Sharon Bridgewater vs DeKalb County , 430 F. App'x 837 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15276 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 16, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-01082-ODE
SHARON BRIDGEWATER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DEKALB COUNTY,
by and through Vernon Jones, Chief,
N. T. MARTINELLI,
Executive Officer; Chief of Police for the
DeKalb County Police Department,
C. SCHREINER,
Police Officer; #2491; Individually and in her
official capacity as the arresting Officer,
DETECTIVE GEORGE,
individually and in his/her official capacity
as Detective.,
LIEUTENANT HAMILTON,
Individually and in her/his official capacity
as Lieutenant,
DOES 1 THROUGH 50,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 16, 2011)
Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sharon Bridgewater, proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against Dekalb County, the Dekalb County Chief of Police, and various Dekalb
County police officers, asserting claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The action stems from events that occurred in October and
November 2007 in Georgia. Bridgewater filed the complaint in April 2010, more
than two years after either event. The district court sua sponte dismissed her
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), finding that it was time barred.
Bridgewater appears to contend that the statute of limitations should have been
tolled under Georgia Code § 9-3-99 while “[c]harges were pending against [her]
from 2007 thru [sic] 2009” for “theft by taking.”1
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to
1
“We construe pro se pleadings liberally.” H&R Block E. Enter., Inc. v. Morris, 606
F.3d 1285, 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010).
2
state a claim under to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), viewing all allegations in the
complaint as true. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489–90 (11th Cir. 1997).
The length of the limitations period governing a § 1983 action is dictated by state
law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1094 (2007). “[T]he
proper limitations period for all section 1983 claims in Georgia is the two year
period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 for personal injuries.” Williams v. City of
Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33.
Georgia provides for statutory tolling of tort claims arising from a crime
until the prosecution of the person who committed that crime is final. GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-99. That tolling, however, is expressly limited to “any cause of action
in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime.” Id. (emphasis
added). Bridgewater admits that she was not the victim of the alleged crime, but
instead she was the defendant charged with the crime. See Valades v. Uslu, 689
S.E.2d 338, 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). Therefore, § 9-3-99 did not toll the two-year
statute of limitations period.2
AFFIRMED.
2
Even liberally construing Bridgewater’s largely incomprehensible brief, she does not
appear to make any additional arguments in it. Therefore, any additional arguments are
abandoned. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“If
an argument is not fully briefed . . . we deem [it] abandoned and do not address its merits.”).
3