United States v. Elvin Irizzary ( 2006 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUG 4, 2006
    No. 05-10510                    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                   CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 92-06138-CR-WJZ
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ELVIN IRIZZARY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (August 4, 2006)
    Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Elvin Irizzary appeals the district court's denial of his motion for
    modification of his sentence, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Irizzary argues
    that the district court erred in denying his motion to modify his sentence because
    Amendments 598 and 599, which altered the language of Application Notes 1 and
    2 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, are retroactive and show that he was double-punished for
    the discharge of a firearm while committing a robbery and kidnapping.
    We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant
    to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Vautier, 
    144 F.3d 756
    , 759 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998). We review de novo a double-counting claim.
    United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 
    188 F.3d 1300
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2), a district court has discretion to reduce the
    term of imprisonment of an already incarcerated defendant when the defendant’s
    sentence was based upon a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by
    the United States Sentencing Commission. United States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    ,
    780 (11th Cir. 2000). Before granting a sentence modification, however, a district
    court must consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are
    applicable, and evaluate whether such a reduction is “consistent with the applicable
    policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).
    Thus, the law permits, but does not require, a district court to resentence a
    defendant under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Brown, 
    104 F.3d 1254
    , 1255 (11th
    Cir. 1997). Moreover, only amendments listed in § 1B1.10(c) may be applied
    2
    retroactively through a 3582(c)(2) motion. United States v. Pelaez, 
    196 F.3d 1203
    ,
    1205 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999).
    Amendment 598 is not listed in § 1B1.10(c). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). It
    thus may not be applied retroactively. Therefore, the district court correctly
    refused to apply Amendement 598 to Irizzary.
    Amendment 599 may be applied retroactively. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (Nov.
    2000). Amendment 599 affects the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 and provides
    that if a sentence under this guideline (i.e., a 60-month mandatory sentence as
    required by 18 U.S.C § 924(c) for use of a firearm) is imposed in conjunction with
    a sentence for an underlying offense, the sentencing court may not apply any
    specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an
    explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense.
    See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 599 (Nov. 2000). Amendment 599 further provides
    that a sentence under § 2K2.4 accounts for any explosive or weapon enhancement
    for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such enhancement that
    would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable as relevant
    conduct. Id.
    At the time Irizzary was sentenced in 1992, Amendment 489 had just
    changed application note 2 to § 2K2.4 to the version that appeared in the
    3
    sentencing guidelines prior to Amendment 599. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 489
    (Nov. 1993). Amendment 489 eliminated the subtraction formula from the
    previous version of the guidelines, and allowed the district court to upwardly
    depart to the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there
    been no conviction under § 924(c). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, comment. (n.2).
    In 1993, Application Note 2 provided as follows:
    Where a sentence under this section is imposed in conjunction with a
    sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense characteristic
    for the possession, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm (e.g.,
    § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(F) (Robbery)) is not to be applied in respect to the
    guideline for the underlying offense.
    In a few cases, the offense level for the underlying offense determined
    under the preceding paragraph may result in a guideline range that,
    when combined with the mandatory consecutive sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h), § 924(c), or § 929(a), produces a total maximum
    penalty that is less than the maximum of the guideline range that
    would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h), § 924(c), or § 929(a) (i.e., the guideline range that
    would have resulted if the enhancement for possession, use, or
    discharge of a firearm had been applied). In such a case, an upward
    departure may be warranted so that the conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h), § 924(c), or § 929(a) does not result in a decrease in total
    punishment. An upward departure under this paragraph shall not
    exceed the maximum guideline range that would have resulted had
    there not been a count of conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h),
    § 924(c), or § 929(a).
    U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, comment. (n.2) (Nov. 1993). In 2000, Application Note 2
    stated:
    If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a
    4
    sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense
    characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an
    explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying
    offense. A sentence under this guideline accounts for any explosive
    or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of conviction,
    including any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct
    for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant
    Conduct). Do not apply any weapon enhancement in the guideline for
    the underlying offense, for example, if (A) a co-defendant, as part of
    the jointly undertaken criminal activity, possessed a firearm different
    from the one for which the defendant was convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). However, if a defendant is convicted of two armed bank
    robberies, but is convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) in connection
    with only one of the robberies, a weapon enhancement would apply to
    the bank robbery which was not the basis of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)
    conviction.
    [. . .]
    In a few cases, the offense level for the underlying offense determined
    under the preceding paragraphs may result in a guideline range that,
    when combined with the mandatory consecutive sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h), § 924(c) or § 929(a), produces a total maximum
    penalty that is less than the maximum of the guideline range that
    would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h), § 924(c) or § 929(a) (i.e., the guideline range that
    would have resulted if the enhancements for possession, use, or
    discharge of a firearm had been applied). In such a case, an upward
    departure may be warranted so that the conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h), § 924(c) or § 929(a) does not result in a decrease in the total
    punishment. An upward departure under this paragraph shall not
    exceed the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted
    had there not been a count of conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (h),
    § 924(c) or § 929(a).
    U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, comment. (n.2) (Nov. 2000). In 2002, Amendment 642
    redesignated Application Note 2 as Application Note 4. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend.
    5
    642 (Nov. 2002).
    The purpose of Amendment 599 is merely “to clarify under what
    circumstances defendants sentenced for violations of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) in
    conjunction with convictions for other offenses may receive weapon enhancements
    contained in the guidelines for those other offenses.” U.S.S.G. App. C, amend.
    599 (Nov. 2000), “Reason for Amendment.” Irizzary did not receive a weapons
    enhancement to his offense level; rather, the district court departed upward as
    suggested in application note 2. The final paragraph of application note 2 was not
    changed by Amendment 599. Thus, after Amendment 599, district courts are still
    permitted to depart upward to the maximum guideline range that would have
    resulted had there been no conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4,
    comment. (n.2) (Nov. 2000). Because Irizzary received an upward departure, and
    not a weapons enhancement, Amendment 599 does not apply to his sentence.
    Irizzary’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to an upward departure based on
    Amendment 489. Amendment 599 does not affect these changes to the guidelines
    made by Amendment 489. Thus, Amendment 599 does not apply to Irizzary. The
    district court did not err in refusing to apply this Amendment.
    The judgment of the district court is
    6
    AFFIRMED.1
    1
    Irizzary’s other arguments on appeal are rejected without need for further discussion.
    Irizzary’s request for oral argument is denied.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-10510

Judges: Anderson, Dubina, Hull, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 8/4/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024