United States v. Christopher Allen Williams ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 13, 2011
No. 10-14385 JOHN LEY
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:10-cr-00001-WTM-GRS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 13, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Allen Williams appeals his two concurrent 48-month sentences
after a jury found him guilty of aiding and abetting Mario Weston to commit two
bank robberies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). At trial, Williams testified
that, although he drove Weston to the banks, he did not know that Weston
intended to, or in fact did, rob the banks until a dye pack exploded in the car as
they were about to drive away from the second bank. On appeal, Williams argues
that the district court erred by imposing a two-level obstruction-of-justice
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for committing perjury at his trial.
“We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings necessary for
an obstruction of justice enhancement based on perjury and accord great deference
to the district court’s credibility determinations.” United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d
756, 763 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation, ellipsis, and alteration omitted).
Section “3C1.1 provides for a two level enhancement for defendants who
willfully obstruct or impede, or attempt to obstruct or impede, the administration
of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
instant offense of conviction.” Id. at 762–63 (citation, ellipsis, and alterations
omitted); see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The commentary to § 3C1.1 makes clear that the
enhancement applies when the defendant commits perjury during his trial.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(b)). In order for a court to find that a defendant
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perjured himself: “(1) the testimony must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the
testimony must be false; (3) the testimony must be material; and (4) the testimony
must be given with the willful intent to provide false testimony and not as a result
of a mistake, confusion, or faulty memory.” Singh, 291 F.3d at 763 n.4.
In this case, the district court found that Williams committed perjury by
deliberately providing untruthful testimony at his trial in an attempt to avoid guilt.
Contrary to Williams’s argument, the district court did not make this finding
merely because the jury returned a guilty verdict after he testified in his own
defense. Rather, the court independently found that his testimony was not truthful,
emphasizing that: Williams had a prior association with Weston, who had recently
been released from prison; when Weston entered the banks, Williams parked in a
manner that concealed his car and allowed for a speedy escape; Williams did not
stop driving when the dye pack exploded; and Williams was not a naive person in
light of his college education and service in the Marine Corps. We further point
out that a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified at trial
that Williams admitted knowing Weston’s true purpose and acting as Weston’s
driver after the first incident. In sum, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Williams committed perjury, and we therefore affirm the court’s
two-level enhancement and Williams’s sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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