United States v. Dwelley Cauley ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-10876 OCTOBER 11, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-20764-CR-MGC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DWELLEY CAULEY,
a.k.a. Bart,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 11, 2006)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On appeal after remand to the district court for resentencing pursuant to
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005),
Appellant Dwelley Cauley argues that the district court erred by not (1) dismissing
his indictment for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, 21
U.S.C. § 846, because it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, and (2) permitting
him to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his prior attorney coerced him
into pleading guilty. The district court refused to consider Cauley’s motions to
dismiss his indictment and withdraw his guilty plea, finding that they fell outside
the scope of our limited mandate to resentence Cauley in accordance with Booker’s
advisory Guideline scheme.
We review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Luckey v. Miller,
929 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1991). “Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, both
district courts and appellate courts are generally bound by a prior appellate
decision in the same case.” Alphamed, Inc. v. B. Braun Med., Inc., 367 F.3d 1280,
1285-86 (11th Cir. 2004). This doctrine, thus, precludes courts from revisiting
issues that were decided explicitly, or by necessary implication, in a prior appeal.
Luckey, 929 F.2d at 621.
“The mandate rule is simply an application of the law of the case doctrine to
a specific set of facts.” Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1511
(11th Cir. 1987). “If the appeals court issues a specific mandate, the district court
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must obey: the mandate is not subject to interpretation.” United States v. Mesa,
247 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001). In Mesa, we affirmed the district court’s
refusal to consider an argument raised for the first time at resentencing following
remand, concluding that requiring the district court to consider a new argument at
resentencing, when the argument should have been raised in the first appeal,
“would give defendants incentive to introduce sentencing objections in a piecemeal
fashion and would allow them (by their waiting to advance the argument anew at
re-sentencing) to avoid the difficult burden of ‘plain error’ review in their first
appeal.” Id. at 1170-71.
We conclude from the record that Cauley’s case is comparable to Mesa. In
Cauley’s initial direct appeal, he did not raise his claims that his indictment should
be dismissed because it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause or that his attorney
coerced him into pleading guilty, even though these arguments were available to
him on direct appeal. We vacated Cauley’s sentence and directed the district court
to resentence Cauley consistent with Booker. The district court was not authorized
to consider Cauley’s motions to dismiss his indictment and withdraw his guilty
plea because they were outside the scope of our limited remand.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Cauley’s motions
to dismiss his indictment and withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that it was
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precluded by the mandate rule from entertaining Cauley’s motions.
AFFIRMED.
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