Martin G. Chestnut v. James McDonough ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-14460 OCTOBER 5, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-14197-CV-KMM
MARTIN G. CHESTNUT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES MCDONOUGH, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections,
CHARLIE CRIST,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 5, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Martin G. Chestnut (“Chestnut”), a Florida state prisoner serving
a 270-month sentence for sexual battery on a person 12 years of age or older but
less than 18 years old, proceeding pro se, challenges the district court’s denial of
his pro se federal habeas petition, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On
appeal, Chestnut argues that trial counsel’s failure to object on hearsay grounds to
the inadmissible testimony of the victim’s mother, the victim’s friend, and a
pediatric nurse falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, was deficient
performance, and was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. Chestnut also argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance while cross-examining the victim by “opening the door” to highly
prejudicial and otherwise inadmissible evidence of uncharged collateral sexual
misconduct.1
We review de novo a district court’s determination as to whether the
standard for granting a § 2254 petition has been met. Van Poyck v. Florida Dep’t
of Corrs., 290 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002). Where a state prisoner’s claim
has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal courts may only grant
habeas relief where the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
1
We granted a certificate of appealability as to these two issues only.
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Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“The ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses of § 2254(d)(1)
are separate bases for reviewing a state court’s decisions.” Putnam v. Head, 268
F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05,
120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000)). A state court’s decision is
“contrary to” federal law if (1) the court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law, or (2) the court
confronts facts that are “materially indistinguishable” from relevant Supreme Court
precedent, but arrives at an opposite result from that arrived at by the Supreme
Court. Id. An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs when the state
court either (1) correctly identifies the legal rule from Supreme Court precedent but
unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of the case, or (2) “unreasonably extends,
or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law
to a new context.” Id.In the instant case, the issue before us is not whether the state trial and
appellate courts’ decisions were “contrary to” federal law, but whether the
decisions were “unreasonable applications” of federal law. The clearly established
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federal law on this issue is the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under
Strickland, for a movant to demonstrate whether counsel has provided ineffective
assistance, he must show both (1) deficient performance by counsel and (2) a
reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient performance affected the trial
outcome. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. As to the performance prong, the
reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s
perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and
the standard of review is highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
Moreover, the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s performance
was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged
action was not sound strategy. Id. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65.
As to the prejudice prong, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In other
words, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104
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S. Ct. at 2068. We have noted that both this Court and the Supreme Court “have
said that strategic choices are ‘virtually unchallengeable.’” Provenzano v.
Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). We have
further explained that this is especially so “where those decisions were made by
experienced criminal defense counsel.” Id.Assuming arguendo that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient for failing to object to alleged hearsay testimony, Chestnut cannot show,
absent the alleged hearsay testimony, that there was a reasonable probability that
the trial’s outcome would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,
104 S. Ct. at 2068. The jury heard detailed testimony from the victim on direct
examination (1) identifying the defendant as Chestnut, and (2) stating that Chestnut
had on two separate occasions inserted his finger inside her vagina. The victim
also testified, over trial counsel’s hearsay objection, that she had told a nurse that
Chestnut had put his finger inside her vagina, and that the nurse had subsequently
conducted a physical examination.
Regarding Chestnut’s claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
during cross-examination by allowing in otherwise inadmissible evidence of
collateral crimes, we conclude from the record that the district court did not err in
finding that the state trial and appellate courts’ rulings that counsel’s decision was
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a reasonable tactical decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. The state trial court held an extensive evidentiary
hearing during which trial counsel testified to the following: (1) he had 44 years of
experience as a criminal defense attorney, (2) he had tried on average 30 or 40
trials per year, and (3) he thought it was important to cross-examine the victim in
order to attack her credibility and discredit her testimony. Given that, under
Strickland’s “performance” prong, the standard of review is highly deferential, the
state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland in finding that Chestnut had not
met his burden of proving that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient. See 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying
Chestnut’s § 2254 habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.
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