United States v. Michael Duane Akridge , 243 F. App'x 572 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 25, 2007
No. 06-16102 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00016-CR-1-MP
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL DUANE AKRIDGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 25, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Akridge appeals his conviction for conspiracy to manufacture,
distribute, and possess marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. Akridge argues that the
government did not establish that he was involved in a conspiracy to distribute
marijuana because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
his alleged co-conspirators knew the essential nature of their conspiracy. We
affirm.
At trial, the government presented evidence of a large marijuana growing
operation on the property where Akridge lived with his wife and two children.
Witnesses described a shed located approximately 50 to 60 feet behind the Akridge
residence that contained special track-lighting, hydroponic trays, a carbon dioxide
generator, a digital scale, and 56 marijuana plants in various stages of growth.
Inside the residence, police found marijuana stalks, a scale, bags of processed
marijuana, an assault rifle, and how-to books for growing marijuana. Akridge
testified that he grew the marijuana for personal use, occasionally sold a small
amount, and kept the entire operation hidden from his wife, who also lived in the
residence.
We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence, and view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government to determine whether a reasonable jury
could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Thompson, 473 F.3d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
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127 S. Ct. 2155 (Apr. 30, 2007).
To support a conviction for conspiracy, the government must establish “(1)
an agreement between the defendant and one or more persons, (2) the object of
which is to do either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.” United
States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1998). The government need not
prove that the conspirators knew all of the details or participated in every aspect of
the conspiracy. United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspirators
“knew the essential nature of the conspiracy.” Id. (internal quotation and citation
omitted). “A person who owns or exercises dominion and control over a . . .
residence in which contraband is concealed may be deemed to be in constructive
possession of the contraband.” United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th
Cir. 1983). “A conspiracy conviction will be upheld . . . when the circumstances
surrounding a person’s presence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so
obvious that knowledge of its character can fairly be attributed to him.” United
States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
The government offered sufficient evidence to prove that Akridge’s wife
knew the essential nature of the conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to
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distribute it. The government presented circumstantial evidence that Akridge’s
wife was aware of the vast marijuana growing operation being conducted on their
property. Based on the number of marijuana plants and the presence of a scale in
their residence, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Akridge’s wife was
aware of and consented to the distribution of the marijuana.
In addition to the circumstantial evidence that Akridge’s wife conspired with
Akridge to possess and distribute the marijuana, Akridge elected to testify in his
defense and incurred “a substantial risk of bolstering the [g]overnment’s case.”
United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995). “[A] statement by a
defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of
the defendant’s guilt.” Id. “[W]hen a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk
that if disbelieved ‘the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.’”
Id. (citing Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 961 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992). Akridge
testified that his wife did not help him grow or distribute the marijuana, but the
jury was free to discredit his testimony and believe the opposite. “Drug dealers
have been known to lie.” Molina, 443 F.3d at 829. Because we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, we assume the jury disbelieved
Akridge’s testimony.
Akridge’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
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