Dennis Dean Cooper v. State of Florida , 196 F. App'x 793 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 5, 2006
No. 06-10731 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00216-CV-4-MMP-AK
DENNIS DEAN COOPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA,
CHARLES CRIST,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 5, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dennis Dean Cooper, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
dismissal of his § 1983 complaint challenging his court of conviction’s exclusion
of certain evidence. Because Cooper’s claim, if successful, will not invalidate his
conviction, the district court improperly determined that Cooper’s claim is Heck-
barred.1 Because the record is insufficient to ascertain any other basis for
dismissal, we vacate and remand.
I. Background
Cooper filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of
Florida and Attorney General Charles Crist, alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated because the state’s evidence rules did not recognize his defense of
diminished responsibility, which he attempted to present in his earlier criminal
trial. Cooper noted that the state is permitted to submit evidence of the defendant’s
mental state, but the defendant is prohibited from doing so. He requested $250,000
in damages and a declaratory judgment that the rules violated his constitutional
rights.
The magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed as
Heck-barred because Cooper challenged his conviction and his only available
1
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
2
remedy was under habeas relief.2 Cooper objected, asserting that Heck did not bar
his claim, because even if he were successful, his conviction would not necessarily
be invalidated, as the jury could still convict him after hearing the evidence. In
support of his argument, he cited Dotson v. Wilkinson, 329 F.3d 463 (6th Cir.
2003).
Over Cooper’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and dismissed the complaint, finding the claims Heck-barred.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a suit for failure
to state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Harden v. Pataki, 320
F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003); Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001). “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the prisoner can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407,
1409 (11th Cir. 1984). In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint under the PLRA,
we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe pro se pleadings
liberally. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004).
2
The magistrate judge did not state the basis for the dismissal, but presumably he
conducted the required screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, and found that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
3
III. Discussion
Cooper argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint as
Heck did not apply because: (1) he is seeking damages, (2) his success would not
necessarily invalidate his conviction, and (3) Dotson explains that suits challenging
the procedures used for convictions may proceed. He asserts that allowing both
parties or neither party to submit evidence of mental state would cure the defect,
and neither result would necessarily invalidate his conviction.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “to recover damages for
an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused
by action whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Thus, “the
district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the
complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. However, when
“the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
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outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to
proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id. (emphasis in original;
footnotes omitted).
Here, the district court erred when it concluded that the claim was Heck-
barred because, even if Cooper was successful, it would not necessarily invalidate
his conviction. Compare Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that “[b]ecause an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid
conviction, a successful § 1983 action for Fourth Amendment search and seizure
violations does not imply the invalidity of the conviction. As a result, Heck does
not generally bar such claims.”), with Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1064, 1065
(11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants
“knowingly and willfully conspired to convict him falsely by fabricating testimony
and other evidence against him” was barred under Heck because “[j]udgment in
favor of Abella on these claims [that the defendants unconstitutionally conspired to
convict him of crimes he did not commit] ‘would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction.’”). Even with evidence of Cooper’s alleged mental state at the
time of the offense, a jury would still have the option of convicting Cooper.
Accordingly, the district court erred in finding the complaint Heck-barred.3
3
We note that attacks on the constitutional application of a state’s evidence rules are
generally brought under habeas and that federal courts are reluctant to override a state’s
5
The record does not contain sufficient information for us to determine
whether there were proper bases for dismissal. Therefore, we REVERSE the
district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
evidentiary decision unless the state court ruling rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair.
Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, because his
success would not invalidate his conviction and because of the remedy he seeks, it does not
appear that habeas was the exclusive remedy for Cooper’s claim. Cf. Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d
1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002).
6