International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers System Council U-4 v. Florida Power & Light Co. ( 2014 )

Case: 14-10699 Date Filed: 10/02/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10699
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cv-80080-KLR
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS SYSTEM COUNCIL U-4,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(October 2, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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The facts of this case are well known to the parties. In short, Florida Power
& Light (“FPL”) revoked Michael Kohl’s unescorted nuclear access to its Turkey
Point nuclear power plant after Kohl was arrested for grand theft. FPL contends
that it was required to revoke Kohl’s unescorted nuclear access due to certain
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) regulations, which state that an
individual must be “trustworthy and reliable” to maintain unescorted access. The
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-4 (“IBEW”)
filed a grievance on behalf of Kohl stating that “I Mike Kohl, request that my
Nuclear Access be reinstated and I be returned to work and made whole.” After
filing this grievance, the IBEW filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. While this petition was
pending, FPL lifted its revocation of Kohl’s unescorted access after the state
dropped the grand theft charges. FPL then moved for the district court to dismiss
the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction because the case was moot. The
district court granted FPL’s motion, holding that “[s]ince there is no longer an
impediment to Kohl obtaining unescorted access, there is no effective relief the
Court could grant via arbitration.” (District Court’s Order, Doc. 27 at 2). IBEW
now appeals.
We review de novo a district court’s determination of subject matter
jurisdiction. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340
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(11th Cir. 2011). And we review de novo a district court’s order denying a motion
to compel arbitration. Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d
1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003).
IBEW’s contention that the district court could not determine whether the
underlying grievance itself is moot is without merit. Though cited by neither party,
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S.
49, 62, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1273 (2009), makes clear that “a federal court should
determine its jurisdiction by ‘looking through’ a [petition to compel arbitration] to
the parties’ underlying substantive controversy.” Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)).
If a district court lacks jurisdiction over the substantive controversy, it lacks
jurisdiction to compel arbitration. Id.
But here, the district court incorrectly determined that the underlying
controversy was moot. The district court acknowledged that IBEW’s grievance on
behalf of Kohl “specifically raises the issue of back pay and reinstatement at the
Turkey Point facility.” (Doc. 27 at 2). Thus, even if the issue of nuclear access is
moot, IBEW’s request that Kohl be returned to his previous job and receive back
pay is not.
In a footnote, the district court examined the issues of back pay and
reinstatement, indicating that back pay and reinstatement are “collateral effect[s] of
FPL’s application of NRC regulations and [are] unrelated to the collective
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bargaining agreement between FPL and IBEW.” (Doc. 27 at 2 n.1). On remand,
the district court should consider only whether the collective bargaining agreement
provides the arbitrator with authority to adjudicate this dispute, not issues that go
to the merits, such as whether the NRC regulations render FPL’s actions
unreviewable. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 2150 v.
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, --- F.3d ---, No. 13-3851, 2014 WL 3895757 at
*4 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 2014) (“[W]e do not hold that the arbitrator may…review and
overturn [defendant’s] revocation of [plaintiff’s] unescorted access
privileges….[T]he arbitrator may well find the decision unreviewable….But the
potential weakness of [plaintiff’s] claim on the merits is no defense to the
arbitrability of this dispute, as a threshold question.”).
Consequently, we vacate the district court’s order denying IBEW’s Motion
to Compel Arbitration and remand the case to the district court with instructions to
determine whether FPL’s determination of “access rights” falls within the
arbitration provisions of IBEW and FPL’s collective bargaining agreement. See
Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1027 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2407
(2003) (holding that “gateway matters,” such as the scope of an arbitration
provision, should be determined by courts and not arbitrators)).
VACATED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTION.
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