Calvin C. Caldwell, Jr. v. Fort Lauderdale Airport Task Force , 673 F. App'x 906 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •              Case: 15-12231   Date Filed: 12/09/2016   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-12231
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cv-60050-JIC
    CALVIN C. CALDWELL, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    FORT LAUDERDALE AIRPORT TASK FORCE,
    Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport,
    DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
    PHIL MACDONALD,
    Officer, Broward County Sheriff,
    DUSTIN THOMPSON,
    Officer, Broward County Sheriff,
    OKEEFE,
    Officer, Broward County Sheriff, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 9, 2016)
    Case: 15-12231    Date Filed: 12/09/2016   Page: 2 of 9
    Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Calvin Caldwell appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights lawsuit against the Fort Lauderdale Airport Task Force,
    the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Broward County Sheriff’s Department and four
    of its officers, and the Miami Police department and two of its officers. Caldwell
    alleged that these defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and
    Fourteenth Amendments by unlawfully detaining him at the Fort Lauderdale and
    Miami airports and seizing money that he was traveling with.
    According to the allegations in Caldwell’s complaint, which we accept as
    true for purposes of this appeal, in February 2012, Caldwell flew into the Fort
    Lauderdale Airport from Columbus, Ohio.         As he exited the plane, he was
    approached by Officer Phil MacDonald, who, after asking Caldwell what he was
    doing in town, took Caldwell’s carry-on bag and opened it in the terminal.
    MacDonald then asked Caldwell to accompany him to the terminal interdiction
    office. Caldwell requested to have his attorney present, but no attorney was called.
    When Caldwell and MacDonald arrived at the interdiction office, Caldwell asserts,
    he was shoved into the room and his cell phones were thrown against the wall.
    Officers O’Keefe and Poole threatened to taser him and called him a racial slur.
    2
    Case: 15-12231   Date Filed: 12/09/2016   Page: 3 of 9
    In the interdiction office, Officers O’Keefe and Poole emptied the contents
    of Caldwell’s luggage and found cash wrapped in clear plastic bags. Caldwell said
    he had $25,000 in business capital. Despite Caldwell’s request to have the money
    counted in his presence, Officer MacDonald left the room to count the cash with a
    machine. He returned an hour-and-a-half later and handed Caldwell a receipt for
    $23,340, though Caldwell claimed he had $25,000. Caldwell was told to gather his
    possessions and leave. The officers failed to return Caldwell’s Florida driver’s
    license, debit card, and cell phones. Caldwell reported the missing items, and his
    driver’s license was returned a few hours later. Caldwell took the receipt for the
    $23,340 to his attorney.
    In December 2012, Caldwell flew into the Miami International Airport from
    Columbus, Ohio. As he walked through the terminal, he noticed that he was being
    tailed by Officer O’Keefe. Eventually, O’Keefe accosted and then detained him
    until Officers MacDonald and Poole arrived. The officers took Caldwell to the
    terminal interdiction office, where he met Detective Quintas. Caldwell explained
    that he was in town to give a deposition at his attorney’s office. MacDonald took
    and opened his carry-on bag, which again contained cash. At Quintas’s direction,
    Caldwell counted the currency, placed it in a clear plastic bag, and initialed the
    amount. After a wait of nearly two hours, the officers conducted a dog sniff. In
    Caldwell’s opinion, the dog did not alert to the currency. The officers gave
    3
    Case: 15-12231     Date Filed: 12/09/2016   Page: 4 of 9
    Caldwell a receipt for $5,790 and let him go. Thirty days later, the Department of
    Justice contacted Caldwell and told him to file a claim for the return of the seized
    currency. He did so.
    For relief, Caldwell requested the return of all seized currency plus interest,
    attorney’s and filing fees, punitive damages, and reimbursement of the cost of his
    flights and other additional lost funds.
    After granting Caldwell, who was in custody at the time, leave to proceed in
    forma pauperis, a magistrate judge sua sponte screened his complaint, pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e)(2). In a report and recommendation (“R&R”), the
    magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed “without
    prejudice” for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
    The magistrate judge implicitly construed Caldwell’s complaint as asserting
    one claim: a procedural due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
    based on the defendants’ retention of the seized currency. Finding that Caldwell
    had “an adequate post-deprivation state remedy for the alleged wrongful taking of
    his property in the form of a tort action for conversion,” the magistrate judge
    concluded that no procedural due-process violation had occurred. See Case v.
    Eslinger, 
    555 F.3d 1317
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that no procedural due-
    process violation has occurred if an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available,
    such as a civil cause of action for wrongful conversion of personal property under
    4
    Case: 15-12231       Date Filed: 12/09/2016      Page: 5 of 9
    state law). The magistrate judge also noted that Caldwell was seeking the return of
    his funds in a pending civil forfeiture action filed by the government against the
    funds.
    In March 2015, Caldwell filed a response to the magistrate judge’s R&R.
    He explained that he had “reviewed the rule of law and case law given in support”
    by the magistrate judge and found “no basis to object or argue against said
    conclusion.” He agreed that “dismissal without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) is fair and just.” Caldwell stated that he would prosecute his
    claims in the pending forfeiture action.
    Caldwell, through counsel, filed claims for the seized currency in the civil
    forfeiture action, which the government initiated in August 2012.1 See CM/ECF
    for U.S. Dist. Ct. for S.D. Fla., case no. 0:12-cv-61508-LSS. He argued that the
    currency had been unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
    Eventually, the case was set for a bench trial on March 31, 2015. About two weeks
    before the trial date, however, the government filed a motion for voluntary
    dismissal without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The court granted the
    motion and dismissed the action on March 17, 2015. 2
    1
    Caldwell’s counsel withdrew in July 2013, and Caldwell represented himself thereafter.
    2
    Despite the dismissal of the forfeiture action and the “release” of the seized currency,
    Caldwell did not receive the money. According to the government, the Debt Collection
    Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. § 3716, required that the seized currency first be applied to
    pay down delinquent non-tax debts Caldwell owed to the federal government and various state
    5
    Case: 15-12231     Date Filed: 12/09/2016    Page: 6 of 9
    In April 2015, after the dismissal of the forfeiture action, Caldwell filed a
    motion for default judgment against the defendants on his claims, despite his
    earlier representation that dismissal without prejudice was “fair and just.” This
    motion was docketed as a motion for clerk’s entry of default and denied by a
    deputy clerk.
    On April 15, 2015, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s R&R
    and dismissed the complaint “without prejudice.” The court determined that the
    forfeiture action, which the government had voluntarily dismissed, provided
    Caldwell with an adequate forum to address his purported injury, so he did not
    state a § 1983 claim. The court granted Caldwell leave to proceed in forma
    pauperis on appeal.
    On appeal, Caldwell argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
    complaint for failure to state a claim. Liberally construing his appellate brief, we
    find that he contends that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
    unlawfully detaining him, searching his luggage, and seizing his property.
    A district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28
    U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo. Troville v. Venz, 
    303 F.3d 1256
    ,
    1259 (11th Cir. 2002). Section 1915(e) provides that an in forma pauperis action
    courts. Caldwell separately appealed from the civil forfeiture proceeding.   That appeal is
    traveling under No. 15-15311.
    6
    Case: 15-12231     Date Filed: 12/09/2016   Page: 7 of 9
    or appeal shall be dismissed at any time if it fails to state a claim for which relief
    may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We liberally construe the filings of
    pro se parties. Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 
    760 F.3d 1165
    , 1168 (11th Cir.
    2014).
    Caldwell’s complaint, liberally construed, presents two distinct claims.
    First, Caldwell alleged that the defendants violated due process by retaining his
    seized property. We have stated that “[a] complaint of continued retention of
    legally seized property raises an issue of procedural due process under the
    Fourteenth Amendment.” 
    Case, 555 F.3d at 1330
    . This type of claim fails where
    an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available, such as a civil cause of action for
    conversion. 
    Id. at 1331.
    Thus, the district court correctly concluded that no
    procedural due-process violation had occurred because Caldwell had adequate
    post-deprivation remedies for the alleged wrongful taking of his property. 
    Id. Second, Caldwell
    alleged that the searches and seizures themselves were
    unlawful. Such a claim arises under the Fourth Amendment and is not defeated by
    the existence of an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Byrd v. Stewart, 
    811 F.2d 554
    , 555 (11th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing “unlawful retention” claims from
    “unlawful seizure” claims and remanding where the district court failed to address
    the Fourth Amendment claim); see also Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 
    774 F.2d 1495
    ,
    7
    Case: 15-12231    Date Filed: 12/09/2016   Page: 8 of 9
    1501–02 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v.
    Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    (1989).
    Here, the district court did not address whether Caldwell stated a claim
    under the Fourth Amendment. And viewed in his favor, his allegations suggest
    that state law-enforcement officers acting under color of state law detained him
    without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and then unlawfully searched his
    luggage and seized his personal property, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
    See 
    Byrd, 811 F.2d at 555
    . Because Caldwell’s allegations appear to state a viable
    Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, we vacate and remand for further
    proceedings on this claim.
    In remanding Caldwell’s Fourth Amendment claim, we recognize that
    Caldwell told the district court in his response to the magistrate judge’s R&R, that
    dismissal was “fair and just.” Normally, this representation might be sufficient to
    apply the doctrine of invited error, which prohibits a party from challenging a
    ruling that the party expressly invited. Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 
    289 F.3d 1283
    , 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Nevertheless, liberally construing Caldwell’s filings, we cannot conclude
    that he invited the court to dismiss his complaint without addressing his Fourth
    Amendment claim. Given the title of the magistrate judge’s R&R, “Preliminary
    Report of Magistrate Judge,” and the fact that the R&R addressed Caldwell’s
    8
    Case: 15-12231       Date Filed: 12/09/2016       Page: 9 of 9
    unlawful-retention claim only, it is ambiguous whether Caldwell understood the
    R&R to recommend a final adjudication of his complaint or just dismissal of the
    due-process claim. Moreover, Caldwell’s agreement with the R&R appears to
    have been based on his belief that he could obtain relief in the forfeiture action,
    which was dismissed by the government shortly after Caldwell filed his response
    to the R&R. After the voluntary dismissal, Caldwell filed a motion for default
    judgment on his complaint, indicating that he wished to proceed with his
    complaint. Given the ambiguous and contingent nature of Caldwell’s position on
    whether dismissal was appropriate, we conclude that the doctrine of invited error
    does not apply. 3
    In sum, because Caldwell’s complaint asserted a Fourth Amendment claim
    under § 1983 that was not addressed by the district court, we vacate and remand
    for further proceedings on this claim.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    3
    We also conclude that Caldwell has not otherwise waived his challenge to the district
    court’s order. Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, which took effect on December 1, 2014, provides that
    “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations . . . waives the
    right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal
    conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
    appeal for failing to object.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (emphasis added). Before Rule 3-1 went into
    effect, we reviewed de novo a magistrate judge’s legal conclusions in a report and
    recommendation even if the party failed to object to them. See Dupree v. Warden, 
    715 F.3d 1295
    , 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, the magistrate judge’s R&R did not give Caldwell clear
    notice of the consequences on appeal for failure to object to the legal conclusions in the R&R.
    Accordingly, we review de novo the question of whether Caldwell failed to claim under § 1983.
    See 
    Troville, 303 F.3d at 1259
    .
    9