United States v. Josny Charlestain ( 2013 )


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  •             Case: 12-16085   Date Filed: 08/05/2013   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-16085
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:12-cr-80054-WJZ-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOSNY CHARLESTAIN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 5, 2013)
    Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 12-16085     Date Filed: 08/05/2013    Page: 2 of 8
    Appellant Josny Charlestain appeals his 108-month above guideline-range
    total sentence imposed by the district court for possession of a firearm and
    ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), and
    possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person subject to a domestic violence
    order, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(8). He argues that the district court erred
    by admitting evidence about an unrelated 2009 murder for which he was charged
    but not prosecuted, applying an aggravating role sentencing enhancement, and
    imposing an unreasonable sentence which was far above the Guideline range. We
    address each point in turn.
    I.
    We review a “district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de
    novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Grant, 
    397 F.3d 1330
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). Where a defendant raises a sentencing issue for the
    first time on appeal, plain error review applies. See United States v. Aguillard,
    
    217 F.3d 1319
    , 1320 (11th Cir. 2000). “For this Court to correct plain error:
    (1) there must be error; (2) the error must be plain; and (3) the error must affect
    substantial rights.” 
    Id. at 1320
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Federal law provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
    concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
    offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
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    purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3661
     (emphasis
    added). That includes hearsay, so long as it is sufficiently reliable, and evidence
    that may not be admissible at trial, as long as the defendant has a chance to rebut
    the evidence. United States v. Baker, 
    432 F.3d 1189
    , 1253-54 & n.68 (11th Cir.
    2005). The Supreme Court has noted that, at sentencing, the district court has
    broad discretion to consider “the fullest information possible concerning the
    defendant’s life and characteristics.” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. __, __, 
    131 S. Ct. 1229
    , 1235-36 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that
    a court may even consider relevant acquitted conduct so long as that conduct is
    proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Faust, 
    456 F.3d 1342
    , 1348 (11th Cir. 2006).
    The Guidelines similarly provide that in deciding whether to sentence a
    defendant within or outside of the Guideline range, the court can consider any
    information about the defendant’s background, character, and conduct, unless it is
    otherwise illegal to do so. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. Moreover, under Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 32, the court may allow the parties to introduce evidence
    regarding objections to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) during
    sentencing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(2).
    We conclude from the record that the district court did not err, plainly or
    otherwise, in admitting evidence about the 2009 homicide because it was relevant
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    to the district court’s consideration of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, such as
    Charlestain’s background and characteristics, and the need to provide adequate
    deterrence, prevent additional gun-related crimes, and protect the public.
    II.
    We review for clear error the district court’s determination that a defendant
    is subject to an aggravating-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). United
    States v. Jiminez, 
    224 F.3d 1243
    , 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2000). We review the district
    court’s application and legal interpretations of the Guidelines de novo. United
    States v. Zaldivar, 
    615 F.3d 1346
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Section 3B1.1(c) subjects a defendant to a two-level enhancement “[i]f the
    defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal
    activity” [other than one that involves five or more participants or is otherwise
    extensive]. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). A defendant’s assertion of control over only one
    other participant is sufficient to sustain a § 3B1.1(c) role enhancement.
    Id. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.2); United States v. Mandhai, 
    375 F.3d 1243
    , 1248
    (11th Cir. 2004). A “participant” is a person who is criminally responsible for the
    offense, even if not convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1). In Mandhai, we
    determined that the district court properly applied a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement where
    the defendant recruited one other individual into a terrorist plot, prompted that
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    individual to purchase weapons, and briefed him on the bombing plan. Mandhai,
    
    375 F.3d at 1248
    .
    We conclude from the record that the district court did not clearly err by
    applying the aggravating role enhancement because it was entitled to conclude that
    Charlestain directed his wife to buy the guns involved in the instant offenses.
    III.
    We review the sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness and
    evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion.
    Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 594 (2007); United States v.
    Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 785 (11th Cir. 2005). Application of a variance is likewise
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    , 
    128 S. Ct. at 597-98
    . After
    Irizarry v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 708
    , 714-16, 
    128 S. Ct. 2198
    , 2202-04 (2008), a
    district court’s grant of a variance does not require prior notice of the grounds
    contemplated for a sentence above the range. We will only vacate a sentence when
    “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
    error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
    lies outside the range of reasonable sentences.” United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
    review only a defendant’s final sentence, and not each individual decision made
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    during the sentencing process, for reasonableness. See United States v. Dorman,
    
    488 F.3d 936
    , 938 (11th Cir. 2007).
    When reviewing a sentence, we must first determine that the “district court
    committed no significant procedural error,” United States v. McGarity, 
    669 F.3d 1218
    , 1263 (11th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 378
     (2012), and a sentence may be considered procedurally reasonable where the
    district court considered the parties’ arguments and provided a reasoned basis for
    its choice of sentence, see Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356-58, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2468-69 (2007). If the district court’s decision is procedurally reasonable,
    our analysis then turns to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    , 128 S. Ct. at 597. We review the totality of the facts and circumstances
    to gauge for substantive error. Irey, 
    612 F.3d at 1189-90
    . “[T]he party who
    challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is
    unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).”
    Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 788
    . The § 3553(a) factors include:
    (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
    characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
    of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
    punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
    protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
    educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
    sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
    policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
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    avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
    restitution to victims.
    Id. at 786 (summarizing 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)). In United States v. Scott, 
    426 F.3d 1324
     (11th Cir. 2005), we noted that, “nothing in [United States v.] Booker[, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005),] or elsewhere requires the district court to state on
    the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to
    discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 1329. An acknowledgment that the
    court considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors is adequate
    under Booker. Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 786
    .
    “A district court abuses its discretion when it . . . gives significant weight to
    an improper or irrelevant factor . . . .” Irey, 
    612 F.3d at 1189
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum is an
    indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    ,
    1324 (11th Cir. 2008). When uncertainty exists as to whether the district court
    applied an upward variance or an upward departure, the court considers:
    (1) whether the court referenced a particular Guideline departure provision; and
    (2) whether the court based its decision on a belief that the Guidelines were not
    adequate. United States v. Kapordelis, 
    569 F.3d 1291
    , 1316 (11th Cir. 2009).
    We conclude from the record that Charlestain’s total sentence was
    procedurally and substantively reasonable. First, the record demonstrates that the
    district court imposed an upward variance rather than a departure, and as to
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    procedural reasonableness, it correctly calculated the advisory Guideline range.
    Charlestain has not met his burden of showing that his sentence was substantively
    unreasonable. The court held two sentencing hearings, heard testimony from
    numerous witnesses, considered the parties’ arguments, and discussed the
    § 3553(a) factors before deciding that a sentence above the Guideline range was
    warranted to reflect the full extent of Charlestain’s criminal history, violent
    characteristics, danger to the public, and the need for deterrence. In noting that it
    had considered the parties’ positions, the Guidelines, and the statutory factors, the
    court satisfied Talley. Charlestain’s sentence was also well below the statutory
    maximum.
    For the above-stated resons, we affirm Charlestain’s total sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
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