Mike Redford v. Judge Cynthia Wright , 378 F. App'x 987 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-15398 MAY 12, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 09-02645-CV-WSD-1
MIKE REDFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JUDGE CYNTHIA WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(May 12, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought this lawsuit against defendant, a judge
of the Fulton County, Georgia Superior Court, claiming that she had violated his
civil rights by issuing protective orders, affecting his visitation rights with his
children, and seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed
his complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). He now appeals,
arguing that (1) the district judge erred in dismissing his case without considering
its constitutional merits, and (2) the district judge and magistrate judge to whom
the case was referred should have recused.
We review the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a claim de novo. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1997). We also review de novo the district court’s grant of judicial immunity.
Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, a plaintiff
fails to request a judge to recuse, we review for plain error whether the judge
should have recused sua sponte. See Hamm v. Members of the Bd. of Regents, 708
F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a court must “dismiss the case at any time if
the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious,
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915(e)(2).
A judge acting in his or her judicial capacity is entitled to absolute immunity
from liability for damages under § 1983 unless he or she acts in the “clear absence
of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-357, 98 S. Ct. 1099,
1104-05, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978); see also Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1567
(11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a judge performing judicial acts in a matter over
which he had jurisdiction is entitled to immunity for his actions under Section
1983). We have also extended judicial immunity to cases seeking injunctive relief
against the judge. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000).
Recusal is required in certain circumstances, including when the judge “has
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Mere
adverse rulings do not constitute the sort of pervasive bias that necessitates recusal.
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994).
We have reviewed the district court’s order and conclude that it
comprehensively analyzes plaintiff’s claim according to the applicable legal
standards. For the reasons the district court stated in dismissing the complaint, we
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that defendant was entitled to
judicial immunity. Moreover, because plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence of
personal bias or prejudice on the part of the district judge or the magistrate judge,
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these judges committed no plain error in not stepping down.
AFFIRMED.
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