Daniel Voss v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-10243    Date Filed: 08/17/2022   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-10243
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    DANIEL VOSS,
    an individual,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    STATE FARM        MUTUAL      AUTOMOBILE          INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243          Date Filed: 08/17/2022        Page: 2 of 10
    2                        Opinion of the Court                    22-10243
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-01465-SGC
    ____________________
    Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Donna Smith, an underinsured motorist, hit Daniel Voss
    while he was riding his bicycle. Voss turned to State Farm Insur-
    ance, his underinsured-motorist insurance carrier. State Farm re-
    fused to pay Voss until he won a judgment against Smith—thereby
    proving her liability. After the trial, Voss was awarded $1.9 million
    in damages. He then sued State Farm for breach of contract, bad
    faith, and outrage. A magistrate judge granted State Farm sum-
    mary judgment on each claim. 1 Now, Voss appeals that order. For
    the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I
    Donna Smith struck Daniel Voss with her car while he was
    bicycling, severely injuring him. 2 Nationwide Mutual Insurance
    1Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)(1), the parties consented to have their case
    adjudicated by a magistrate judge.
    2 Voss was taken to the University of Alabama at Birmingham hospital where
    he underwent four brain surgeries. Despite those surgeries, some of Voss’s
    injuries—including impaired cognitive function—will never fully heal.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243        Date Filed: 08/17/2022      Page: 3 of 10
    22-10243                Opinion of the Court                         3
    Company, Smith’s auto insurer, offered Voss its policy limits to set-
    tle the claim against Smith. Unfortunately for Voss, Smith carried
    only $25,000 in liability insurance—far less than his medical ex-
    penses. See Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
    799 F. App'x 768
    ,
    770 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Fortunately for Voss, at the time
    of the collision, he was covered by several State Farm policies that
    included $100,000 of underinsured motorist coverage—still less
    than his medical expenses. Voss informed State Farm that Smith’s
    insurance wouldn’t cover his medical costs and requested an un-
    derinsured-motorist payment.
    As its name implies, underinsured-motorist coverage pays
    an insured for his losses caused by a driver that doesn’t have suffi-
    cient liability insurance to cover the insured’s damages. Here it
    worked essentially like this: Once Voss realized that Nationwide’s
    policy-limits settlement offer wouldn’t cover the cost of his inju-
    ries, he approached his insurer, State Farm. After receiving notice
    that the settlement offer was insufficient to cover Voss’s costs, State
    Farm began investigating Voss’s claim against Smith. At that point
    the insurance policy gave State Farm two options: (a) consent to
    the settlement with Smith/Nationwide or (b) refuse the settle-
    ment. If State Farm consented to the settlement, Nationwide
    would have paid Voss its $25,000 policy limits—thereby releasing
    Smith from any liability—and Voss would then have commenced
    a new, contract-based claim against State Farm for the costs of his
    injuries (or, more likely, would have settled with State Farm for its
    policy limits). If State Farm rejected the settlement, it was required
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243            Date Filed: 08/17/2022        Page: 4 of 10
    4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10243
    to advance, or “front,” Voss the amount of the settlement, and
    leave Voss to pursue a claim against Smith. See 
    id.
    After investigating Voss’s claim, State Farm was uncertain
    about Smith’s liability. 3 Accordingly, it chose option (b) and re-
    jected Nationwide’s policy-limits settlement so that Voss would
    have to prove Smith was, in fact, liable. State Farm “fronted” Voss
    the money that Voss would have received from the Smith/Nation-
    wide settlement, leaving Voss to continue with a suit against
    Smith. Eventually, a jury found Smith liable to Voss for $1.9 mil-
    lion. After the suit, State Farm paid Voss the other $75,000 of his
    underinsured-motorist insurance coverage, and Nationwide paid
    it’s $25,000 policy limit. That left Voss with an excess judgment of
    $1.775 million against Smith.
    So, Voss sued State Farm. He contended that State Farm
    breached its insurance policy in two ways: (1) by failing to conduct
    a good-faith investigation into the question of who was liable for
    the collision; and (2) by refusing to consent to his settlement with
    Smith/Nationwide, thereby forcing him to litigate against Smith
    before paying him. He also contended that State Farm acted in bad
    faith and committed the tort of outrage.
    3 Thisis relevant because under Alabama law, for an insured to receive under-
    insured motorist benefits, the insured must be legally entitled to recover from
    the driver of the underinsured vehicle. See Ex parte Carlton, 
    867 So. 2d 332
    ,
    334 (Ala. 2003). Here, State Farm contends that there was evidence that Smith
    wasn’t liable for the collision and, thus, that it believed Voss may not have
    been entitled to payment.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243             Date Filed: 08/17/2022         Page: 5 of 10
    22-10243                   Opinion of the Court                                 5
    State Farm moved for summary judgment, which a magis-
    trate judge granted. With respect to the breach-of-contract claim,
    the magistrate judge held that, under Alabama law, State Farm had
    to pay Voss only after he demonstrated he was entitled to recovery
    from Smith, and Voss demonstrated liability only after his trial
    against Smith, at which point State Farm paid him. It also held that
    forcing Voss to litigate to establish Smith’s liability was permissible
    under Alabama Law. Thus, the court held, State Farm did not
    breach its contract. The court also held that Voss’s failure to show
    a breach of contract was fatal to his bad-faith claim because breach
    of an insurance contract is an element of that claim. Lastly, it held
    that State Farm’s conduct was not egregious enough to support
    Voss’s outrage claim. Voss now appeals the magistrate judge’s or-
    der. 4
    4 “We review a district court's”—or in this case, the magistrate judge’s—“grant
    of summary judgment de novo.” McNamara v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 
    30 F.4th 1055
    , 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2022). “Summary judgment is proper if ‘the movant
    shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
    “And a genuine dispute exists if a jury applying the applicable evidentiary
    standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant as to
    the material fact.” Brady v. Carnival Corp., 
    33 F.4th 1278
    , 1281 (11th Cir. 2022)
    (cleaned up). “[W]e view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor.” Afford-
    able Bio Feedstock, Inc. v. United States, __ F. 4th __, No. 21-11850, 
    2022 WL 2920058
    , at *2 (11th Cir. July 26, 2022) (quotation omitted).
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243       Date Filed: 08/17/2022    Page: 6 of 10
    6                      Opinion of the Court               22-10243
    II
    For the reasons explained below, we hold that the magis-
    trate judge correctly granted State Farm summary judgment on
    each of Voss’s claims.
    A
    We start with breach of contract. Voss contends that State
    Farm breached its insurance contract by failing to conduct a good-
    faith investigation and by requiring him to sue Smith to recover
    before paying him.
    State Farm’s policy permitted it to “preserve [its] right of
    subrogation against the . . . driver of the uninsured motor vehicle”
    by paying Voss “an amount equal to” Nationwide’s settlement of-
    fer. Doc. 73-22 at 8 (emphasis omitted). State Farm paid Voss
    $25,000 to protect its subrogation right.
    But Voss argues that State Farm shouldn’t have made him
    pursue litigation against Smith. Under Alabama Supreme Court
    precedent, an uninsured-motorist insurance carrier must conduct
    a “good faith investigation” or otherwise “waive any right to sub-
    rogation against the tort-feasor.” Lambert v. State Farm Mut.
    Auto. Ins. Co., 
    576 So. 2d 160
    , 167 (Ala. 1991). Voss seemingly con-
    tends (1) that State Farm did not conduct a “good faith investiga-
    tion” and thereby waived its right to subrogation and, accordingly,
    (2) that it then breached the contract by requiring him to litigate
    against Smith before being willing to pay him. Problematically for
    Voss, Alabama considers a bad-faith failure to investigate a tort
    claim, not a breach-of-contract claim. See State Farm Fire & Cas.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243            Date Filed: 08/17/2022         Page: 7 of 10
    22-10243                   Opinion of the Court                               7
    Co. v. Brechbill, 
    144 So. 3d 248
    , 258 (Ala. 2013). And State Farm
    did not breach any promise that it made in the insurance contract.
    Moreover, Voss cannot prevail on a breach-of-contract
    claim by arguing that State Farm should have paid him sooner.
    The Alabama Supreme Court has held that an insurance company
    can’t be held liable for breach before the insured shows he is “le-
    gally entitled to recover” payment from the underinsured motor-
    ist. Quick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    429 So. 2d 1033
    , 1035
    (Ala. 1983) (holding that State Farm wasn’t liable for failure to pay
    on an uninsured motorist policy because the plaintiffs had not yet
    demonstrated the uninsured driver’s liability); see also Broadway
    v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    364 F. Supp. 3d 1329
    , 1332, 1335–
    36 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (explaining that, to recover from an insurance
    company, an insured must (1) prove that he is entitled to recovery
    against the tortfeasor and (2) show his damages). In other words,
    “[t]here can be no breach of an uninsured motorist contract . . . un-
    til the insured proves that he is legally entitled to recover.” Quick,
    
    429 So. 2d at 1035
    .
    Voss did not prove that he was legally entitled to recover
    from Smith until after trial—at which point State Farm paid him. 5
    5 Trialis not the only method an insured has of showing that he is legally enti-
    tled to recover. An insured can also present the insurance company with “sub-
    stantial evidence” that the uninsured driver was liable. Ex Parte Safeway Ins.
    Co. of Ala., Inc., 
    148 So. 3d 39
    , 43 (2013) (quotation omitted); Broadway, 
    364 F. Supp. 3d at
    1338–39 (M.D. Ala. 2019). But here, Voss did not do so. Alt-
    hough Voss alleged to State Farm that Smith was negligent, he didn’t present
    State Farm with substantial evidence showing that to be the case.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243            Date Filed: 08/17/2022         Page: 8 of 10
    8                          Opinion of the Court                      22-10243
    Accordingly, State Farm did not breach its insurance contract by
    refusing to pay Voss until after he was awarded damages from
    Smith. Because Voss cannot prevail on a breach of contract claim,
    the magistrate judge correctly granted summary judgment.
    B
    Next, Voss’s bad-faith claim. The Alabama Supreme Court
    has held that “[r]egardless of whether the claim is a bad-faith refusal
    to pay or a bad-faith refusal to investigate, the tort of bad faith re-
    quires proof of the . . . absence of legitimate reason for denial.”
    Brechbill, 144 So. 3d at 258 (emphasis added). Here, even if a jury
    could find that State Farm’s investigation was sloppy, 6 it couldn’t
    find that State Farm had no “legitimate reason” for its decision re-
    quiring Voss to litigate. The accident report, State Farm’s photo-
    graphs of the scene, and State Farm’s investigator’s conclusions all
    reasonably led it to believe that Voss might have been contributo-
    rily negligent—and therefore not “entitled to recover.” And State
    Farm was within its rights to “insist that a jury determine liability
    and damages.” Ex parte Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    300 So. 3d 1124
    , 1126 (Ala. 2020). Because the facts, even viewed in favor of
    Voss, cannot demonstrate that State Farm lacked a legitimate
    6 And, to be sure, it was. State Farm did not speak to any of several available
    witness who might have been able to explain what led to the collision. Nor
    did it consult photographs of the scene taken by Nationwide just seven days
    after the collision. Instead, State Farm relied primarily on a police report—the
    information in which was derived solely from Smith (who had an obvious in-
    terest in avoiding liability)—as well as photographs taken four months after
    the collision.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243           Date Filed: 08/17/2022        Page: 9 of 10
    22-10243                  Opinion of the Court                              9
    reason to insist on subrogation, Voss cannot succeed on his tor-
    tious bad-faith claim and the court correctly granted summary
    judgment.
    C
    Finally, “for a plaintiff to recover under [the tort of outrage],
    he must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct (1) was inten-
    tional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused
    emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be ex-
    pected to endure it.” Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge,
    
    565 So. 2d 38
    , 44 (Ala. 1990). For essentially the same reasons that
    we conclude that State Farm didn’t act in bad faith, we hold that a
    reasonable jury could not find that State Farm’s conduct was “ex-
    treme and outrageous.” Thus, Voss could not prevail on his out-
    rage claim, and the magistrate judge correctly granted summary
    judgment for State Farm.
    * * *
    In sum, the magistrate judge appropriately granted sum-
    mary judgment. 7
    7 Voss separately argues that the magistrate judge erred by “refusing to con-
    sider any evidence presented by Voss’ expert in ruling on summary judgment
    without making any affirmative ruling on State Farm’s motion to exclude.”
    Br. of Appellant at 20. The magistrate judge didn’t “de facto” exclude Voss’s
    evidence. Rather, as we read her opinion, the magistrate judge simply found
    that Voss’s proposed evidence didn’t change the result and, accordingly, ruled
    that the evidentiary motion was moot. Doc. 91 at 12, 29. Nowhere in her
    USCA11 Case: 22-10243         Date Filed: 08/17/2022       Page: 10 of 10
    10                       Opinion of the Court                    22-10243
    AFFIRMED.
    opinion does the magistrate judge indicate that she refused to consider the
    presented evidence.