James M. Earley v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston ( 2016 )

Case: 16-12934 Date Filed: 12/22/2016 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-12934
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-01099-EAK-TGW
JAMES M. EARLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON,
LOWES HOME CENTERS, INC.,
SEDGWICK CMS,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 22, 2016)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 16-12934 Date Filed: 12/22/2016 Page: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
James Earley appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reopen, filed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). No reversible error has been shown; we
affirm.
Briefly stated, Earley filed this civil action against his former employer,
Defendant Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., in March 2013. In his pro se complaint,
Earley asserted that he was entitled to certain benefits under workers’
compensation insurance, long-term disability insurance, and unemployment
insurance policies. In July 2013, the district court granted Defendant’s motion to
dismiss with leave to amend. Earley later filed a document that the district court
construed as an amended complaint.
On 7 November 2013, the district court dismissed Earley’s amended
complaint. To the extent Earley purported to assert a claim under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the district court dismissed
the claim with prejudice and without leave to amend. 1
1
The district court construed liberally Earley’s complaint as also attempting to assert state law
claims for workers’ compensation and for unemployment compensation, and a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). In its 7 November 2013 order, the district court
dismissed without prejudice Earley’s state law claims and deferred ruling on the ADA claim,
instructing Earley to file evidence that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Earley
filed no response. In April 2014, the district court dismissed the case in its entirety.
2
Case: 16-12934 Date Filed: 12/22/2016 Page: 3 of 5
On 12 January 2016 -- over two years after the district court dismissed
Earley’s ERISA claim -- Earley filed, by counsel, a motion to reopen pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Earley sought relief from the dismissal so
he could continue to pursue his ERISA claim. In support of his motion, Earley
alleged he never received a copy of the district court’s 7 November order and, thus,
had demonstrated “excusable neglect.” In a reply brief, Earley asserted further that
he “suffers from mental impairment affecting his memory caused, in part, by two
strokes suffered in the pertinent time period.” The district court denied Earley’s
motion to reopen.
We review only for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a Rule
60(b) motion. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984).
Under the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6), “the court may relieve a party
. . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason that
justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). We have said that Rule 60(b)(6) relief
“is an extraordinary remedy which may be invoked only upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances.” Griffin, 722 F.2d at 680. Ultimately, the decision
about “whether to grant the requested relief is . . . a matter for the district court’s
sound discretion.” Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006). That a
grant of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion “might have been permissible or warranted” is not
enough: instead, the denial of the motion “must have been sufficiently unwarranted
3
Case: 16-12934 Date Filed: 12/22/2016 Page: 4 of 5
as to amount to an abuse of discretion.” Id. In other words, a party seeking relief
bears a heavy burden of demonstrating “a justification so compelling that the
district court was required to vacate its order.” Id. (alteration omitted).
Earley has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating “extraordinary
circumstances” warranting relief. In support of his motion, he first contends that
he never received the district court’s 7 November 2013 dismissal order. The
record evidences, however, that this lack of receipt was due at least in part to
Earley’s failure to notify timely the district court of his change in address. Given
Earley’s failure to keep his address current -- despite the district court’s earlier
express instruction to Earley about his obligation to notify the court about address
changes -- we cannot say that his alleged failure to receive the dismissal order
constitutes a sufficiently compelling justification to require relief under Rule
60(b)(6).
Earley also contends that his medical condition constitutes sufficient
“extraordinary circumstances.” In particular, Earley suffered from two strokes, the
earliest of which occurred in July 2014. In denying Earley’s motion to reopen, the
district court recognized that Earley’s medical condition may help to explain the
over two-year delay in filing his motion to reopen. But because Earley’s first
stroke occurred more than six months after the court dismissed with prejudice
Earley’s ERISA claim, the district court concluded that Earley’s medical condition
4
Case: 16-12934 Date Filed: 12/22/2016 Page: 5 of 5
had no bearing on Earley’s failure in his original and amended complaints to state
a claim under ERISA or on Earley’s failure to comply otherwise with court orders.
On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court’s ruling constituted an
abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
5