Robert H. Buckler v. Robet B. MacGregor, III , 634 F. App'x 694 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13320
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00145-WBH
ROBERT H. BUCKLER,
H. ANTHONY MCCULLAR,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
ROBERT B. MACGREGOR, III,
DRUID HILLS CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants,
JEFF RADAR,
individually; and in his official capacity as a
Commissioner for Dekalb County, Georgia, et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(December 15, 2015)
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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Druid Hills Civic Association, Inc. (DHCA) and Robert Bruce
MacGregor, III, appeal the district court’s denial of their motions for sanctions and
attorney’s fees in Robert H. Buckler and H. Anthony McCullar’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against them. They contend that the district court erred in determining that
the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not frivolous or made for an improper purpose.1
This case arises out of a local land use dispute. The plaintiffs sought to
subdivide and develop property that they owned in DeKalb County, Georgia. The
DHCA, MacGregor, and others opposed that effort. After a bitter contest, the
subdivision plan was ultimately thwarted. The plaintiffs proceeded to file this
lawsuit against numerous county officials and private parties, including the DHCA
and MacGregor. In their operative complaint, they asserted a claim against all
defendants under § 1983, alleging that county officials and the private parties
conspired with one another, acting under the color of state law, to violate the
plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. They also asserted state law claims, the
substance of which is unimportant for present purposes.
1
The DHCA and MacGregor purport to identify three different issues on appeal. Each is
simply a different way of saying the same thing: that the district court erred in determining that
the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not frivolous or made for an improper purpose.
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Various defendants separately moved to dismiss. The district court found
that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983 because they
had failed to allege facts sufficient to show a constitutional violation. After
choosing not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining
state law claims, the court dismissed the entire case. Although the court’s
dismissal order was critical of the plaintiffs’ legal theory and their citation of a
vacated case, it explicitly warned that “[the] [d]efendants should not view this
commentary as an invitation to file a motion for sanctions.” Either ignoring that
warning or concluding that an invitation was unnecessary, the DHCA and
MacGregor promptly filed motions for sanctions and attorney’s fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court denied
those motions based on its determination that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was not
frivolous or made for an improper purpose.
We review the decision whether to impose attorney’s fees under § 1988 or
sanctions under Rule 11 only for an abuse of discretion. Baker v. Alderman, 158
F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1998). The decision to impose sanctions or fees falls
within the district court’s discretion because it “is better situated than this Court to
marshal the pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard[s].”
Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 638 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks omitted).
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Rule 11 provides that the court may impose sanctions on an attorney who
pursues a frivolous lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1). “Rule 11
sanctions are warranted when a party files a pleading that (1) has no reasonable
factual basis; (2) is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of
success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing
law; and (3) is filed in bad faith for an improper purpose.” Baker, 158 F.3d at 524;
see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831–32 (1989)
(stating that a claim is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
fact”). “However, the purpose of Rule 11 is to deter frivolous lawsuits and not to
deter novel legal arguments or cases of first impression.” Baker, 158 F.3d at 524.
Section 1988 similarly provides that the district court, at its discretion, may
award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a § 1983 action. 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). When a defendant seeks a fee award under that provision, he
must show that “that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S. Ct. 173, 178 (1980)
(quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was not frivolous or made for an improper purpose. The
defendants have not established that the claim was legally frivolous. The
complaint alleged that the defendants, as private parties, unlawfully conspired with
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government officials to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, which is a
recognized theory of liability under § 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,
29, 101 S. Ct. 183, 187 (1980) (stating that “[p]rivate parties who corruptly
conspire” with government officials “are thus acting under color of state law
within the meaning of § 1983”). The district court ultimately found that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish a § 1983 claim in part because there was no case
law explicitly recognizing the constitutional right the plaintiffs had asserted. As
we have already said, however, “the purpose of Rule 11 is . . . not to deter novel
legal arguments.” Baker, 158 F.3d at 524. While the plaintiffs’ claim was
ultimately unsuccessful, it is not clear that it was “based on a legal theory that
ha[d] no reasonable chance of success.” See id.
The defendants have also not established that the plaintiffs pursued this
lawsuit for an improper purpose. The DHCA and MacGregor contend that the
§ 1983 claim was improper because their underlying conduct was protected by the
First Amendment right to free speech. They argue that they expressed their
opposition to the plaintiffs’ subdivision plan only by presenting their grievances to
government officials. However, the plaintiffs’ operative complaint alleges that the
defendants unlawfully conspired with government officials. Read charitably, that
allegation suggests that the private party defendants did something more than
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petition or speak to their elected officials, and instead engaged in activity that fell
outside the scope of First Amendment protections.
The defendants have also not established that the plaintiffs asserted the
§ 1983 claim for some other improper purpose, “such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(1). As the district court explained, the plaintiffs “resorted to court action”
only after losing a contentious land use dispute, and that “did not constitute the sort
of egregious, abusive, bad-faith conduct required to trigger sanctions or an award
of attorney[’]s[ ] fees.” The district court is in a better position to make that
determination “[g]iven [its] familiarity with the case and the parties,” Thompson,
610 F.3d at 638, and it acted within its discretion in denying the motions for
sanctions and fees.
AFFIRMED.
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