Michael Gibson v. Gadsden, City of Alabama , 377 F. App'x 953 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13460 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 6, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-02355CV-VEH
MICHAEL GIBSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF GADSDEN, ALABAMA,
a municipal corporation,
CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF
GADSDEN, THE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 6, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Gibson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the City of Gadsden, Alabama, the city’s Civil Service Board, and Steven
C. Carroll, Chief of the city’s fire department. The summary judgment resulted in
the dismissal of Gibson’s equal protection and due process claims, which he based
on Appellees’ allegedly discriminatory employment practices. Gibson asserts the
district court erred in ruling (1) his equal protection claim was precluded by his
failure to present any similarly situated comparators; (2) his substantive due
process claim failed because he did not demonstrate interference with any
cognizable fundamental right; and (3) his procedural due process claim failed
because Gibson had no affected property interest. We address each of his claims
in turn and affirm.
I.
Gibson is an African American firefighter who has been employed by the
City of Gadsden’s fire department for seventeen years. Employees hold one of six
ranks in the fire department. In ascending order, the ranks are Firefighter I,
Firefighter II, Driver, Commander, Assistant Chief, and Chief. Gibson has been
ranked Firefighter I for the duration of his employment.
The fire department has a policy under which an employee may “step up” to
serve in an “acting” capacity of a higher ranking employee who is unavailable for
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a given shift. Either a Firefighter I or a Firefighter II may serve as an acting
Driver and will earn a corresponding adjustment in pay for his Driver shift. If the
absence of the higher ranking official exceeds five shifts, however, the
department’s policy requires that only employees with the qualifications necessary
for promotion to the higher-ranking position be allowed to “step up.” To be
eligible for a promotion to the official position of Driver, whose regular duties
include driving fire trucks, an employee must pass both the Firefighter II
certification course and the Apparatus Operator (AO) course. Until 2005, Gibson,
who lacked either certification, often served in the role of acting Driver for periods
of up to five shifts.
In 2005, Gibson was informed that all persons serving as acting Drivers,
even those serving in the position for a term of five shifts or fewer, would be
required to have AO certification. This policy was based on the fire department’s
liability concerns. Several firefighters who had been serving as short-term acting
Drivers without the AO certification, including Gibson, were sent to AO training.
Of those sent to the training, only Gibson failed the course. Gibson was then
offered an opportunity to retake the course, but instead chose to take the
Firefighter II certification course, which he also failed. He did not elect to re-take
either course after failing. Gibson had been allowed to continue serving as an
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acting Driver while attempting to become AO certified. After Gibson’s failure to
become certified, the department no longer allowed Gibson to drive fire trucks.
Gibson then sued, claiming the refusal to allow him to continue to “step up” into
the position of acting driver was a violation of his constitutional equal protection
and due process rights.
II.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution prohibits intentional race
discrimination in public employment. Williams v. Consolidated City of
Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). To establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must show that he is a member of a racial
minority who was treated differently than “similarly situated non-minority”
employees. Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 1985). Gibson
failed to show that the fire department treated similarly situated non-minority
firefighters differently.
Gibson lists several non-African American firefighters who were not AO
certified but who were allowed to drive fire trucks after the 2005 policy was
implemented. The people cited by Gibson, however, were not similarly situated
comparators “in all relevant respects.” See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d
1189, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007). They all held a rank above Driver, and therefore had
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previous experience as full-time Drivers at some point in their careers.1 Gibson
does not have that professional experience. No one of Gibson’s rank was allowed
to drive fire trucks without being AO certified after the 2005 policy was
implemented. Because he fails to show he was treated differently than other
similarly situated non-minority firefighters, Gibson’s equal protection claim fails.
II.
The Constitution’s substantive due process protections extend only to
certain fundamental rights so “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” that “no
amount of process can justify [their] infringement.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d
1550, 1556–67 (11th Cir. 1994). “Because employment rights are state-created
rights and are not ‘fundamental’ rights created by the Constitution, they do not
enjoy substantive due process protection.” Id. at 1560. Because Gibson bases his
substantive due process claim on an employment decision, the claim fails.
III.
The Constitution’s procedural due process protections guarantee citizens
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may wrest
1
Prior to 1995, the department did not require Drivers to be AO certified, and thus the
people at issue all held their Driver positions prior to the change in policy. Currently, these
people do not drive fire trucks on their regular shifts, but on overtime shifts, when every
employee begins with the rank of “acting Firefighter” and then is given the opportunity to step up
into vacant positions.
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from them life, liberty, or property. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, to establish his procedural due process claim on the facts
alleged, Gibson must first demonstrate he had a property interest in the continued
role of acting Driver. “Generally, a public employee has a property interest in
continued employment if state law or local ordinance in any way limits the power
of the appointing body” to end the employment. Ross v. Clayton County, 173 F.3d
1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).
Both the fire department’s Handbook, and the 2005 policy state placement
of an employee in an “acting” position is left entirely to the Fire Chief’s discretion.
The 2005 policy states: “When the position of a superior officer is temporarily
vacant, the Chief may, at his sole discretion, place an employee in that position for
up to five consecutive shifts.” (emphasis added). Section 10(d) of the Handbook
states: “The Fire Chief may, at his discretion, place an employee in a position due
to a temporary absence based on the employee’s qualifications and placement on
the promotional roster.” (emphasis added). We conclude Gibson had no property
interest in the continuation of his duties as acting Driver, as no policy, ordinance,
or other writing created that expectation. Thus, Gibson has failed to establish a
procedural due process claim based on any interference with those duties.
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In accordance with the reasoning above, we conclude Gibson’s claims fail
as a matter of law, and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Appellees.
AFFIRMED.
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