seek
nominal damages for First Amendment violations. See Al-Amin v. Smith, ___
F.3d ___, 2008 WL 60018, at *14 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2008).
Here, Frazier alleged that he was subject to discipline in retaliation for filing
administrative grievances, facts which, if proven, would support a First
Amendment retaliation claim. However, Frazier did not allege any physical injury,
only mental and emotional injury.
Further, § 1997e(e) bars prisoner civil actions for “mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e).5 Under our case law, § 1997e(e) thus bars Frazier’s claims for
compensatory and punitive damages. See Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1287-
88 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Harris I”), vacated in part and reinstated in part on reh’g, 216
F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Harris II”) (affirming district court’s
5
Thus, “1997e(e) applies only to lawsuits involving (1) Federal civil actions (2) brought
by a prisoner (3) for mental or emotional injury (4) suffered while in custody.” Napier v.
Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002).
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dismissal of claims for compensatory and punitive damages as barred by
§ 1997e(e), but vacating and remanding with directions to enter dismissal without
prejudice); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that
under our case law § 1997e(e) precludes an inmate’s claims for compensatory and
punitive damages).
Despite this limitation, this Court has concluded that § 1997e(e) does not bar
claims for nominal damages. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1271; see Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003). In Hughes, we stated that “[n]ominal damages
are appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a fundamental constitutional
right, even if he cannot prove actual injury sufficient to entitle him to
compensatory damages.” Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 255, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1048 (1978)).
Here, as in Hughes, the district court dismissed Frazier’s complaint sua
sponte before the defendants were served. Thus, the district court did not consider
whether Frazier’s pro se complaint can be liberally construed to request nominal
damages. See id. at 1162-63. For this reason, as in Hughes, we remand to the
district court to consider Frazier’s potential nominal damages claim for the alleged
retaliation in the first instance.
Finally, the district court’s dismissal order did not specify that Frazier’s
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claims were dismissed without prejudice. Thus, the district court’s dismissal of
Frazier’s compensatory and punitive damages claims was an adjudication on the
merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (providing that, unless the district court’s order
“otherwise specifies,” involuntary dismissals are adjudications on the merits).
Dismissals of claims for monetary damages under § 1997e(e) “should be without
prejudice to re-filing the claim if and when the plaintiff is released.” Harris II, 216
F.3d at 980.
Accordingly, although we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Frazier’s
claims for compensatory and punitive damages, we vacate and remand with
directions that these claims are to be dismissed without prejudice. We further
vacate the district court’s dismissal of Frazier’s First Amendment retaliation claim
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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