Timothy Walker v. United States , 367 F. App'x 67 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                   FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-12345                 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    FEBRUARY 23, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket Nos. 09-80569-CV-WPD,
    98-08095-CR-WPD
    TIMOTHY WALKER,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (February 23, 2010)
    Before CARNES, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Timothy Walker, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his motion for default judgment seeking to vacate his criminal
    sentence. On appeal, the government responds that the district court did not err in
    dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction because Walker’s motion was an
    unauthorized successive 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion.
    We review questions concerning jurisdiction de novo. Williams v. Chatman,
    
    510 F.3d 1290
    , 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). A federal prisoner may file a 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
    Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
    to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
    authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (a). To file a second or successive § 2255 motion, the movant must first file
    an application with the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
    district court to consider it. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (b)(3)(A). “Without authorization,
    the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.”
    Farris v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
    To determine whether a prisoner’s pro se motion is a second or successive
    § 2255 motion, we examine the content of the filing and the relief sought. See
    United States v. Holt, 
    417 F.3d 1172
    , 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a pro se
    prisoner’s writ of audita querela was actually a § 2255 motion). Despite what a
    2
    prisoner may entitle his motion, a motion that collaterally attacks a prisoner’s
    sentence as being unconstitutional is a motion to vacate under § 2255. Id.
    Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    , a movant must obtain a certificate of
    appealability (“COA”) to appeal a final order in a § 2255 proceeding. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(1)(B). In Hubbard v. Campbell, 
    379 F.3d 1245
     (11th Cir. 2004), we
    held that if the district court’s order is not a final order within the meaning of 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    , a COA is not required. 
    Id. at 1247
    . In Hubbard, a petitioner filed
    an “amended petition” to amend his original habeas petition. 
    Id. at 1246
    . The
    district court construed the amended petition as a successive petition and dismissed
    it for failure to obtain authorization from us. 
    Id.
     The petitioner appealed to us for
    a COA so that he could appeal the district court’s dismissal of his amended
    petition, but did not seek leave to file his amended petition as a successive petition
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (b)(3)(A). 
    Id. at 1247
    . We held that the district court’s
    dismissal of the amended petition was not a final order under the meaning of
    § 2253 because the decision was a final order dismissing the amended petition for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. We concluded that we had jurisdiction to
    review the order pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    Having jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal of Walker’s
    motion for default judgment pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm because,
    3
    although the district court did not construe Walker’s motion as an unauthorized
    successive motion to vacate and Walker did not seek to treat his motion as such,
    the district court lacked jurisdiction because Walker’s motion was an unauthorized
    collateral attack on his sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-12345

Citation Numbers: 367 F. App'x 67

Judges: Carnes, Barkett, Kravitch

Filed Date: 2/23/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024