Williams v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections , 195 F. App'x 939 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 15, 2006
No. 05-16817 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-60356-CV-CMA
CHARLES WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
James McDonough, Secretary,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 15, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Williams, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams was arrested for sexual abuse of a child. At the time of his arrest,
after he had been read and had waived his Miranda warnings, Williams stated,
“This is being blown out of proportion. I’ve touched her; she is always teasing me,
but I don’t want to incriminate myself.” After he made the statement, the officer
that arrested Williams ceased his questioning.
At trial, the prosecution used Williams’s statement to the arresting officer
three times. On each occasion, Williams’s attorney objected and argued that the
prosecutor had commented on Williams’s right to remain silent. The trial court
overruled each objection and found that Williams’s statement was appropriate as
part of his confession.
On direct appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the
admission of the statement. See Williams v. State, 755 So.2d 714, 717 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999). On collateral review before the Florida courts, Williams argued
that his counsel was ineffective for failure to suppress the incriminating statement
before trial. The Florida courts ruled that the claim was procedurally barred
because Williams had raised the issue on direct appeal.
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On federal habeas review, the district court ruled that Williams’s counsel
was not ineffective for failure to move to suppress the incriminating statement
because there was not a reasonable probability that the trial court would have
granted the motion. The district court also ruled that the affirmance on direct
appeal of the decision to admit the statement was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In examining a federal district court’s denial of a [section] 2254 habeas
petition, we review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.”
Occhicone v. Crosby, 455 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
a federal district court may not grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a
state prisoner
. . . with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “A state-court decision will . . . be contrary to [the Supreme
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Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [those] cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 405, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). “A state-court decision will also be
contrary to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that]
precedent.” Id. at 406, 120 S. Ct. at 1519-20. “[W]hen a state-court decision
unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s
case, a federal court applying [section] 2254(d)(1) may conclude that the
state-court decision falls within that provision’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause.”
Id. at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521. The factual determinations of the state court “shall
be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
III. DISCUSSION
A defendant has a right to remain silent, and the invocation of that right
cannot be used against the defendant. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611, 96 S. Ct.
2240, 2241 (1976). To avail himself of the right to remain silent, a defendant must
make an unequivocal invocation of that right. Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d
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1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994); see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62, 114
S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994). The “primary protection afforded suspects subject to
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.” Davis, 512 U.S. at
460, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. Whether an invocation of the right to silence is
unequivocal is determined by an objective inquiry. Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d
1095, 1101 (11th Cir. 1995).
Williams argues that his counsel was ineffective for failure to obtain the
suppression of Williams’s statement that Williams “[didn’t] want to incriminate
[himself].” Williams argues that the statement was an invocation of his right to
remain silent and its admission violated his right to due process. We disagree.
Because Williams’s equivocal statement regarding his desire not to
incriminate himself could be construed as part of his admission, the determination
of the Florida courts that Williams’s statement was not an invocation of his right to
remain silent was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Supreme Court precedent. Likewise, Williams’s counsel was not
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress Williams’s statement because the
statement was admissible. There is no likelihood that a motion to suppress the
statement would have been granted.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The denial of Williams’s petition for habeas corpus is
AFFIRMED.
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