United States v. Tyreik Larry Watson , 581 F. App'x 821 ( 2014 )

Case: 14-10991 Date Filed: 10/17/2014 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10991
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cr-00128-WTM-GRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TYREIK LARRY WATSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(October 17, 2014)
Before HULL, ANDERSON and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Tyreik Larry Watson appeals his 151-month sentence, imposed after
pleading guilty to 1 count of distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Watson argues that his
career­offender enhanced sentence is substantively unreasonable because, although
Watson concedes that his designation as a career offender was technically correct,
its application resulted in an excessive sentence: he says he is merely a long-term
drug addict with no history of violence who sold small amounts of drugs mainly to
support his habit. He contends that the career-offender guideline enhancement
does not distinguish between defendants convicted of the same offense based on
the seriousness of their offense conduct or their prior convictions, creating
unwarranted sentencing disparities through unwarranted uniformity.
Our authority to review sentences is a limited authority. We review the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 596, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007)
(stating that “[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the
Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.”). A court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider all
factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor
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significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the
proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc). The factors that the court weighs are set out in § 3553(a), and
“a district court commits a clear error in judgment when it weighs those factors
unreasonably, arriving at a sentence that does not achieve the purposes of
sentencing as stated in [that statute].” Id. (quotations omitted). These purposes
include the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future
criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). The court must also consider
the nature and circumstances of the offense committed and the defendant’s history
and characteristics, the kinds of sentences available, the guideline range applicable
to the defendant, U.S. Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities between defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct, and any need to provide restitution to
victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
“The district court must evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors when arriving at
a sentence, but is permitted to attach ‘great weight’ to one factor over others.”
United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the district court and we will not substitute our judgment in
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weighing the relevant factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The district court need not “state on the record that
it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or . . . discuss each of the
§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. Instead, all that is required of the court is an
acknowledgement that it considered the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden to show that the
sentence is unreasonable in the light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). Although we do not
presume a sentence falling within the guideline range to be reasonable, we
ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d
739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum
penalty (as is the case here) is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See
United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012) (a sentence was
reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum).
Based on the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that a sentence at the low end of Watson’s guideline range, which
was enhanced based on his status as a career offender, was appropriate in the light
of Watson’s history of recidivism. Watson’s adverse criticism of the general
functioning of the career-offender guideline is unpersuasive, particularly when the
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sentencing court properly found that the facts of this case justified the
enhancement.
Upon review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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