John J. Eley v. Baptist Hospital Worth County , 199 F. App'x 757 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-12621 September 12, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00086-CV-WLS-1
JOHN J. ELEY,
LORI A. ELEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BAPTIST HOSPITAL WORTH COUNTY INCORPORATED,
M.D. EDWIN ADOLFO HERRERA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
(September 12, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants, Dr. John L. Eley (“Eley”) and Lori A. Eley (referred to
collectively as “the Eleys”), appeal the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to defendants/appellees, Baptist Hospital Worth County, Inc. (“the
hospital”), Dr. Edwin Adolfo Herrera (“Dr. Herrera”), and various nurses and
hospital employees, on the Eleys’ claim of medical malpractice. Eley alleges that
the defendants’ acts and omissions while he was in the hospital caused him to
develop reflex sympathetic distrophy n/k/a complex regional pain syndrome – type
I (“RSD”). Eley also alleges that the RSD has rendered him permanently injured
and permanently disabled. In support of his claim, Eley presents testimony from
four medical experts: Nancy Moureau, a licensed registered nurse, Dr. Richard
Hoffman, a psychologist, Dr. Robert Schelper, a pathologist, and Dr. Anthony
Kirkpatrick, a pain management specialist.
DISCUSSION
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis
that the Eleys did not present any admissible expert testimony that Eley’s RSD
was caused by defendants’ negligence. We review de novo the district court’s
order granting summary judgment, applying the same legal standards that bound
the district court. Giddens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 445 F.3d
1286, 1292 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2006).
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In a diversity case , liability is determined in accordance with the law of the
state where the alleged wrong occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). Georgia law controls this case
because it is a case of medical malpractice where the alleged tortious acts were
committed in Georgia. To make a claim for medical malpractice in Georgia, a
plaintiff must prove: “(1) the duty inherent in the health care provider-patient
relationship; (2) breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of
skill and care; and (3) that this failure is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained.” Smith v. Am. Transitional Hosps., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361
(S.D. Ga. 2004) (quoting Knight v. West Paces Ferry Hosp., Inc., 585 S.E.2d 104,
105, 262 Ga. App. 220 (Ga. App. 2003)). In order to prove the causation prong, a
plaintiff must present expert medical testimony. See Smith, 330 F. Supp. 2d at
1363.
The record demonstrates that the Eleys failed to present the requisite
credible expert testimony to support proof of causation, and they are therefore
unable to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against the
defendants. At most, the Eleys’ nurse expert opines that the IV therapy was
improperly administered under established standards. However, the Eleys do not
present competent medical expert opinion that the improper administration of the
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IV therapy was a cause of Eley’s RSD. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
AFFIRMED.
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