Jeffrey Eugene Lee v. Warden, FCC Coleman - USP II ( 2018 )

Case: 16-17466 Date Filed: 03/09/2018 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-17466
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cv-00505-WTH-PRL
JEFFREY EUGENE LEE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - USP II,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 9, 2018)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JULIE CARNES, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jeffrey Lee, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 requesting the district court to vacate his state court guilty plea. The
district court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. This is Lee’s appeal.
I.
A jury convicted Lee of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack
cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846. Because he had two prior felony drug convictions, the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) mandated that the district court sentence Lee to life
imprisonment without eligibility for parole. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
On direct appeal, Lee contended that one of the predicate convictions for his
federal sentence was invalid. That conviction was the result of a state law drug
offense to which Lee pleaded guilty. Lee did not appear for sentencing and the
state court did not enter judgment of conviction. Lee contended that the state
court’s failure to enter judgment disqualified his guilty plea as a conviction under
the CSA. We affirmed his federal conviction without discussion and affirmed his
federal sentence on the basis that “a plea of guilty is a conviction within the
meaning of the CSA.” United States v. Lee, No. 92-2760, at 4 (11th Cir. June 21,
1994).
In his § 2241 petition, Lee claimed that his state court guilty plea is invalid
and asked the district court to vacate that plea. But Lee now contends that he
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meant to ask the district court to order the state court to impose the sentence for his
drug conviction, because only after that is done can he appeal it. He concedes that
he has abandoned any argument that the state court guilty plea is invalid. See
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1.
II.
Lee contends that the district court had jurisdiction to order the state court to
impose a sentence. We review de novo the dismissal of his petition, Howard v.
Warden, 776 F.3d 772, 775 (11th Cir. 2015), and we construe liberally filings by
pro se litigants, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Lee argues that the state court’s failure to impose his sentence prevents him
from appealing and as a result violates due process. In support of that argument,
he cites Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016), which he says
held that “the failure of a state court to promptly impose sentence violates the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. He also cites
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S. Ct. 1123
(1973), which he says authorized the district court “to issue an order directing the
Florida state court to impose [his] sentence immediately.” Appellant’s Br. at 3.1
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Neither Braden nor Betterman stand for those propositions. The Betterman Court noted
that the petitioner “did not preserve a due process challenge” and as a result the Court
“confine[d] [its] opinion to his Sixth Amendment challenge.” 136 S. Ct. at 1612. And the
Braden decision simply held that a defendant who was detained based on a pending indictment
may file a § 2241 petition to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 410 U.S. at 489,
93 S. Ct. at 1126–27.
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The district court properly denied Lee’s § 2241 petition because he
challenges action, or inaction, of the state court, not of the federal court whose
judgment put him in custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”) (emphasis added). The due
process violation that Lee alleges relates only to the state court’s failure to sentence
him. Section 2241 does not authorize the district court to order the state court to
impose Lee’s sentence, and absent statutory authority to review the state court’s
inaction, “a federal court lacks the general power to issue writs of mandamus to
direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.”
Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cty. Sup. Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
AFFIRMED.
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