United States v. Nicholas Paul Godsey , 224 F. App'x 896 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 19, 2007
No. 06-14081 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00116-CR-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NICHOLAS PAUL GODSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(March 19, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I.
Nicolas Paul Godsey, who was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.
II.
In October 2003, Officer Darryl Wilson of the Bayou La Batre police
department participated in an investigation of Godsey, who was a state probationer
at the time. As a result of the investigation, two arrest warrants were issued for
Godsey, one for rape and another for furnishing a controlled substance to a minor.
In early November 2003, Wilson contacted Deloris Bagsby, an employee of the
Mobile County Community Corrections Center (“MCCCC”) and Godsey’s
probation officer. Bagsby referred the matter to John Branscomb, a subordinate
county probation officer who at times had visited Godsey as part of Godsey’s
probation. Wilson related to Branscomb that warrants had been issued for
Godsey’s arrest. Wilson then requested that Branscomb accompany him to
Godsey’s residence at the time the warrants were served for the purpose of
conducting a search. Branscomb agreed.
On the morning of November 13, 2003, Wilson, Branscomb, and a Bayou
La Batre police officer arrived at Godsey’s trailer home. When Godsey opened the
door, he was arrested. Wilson handcuffed Godsey and explained his rights.
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According to Branscomb, Godsey stated that he wanted to cooperate. After a
second individual in the trailer was arrested for possession of Ecstacy, Branscomb
explained to Godsey that, as a probation officer, he had the right to search the
residence. Godsey then shook his head in agreement, although he denies that he
consented to the ensuing search. Branscomb proceeded to search the house,
including using keys found in the house to open a locked room and a safe. During
his search of the residence, Branscomb located drugs and weapons. As a result,
Godsey was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 46 grams of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and using and carrying a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c).
Godsey moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, asserting that
the probation officer lacked a warrant or probable cause for the search. Godsey
also denied that he had consented to the search. The district court denied the
motion to suppress, finding that the county probation officer had operated under
state regulations authorizing searches of probationers’ residences upon reasonable
grounds, and that the arrest warrants here established reasonable suspicion to
conduct the search. The district court found that, to the extent a diminished
privacy interest was relevant to its analysis, the very fact that Godsey was on
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probation demonstrated its existence. The district court also found that Godsey
waived any argument that a state probationer was different from a county
probationer because he cited no authority to support this claim. Finally, the district
court found that, even if there was no county regulation, the motion failed because
other courts had found that such searches were constitutional as long as supported
by reasonable suspicion, and there was no requirement that the probationer be on
notice.
Godsey moved for reconsideration, asserting that the information supporting
the arrest warrants was stale, therefore, the probation officer did not have
reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. Godsey then pleaded
guilty to both counts of the indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement in
which he retained the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.
Godsey was sentenced to 96 months on the drug count and a consecutive
mandatory 60 months on the firearm count, for a total of 156 months
imprisonment.
III.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo,
reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the
district court. United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005);
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United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 824 (11th Cir. 1996).
IV.
“It is always true of probationers . . . that they do not enjoy the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3169, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987) (citation and
internal quotations omitted). In Griffin, a Wisconsin regulation permitted a
probation officer to conduct a warrantless search of a probationer’s home if there
were “reasonable grounds” to believe the probationer was in violation of his
probation. Id. at 870-71. The Supreme Court upheld the search, concluding that
the regulation was justified by the “special needs” of a state’s probation system.
Id. at 876.
In this case, Godsey argues that the search was improper in the absence of a
regulation such as that described in Griffin. Alabama does, however, have a
regulation similar to that in Griffin, although it is part of the state probation
system. Godsey alleges that because the probation officer who conducted the
search of his home was a county probation officer, the state regulation did not
apply and did not grant him the authority to conduct the search. The county
program responsible for overseeing Godsey’s probation was created by the court
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system as an alternative program for youthful offenders and was modeled after the
state system. Furthermore, though the MCCCC was not formally connected to the
state system, the MCCCC did not have its own independent regulations and
Branscomb testified that he assumed the authority to search probationers’ homes,
as described in the state regulations, extended to county probation officers.
Therefore, the distinction advanced by Godsey is a distinction without a difference,
and we conclude that the state regulations did give Branscomb authority to search
the probationer’s home if the search was properly supported by reasonable
suspicion. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
Reasonable suspicion consists of “a sufficiently high probability that
criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy
interest reasonable.” Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311.
When making a determination of reasonable suspicion, [this court]
must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see
whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting legal wrongdoing. It is clear that an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity is not enough
to satisfy the minimum level of objectivity required.
Id. (citing United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 970 (11th Cir. 2003)). The
officer must “be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id.(citing United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1107 (11th Cir. 2003)).
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In this case, police notified the MCCCC that arrest warrants for rape and a
controlled substance offense had been issued for Godsey. This information was
sufficient to give reasonable suspicion that Godsey had violated the terms of his
supervised release. As reasonable suspicion may arise from the officers’ collective
knowledge, it is of no matter that Branscomb received the information second
hand. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, in
light of the arrest warrants and the information from police and Branscomb’s
supervisor, we conclude that Branscomb had reasonable suspicion to support the
search, and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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