United States v. Stanley Edouard ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 18, 2006
No. 05-16979 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-20929-CR-SH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STANLEY EDOUARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 18, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Stanley Edouard appeals his conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Edouard alleges that he was prejudiced as a
result of the district court, sua sponte, excusing and replacing an impaneled juror
with an alternate juror on the basis of severe financial hardship to the impaneled
juror in relation to his probationary employment. Edouard alleges that the district
court improperly excused the juror because there was no “clear factual support” to
prove that the juror was unable to perform, or disqualified from performing, his
duties. Additionally, Edouard argues that an employment inconvenience is not
tantamount to an inability to serve on a jury. Edouard also argues that the district
court should have held a hearing on the juror’s incapacity since his disability was
not obvious. Finally, Edouard claims prejudice because the juror had “expressed
great concern” over the government’s recording of conversations.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c), the district court “may impanel up to 6
alternate jurors to replace any jurors who are unable to perform or who are
disqualified from performing their duties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(c). We review a
district court’s decision to replace an impaneled juror with an alternate juror for an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1152 (11th Cir.
2003). We “review the exercise of this discretion to ensure that the [d]istrict [c]ourt
did not discharge the juror without factual support, or for a legally irrelevant
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reason so as to amount to a showing of bias or prejudice to the defendant.” Id.(internal quotations and citations omitted). A juror can be excused from jury duty
because of severe financial hardship. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 224, 66 S.Ct. 984, 987-88, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) (stating, in the civil context,
that financial hardship is a proper reason for excusing a juror from jury duty if the
“financial embarrassment is such as to impose a real burden and hardship”).
Moreover, “reversal is required only if there is a reasonable possibility that the
district court's violation of Rule 24(c) actually prejudiced the defendant by tainting
the jury's final verdict.” Id. at 1286-87 (citations omitted).
Upon review of the record and having considered the briefs of the parties in
light of the deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in excusing the juror sua sponte.
AFFIRMED.
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