McKinzie v. Secretary, Department of Corrections , 265 F. App'x 858 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 19, 2008
No. 07-11892 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00542-CV-T-24-EAJ
LEROY MCKINZIE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 19, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Leroy McKinzie, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s decision to dismiss, as procedurally barred, his claim in his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition that the state trial court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. We granted a
Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on the issue of “whether the district court
erred in denying as procedurally barred appellant’s claim that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction.” On appeal, McKinzie argues that the
substance of his argument before the state courts was that the State had failed to
meet its burden of establishing that he had concealed a firearm in a location that
was not his residence. He argued that his claim was one of insufficient evidence,
and it was fairly presented to the state courts. He contended that he referred to the
due process reasonable doubt standard before the state courts, which provided them
with an opportunity to address his federal constitutional rights.
We conduct a de novo review of a district court’s determination that a
habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from raising a claim in federal court.
Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 809 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 951(2007). In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner’s
claim that the evidence in support of his conviction was insufficient to have led a
rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes a
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federal constitutional claim that is cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding,
“assuming that state remedies have been exhausted, and that no independent and
adequate state ground stands as a bar.” 443 U.S. 307, 321, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2790
(1979) (internal citations omitted).
As Jackson indicates, before bringing a habeas petition in federal court, the
petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging
his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction motion, 443
U.S. at 322-23, 99 S. Ct. at 2791; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c). To exhaust state
remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]” his federal claims to the state court,
providing it with “an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing upon them.” Henry v. Dep’t of Corr., 197 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “If state courts are to be given the
opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must . . .
be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States
Constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S. Ct. 887, 888
(1995). However, the petitioner is not necessarily required to cite “book and verse
on the federal constitution.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509,
513 (1971) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has held that “ordinarily a state
prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read
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beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not alert it to the
presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion
in the case, that does so.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S. Ct. 1347,
1351 (2004). “It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal
claim were before the state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was
made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277, 74 L. Ed. 2d 3(1982).
“The purpose of a motion for judgment of acquittal is to test the legal
sufficiency of the evidence presented by the [S]tate.” Harris v. State, 954 So.2d
1260, 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The Florida Supreme Court has held that
there is “sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence
of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Baugh v. State, 961
So.2d 198, 204 (Fla. 2007). The statutory provisions with respect to a concealed
firearm do not apply when an individual possesses the firearm within his own
home. Fla. Stat. § 790.25(3)(n) (2006).
We may review the merits of a claim in the first instance when a district
court improperly finds that a claim is procedurally barred. See Peoples v.
Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004).
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In reviewing a state court’s decision denying habeas relief, we are prohibited
from granting habeas relief unless the state decision was (1) “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Moreover, factual findings of state
courts are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner can rebut them only by clear
and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if either
“(1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by
Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts,
the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court
case.” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). An “unreasonable
application” of clearly established federal law may occur if the state court
“identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably
applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case.” Id. “An unreasonable
application may also occur if a state court unreasonably extends, or unreasonably
declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new
context.” Id. A state court’s summary, unexplained rejection of a constitutional
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issue qualifies as an adjudication that is entitled to deference. Wright v. Sec’y for
Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). For § 2254(d)(1) to apply,
the state court is required only to reject a claim on the merits, not to provide an
explanation. Id. at 1255. A state court decision “that does not rest on procedural
grounds alone is an adjudication on the merits, regardless of the form in which it is
expressed.” Id. at 1255-56.
The Supreme Court has held that, in an appeal that challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, the “critical inquiry” is “whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89. The Supreme Court noted that
it is the duty of the trier of fact “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts,” and
a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to whether it believes the
evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. In weighing the sufficiency of
the evidence, it is not required that the evidence rule out every hypothesis except
that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin v. State of Alabama, 730 F.2d 721,
724 (11th Cir. 1984).
Florida law prohibits an individual from “carry[ing] a concealed firearm on
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or about his or her person.” Fla. Stat. § 790.01(2) (1995). A concealed firearm is
defined “as any firearm carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal
the firearm from the ordinary sight of another person.” Dorelus v. State, 747 So.2d
368, 370 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 790-001(2)). The firearm need not be
absolutely invisible. Id. at 370-371.
Here, necessarily underlying the state court decisions was a determination
that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a concealment conviction, a standard
identical to federal sufficiency review. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court erred in finding this claim procedurally barred. However, the evidence in
this case, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, demonstrates that a
rational juror could have found McKinzie guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
concealing a firearm. The state courts did not unreasonably apply Jackson.
Because we conclude from the record that McKinzie’s underlying due
process claim is without merit, we affirm the denial of habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
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