United States v. Jonathan Claret , 713 F. App'x 863 ( 2017 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-17291
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20405-KMW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JONATHAN CLARET,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(October 31, 2017)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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After pleading guilty, Jonathan Claret appeals his 40-month sentence for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Claret’s conviction stems from a video he posted on Instagram showing him
shooting an AK-47 style rifle at a gun range in May 2016. On appeal, Claret
argues that the district court erred: (1) in calculating his base offense level of 22,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3), because his prior conviction for Florida armed
robbery was not a qualifying crime of violence; and (2) in assessing one criminal
history point for each of his two prior marijuana possession offenses, for which the
state court withheld adjudication. After review, we affirm the district court’s
guidelines calculations and Claret’s 40-month sentence.
I. OFFENSE LEVEL UNDER § 2K2.1
Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, the defendant’s base offense level is 22 if he (1)
possessed, inter alia, a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity
magazine (2) subsequent to sustaining a felony conviction of a “crime of violence”
or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The phrase “crime of
violence” has the same meaning given to that term in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Under the 2015 version of the Sentencing Guidelines,
which was the version applied at Claret’s sentencing, § 4B1.2(a) defined “crime of
violence” as any felony that:
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
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(2) is a burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2015). Section 4B1.2(a)(1) is commonly referred to as the
“elements clause” and § 4B1.2(a)(2) contains the “enumerated offenses” and the
“residual clause.” See United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1240-41 (11th Cir.
2011). In addition to the offenses enumerated in the text of § 4B1.2(a)(2), the
commentary identified numerous other offenses, including robbery, that also were
included as “crimes of violence.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2015). Prior to
2016 amendments to § 4B1.2, this Court treated the crimes listed in the
commentary the same as the crimes listed in the text of the § 4B1.2(a)(2). See,
e.g., Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1242-45 (addressing robbery); United States v. Palomino
Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1326-34 (11th Cir. 2010) (addressing aggravated assault).
In August 2016, a few months before Claret’s sentencing, the Sentencing
Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)’s definition of “crime of violence” in
several ways, including eliminating the residual clause and revising the offenses
enumerated in the text to include, among others, robbery. See U.S.S.G. app. C,
amend. 798. The Sentencing Commission explained that the list of qualifying
offenses formerly “set forth in both § 4B1.2(a)(2) and the commentary at
Application Note 1,” were moved into the guideline’s text “[f]or easier
application.” U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 789 (Reason for Amendment). The
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elements clause in § 4B1.2(a)(1), however, remained unchanged, and thus crimes
of violence qualifying under the elements clause before the amendment continue to
qualify under that clause after the amendment.1
Prior to sentencing, Claret objected to the Presentence Investigation Report’s
(“PSI”) determination that Claret’s base offense level was 22 based on his 2011
Florida conviction for armed robbery. Claret argued that: (1) § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s
residual clause in the 2015 version of the Guidelines was unconstitutionally vague
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 576
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), invalidating the identical residual clause in the
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (2)
Florida armed robbery, Florida Statutes § 812.13(2), was not a crime of violence
under § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s elements clause because it did not have as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of the kind of “violent force” required by
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (“Curtis Johnson”).
At the November 2016 sentencing hearing, the district court overruled
Claret’s objection to his base offense level. The district court concluded that
Claret’s Florida armed robbery conviction constituted a crime of violence under
this Court’s binding precedent in United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1240-41,
1
Prior to sentencing, Claret argued that the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the
time of his offense should apply rather than the 2016 amended Sentencing Guidelines in effect at
the time of his sentencing, and the district court applied the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines.
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and United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1238-46 (11th Cir. 2016). Claret
acknowledged this Court’s precedent, but stated that he wished to preserve his
argument that Seabrooks was “incorrectly decided under Johnson.”
The district court correctly calculated Claret’s base offense level of 22. It is
uncontested that Claret was in possession of a semiautomatic firearm capable of
accepting a large capacity magazine (the AK-47 style rifle). Moreover, the district
court did not err in determining that Claret’s 2011 Florida armed robbery
conviction under Florida Statutes § 812.13(2) qualified as a crime of violence.
Under Florida law, the defendant commits both robbery and armed robbery
by taking money or other property “from the person or custody of another, with
intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the
money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force,
violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1), (2)(a). The only
difference between robbery and armed robbery is that, in an armed robbery, the
defendant carries “a firearm or other deadly weapon.” See id. § 812.13(2)(a).
In Lockley, this Court concluded that Florida robbery, under Florida Statutes
§ 812.13(1), qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s
element’s clause. 632 F.3d at 1244-45. Additionally, this Court has repeatedly
held that Florida armed robbery, under § 812.13(2), qualifies as a violent felony
under the ACCA’s identical elements clause in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See United
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States v. Fritts, 841 F3d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 2016); Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at 1340-
41; United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).2
There is no merit to Claret’s argument that the application of the prior panel
precedent rule in this case violates his due process rights. The argument Claret
makes on appeal—that the violent force required by Curtis Johnson is not an
element of a § 812.13(2) offense of Florida armed robbery—has been argued to,
and decided by, this Court in Fritts, Seabrooks, and Dowd, and these holdings have
not been overturned by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. Thus,
Claret’s arguments in this case are foreclosed by our precedent. See Archer, 531
F.3d at 1352.
Alternatively, Claret’s 2011 Florida armed robbery conviction qualifies as
an enumerated offense. The 2015 commentary to § 4B1.2 lists robbery as a crime
of violence. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. The definition of crime of violence
provided in the guideline’s commentary is authoritative. United States v. Hall, 714
F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). Further, this Court has concluded that Florida
robbery is generic robbery, and thus qualifies as a crime of violence under the
enumerated robbery offense. See Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1242-45.
2
Because the definitions of “violent felony” in the ACCA and “crime of violence” in the
Sentencing Guidelines are virtually identical, this Court applies decisions as to the interpretation
of one definition to the other definition. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1309 n.16 (11th
Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d
1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Accordingly, the district court properly determined, consistent with our
precedent, that Claret’s 2011 conviction for armed robbery under § 812.13(2)
qualifies as a crime of violence both under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s elements
clause and as an enumerated offense under the 2015 commentary to § 4B1.2
(2015). Because Claret’s current offense involved the requisite semiautomatic
firearm, and he committed his offense after he sustained a felony conviction for a
crime of violence, the district court did not err in determining that Claret’s base
offense level was 22 under § 2K2.1(a)(3).
II. CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a), a prior sentence is “any sentence previously
imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo
contendere.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). However, “[a] diversionary disposition
resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere, in a
judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) even if a conviction
is not formally entered.” Id. § 4A1.2(f). This Court has held that while an offense
in which the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere and adjudication was
withheld does not qualify as a prior sentence under 4A1.2(a)(1), it does qualify as a
diversionary disposition that is properly counted as a “prior sentence” under
4A1.1(c). United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017); see also
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United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1522 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Rockman, 993 F.2d 811, 813-14 (11th Cir. 1993).
Here, the district court did not err in assessing one criminal history point for
each of Claret’s two Florida misdemeanor marijuana possession convictions. 3 At
sentencing, Claret’s counsel, an attorney with Federal Defender’s Office in Miami,
Florida, agreed that Claret had entered pleas of nolo contendere to the two offenses
and that the Florida state court had withheld adjudication. Claret’s counsel argued
instead that this Court’s prior precedent in Rockman was incorrectly decided and
that withheld adjudications in Florida state courts should not be considered
diversionary dispositions because they are not rehabilitative. The district court
overruled Claret’s objection to the criminal history points, stating that “under the
law [the convictions] are affirmatively accounted for.”
This Court repeatedly has held that a diversionary disposition supported by a
nolo contendere plea for which adjudication is withheld is properly counted as a
prior sentence under 4A1.1(c) and, thus, should be included in the criminal history
calculation. See Wright, 862 F.3d at 1280; Tamayo, 80 F.3d at 1522; Rockman,
993 F.2d at 813-14. Accordingly, the district court properly determined that
Claret’s two adjudications withheld for marijuana possession qualified as
3
“We review de novo the district court's interpretation and application of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Acuna-Reyna, 677 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.
2012) (quotation marks omitted).
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“diversionary dispositions” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f) for purposes of assigning
one criminal history point to each of them under § 4A1.1(c).
On appeal, Claret for the first time makes a different argument. Now Claret
contends that the government failed to present evidence at the sentencing hearing
that he actually entered a nolo contendere plea. 4 This argument ignores that, at the
sentencing hearing, even Claret’s attorney stated to the district court that “this is as
to the nolo plea to the count where the Court withheld adjudication.” The district
court then even acknowledged that it could be difficult for a defendant who has
entered a nolo contendere plea to understand how that the conviction could be later
counted against them in future cases. In response, Claret again did not dispute that
there were nolo pleas. Rather, defense counsel continued to argue solely that this
Court’s Rockman—holding that a prior offense in which the state court withheld
adjudication after a nolo contendere plea is a “diversionary disposition” under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f)— was incorrectly decided. Claret therefore invited the district
court to find that Claret pled nolo contendere to the adjudication withheld offenses.
Claret’s new argument—that the government did not prove it was a nolo
contendere plea—is foreclosed by the invited-error doctrine. See United States v.
4
In his reply brief, Claret raises additional new arguments as to why the district court
should not have assessed criminal history points for his marijuana convictions, including that the
record did not show that he was represented by counsel or informed of the consequences of his
plea in state court. Because Claret did not make these arguments in his opening brief, we do not
address them. See United States v. Britt, 437 F.3d 1103, 1104 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the doctrine of invited
error applies when a defendant induces or invites the district court to make an
error).
Claret’s final argument is that the district court improperly considered the
underlying facts of one of his marijuana offenses in calculating his criminal history
score. We disagree. First, the district court overruled Claret’s objection and stated
that the withheld adjudications were properly counted. After that ruling, the
district court addressed Claret’s own argument that his marijuana offenses were
minor by pointing out that a firearm was involved in one of the offenses. The
district court then stated, “In any event, I will overrule the defendant’s objection.”
When viewed in context, the district court’s comment does not indicate that the
district court considered the firearm in deciding whether to assign one criminal
history point to that marijuana conviction.
Given that it was undisputed that Claret’s two adjudications withheld
resulted from nolo contendere pleas, the district court properly assigned one
criminal history point for each marijuana possession offense and correctly
calculated Claret’s criminal history score.
AFFIRMED.
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