United States v. Juan Demetrius Allen , 714 F. App'x 988 ( 2018 )


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  •             Case: 17-13555   Date Filed: 03/09/2018   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13555
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00014-RV-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    JUAN DEMETRIUS ALLEN,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (March 9, 2018)
    Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13555     Date Filed: 03/09/2018    Page: 2 of 5
    Juan Allen appeals his total 117-month sentence after pleading guilty to two
    counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 18
    U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), possession of a controlled substance with intent
    to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and (b)(1)(D), and possession of a
    firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). He
    argues his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the District Court
    assessed a two-level enhancement for possessing between three and seven firearms
    when the evidence used to support this enhancement was inconclusive. He also
    argues that his base offense level was incorrect because a conviction under Fla.
    Stat. § 893.13, is not a “controlled substance offense” according to U.S.S.G. §
    4B1.2(b), an argument he concedes is foreclosed by Circuit precedent.
    I.
    We use a two-step process to review a sentence’s reasonableness. Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). First, we must confirm that the district
    court committed no significant procedural error. 
    Id. A sentence
    is procedurally
    erroneous if a district court commits an error “such as failing to calculate (or
    improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
    failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
    erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. . . .” 
    Id. After reviewing
    for procedural reasonableness, we consider the substantive
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    reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
    
    Id. We review
    a district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v.
    Tejas, 
    868 F.3d 1242
    , 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). “For factual findings to be clearly
    erroneous, we must be left with a definite and firm conviction that the court made a
    mistake.” 
    Id. A defendant
    receives a two-level increase if the offense involved
    between three and seven firearms. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). Where a defendant
    challenges the factual basis of his sentence as set forth in the presentence
    investigation report, the Government has the burden of establishing the disputed
    fact by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Bradley, 
    644 F.3d 1213
    ,
    1283 (11th Cir. 2011).
    Here, the District Court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of
    the evidence that Allen possessed between three and seven firearms; thus, the
    Court thus did not err in applying the § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) enhancement. The Court
    concluded that Allen at one time possessed at least three different guns (in addition
    to the two guns seized after Allen’s arrest) featured in images on Allen’s phone. A
    reasonable factfinder had considerable evidence upon which to rest this inference.
    An ATF agent testified that all of the images were taken using the same phone
    model as Allen’s. The background in one image showed a “4Runner” car mat, and
    the agent testified that Allen rented a Toyota 4Runner on the same day the image
    was taken. The agent further testified that the fabric covering the seats in several
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    other photos matched the distinct design pattern of the seat fabric in the car Allen
    possessed at the time he was arrested. And at least two of the guns were
    photographed alongside one of the guns seized from Allen after his arrest. While
    none of this evidence established conclusively that Allen took the photos, they
    support the reasonable inference that he did, and that he possessed the firearms in
    the photos. Hence, the District Court did not clearly err.
    On this record, the District Court’s conclusion that Allen possessed between
    three and seven firearms does not elicit “a definite and firm conviction” that the
    Court rested its factual findings on insufficient evidence. Therefore, the Court did
    not clearly err.
    II.
    The definition of a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 is
    found in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which states
    The term “controlled substance offense” means an offense under federal or
    state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that
    prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution or dispensing of a
    controlled substance…or the possession of a controlled substance…with
    intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.
    U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.1), U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). In relevant part, Fla. Stat.
    § 893.13(1)(a) states “a person may not sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess
    with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” Fla. Stat.
    §893.13(1)(a). Knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is not an element of
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    the offense. Fla. Stat. § 893.101. Allen correctly concedes that our precedent
    clearly holds that a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 is a controlled substance
    offense. United States v. Pridgeon, 
    853 F.3d 1192
    , 1198 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.
    denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 215
    (2017); United States v. Smith, 775 F3d 1262, 1268 (11th
    Cir. 2014). In Pridgeon and Smith, we held, for purposes of the career offender
    increase, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, that a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 qualifies as
    a “controlled substance offense.” 
    Id. Allen preserved
    this objection pending
    resolution of the certiorari petition to the Supreme Court in Pridgeon, which has
    since been denied. Accordingly, our precedent forecloses this objection.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-13555 Non-Argument Calendar

Citation Numbers: 714 F. App'x 988

Judges: Tjoflat, Pryor, Martin

Filed Date: 3/9/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024