Jason Spencer Weeks v. United States , 382 F. App'x 845 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 11, 2010
No. 09-14229 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 09-01173-CV-T-24-TBM
94-00065-CR-T-2
JASON SPENCER WEEKS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 11, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jason Spencer Weeks (“Weeks”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence. We granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”)
to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether the district court erred in failing to consider the
timeliness of [Weeks’] 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, in light of having
been filed within one year of the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Santos, [553] U.S. [507], 128 S. Ct. 2020, 170 L.E.2d 912(2008), in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)?
(2) Whether the district court erred in finding that [Weeks’] 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 motion to vacate was successive?
R1-11. Our review of the record and the law leads us to conclude that the district
court committed error as to both issues. Accordingly, we REVERSE and
REMAND for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Weeks is currently serving a 360-month sentence for a 1994 jury conviction
on multiple counts: conspiracy to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; four
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; two counts of wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; two counts of money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956; interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314; conspiracy to murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1117; illegal possession
of silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5681; and two counts of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition by fugitives, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922. See
2
United States v. Weeks, 295 Fed. Appx. 942, 943 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(unpublished). We affirmed Weeks’ convictions and sentences on direct appeal in
an unpublished opinion, with the mandate issuing on 15 April 1998. United States
v. Weeks, No. 95-2403 (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 1997); Doc. 457. Weeks did not
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
In December 1998, Weeks filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his
sentence. Doc. 467. In August 1999, the district court dismissed the motion
without prejudice for failure to file a brief or legal memorandum. Doc. 485. In
January 2006, we denied as unnecessary Weeks’ application for leave to file a
second or successive § 2255 motion. In re: Jason Weeks, No. 06-10002-J (11th
Cir. Jan. 24, 2006); Doc. 499. We explained that Weeks did not need permission
to file a second or successive petition because his first § 2255 motion was not
decided on the merits, but rather dismissed without prejudice. See Doc. 499 at 3.
Weeks filed this § 2255 motion on 1 June 2009. R1-1. Citing Santos, he
challenges his convictions and sentences on the two federal money laundering
counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Specifically, he argues that: (1) there was
insufficient evidence to support his convictions, or he is actually innocent, because
his transactions did not involve “profits” from a crime; (2) the indictment was
defective because it did not allege that the charged transaction involved profits
3
from unlawful activity; (3) the jury instruction omitted two necessary elements of
the charged crimes – that profits from a crime were involved in the transaction, and
Weeks knew of this fact; and (4) his sentence exceeded the legal maximum
because the district court erroneously used expense transactions to calculate his
offense level. Id. at 5-9.
On 26 June 2009, the district court denied Weeks’ motion as time-barred and
successive. R1-5 at 3-4. The court found that Weeks’ 2009 motion was untimely
because it was not filed within one year of 1998, the date his conviction became
final. Id. at 2-3. The court did not address Weeks’ argument that his motion was
timely because it was filed within one year of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Santos. See R1-1 at 12. Additionally, the court concluded that Weeks’ motion
should be denied as successive because we had not authorized a successive § 2255
motion. R1-5 at 3. The district court denied a COA. Id. at 4.
Weeks appealed, and we granted a COA limited to the issues of whether the
district court erred in failing to consider the timeliness of his motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), and whether the district court erred in finding that his motion
was successive.
4
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether Weeks’ Motion was Untimely
We review de novo the district court’s determination that Weeks’ § 2255
motion was time-barred. See Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1037 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a § 2255 motion must be filed within one year of the latest of
the following four dates:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2009). For purposes of § 2255(f)(3), the one-year limitations
period begins running on the date the Supreme Court decided the case which
initially recognized the right being asserted. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S.
353, 357, 360, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2482-83 (2005).
5
Weeks’ § 2255 motion was based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Santos,
which was decided on 2 June 2008. Because Weeks filed his § 2255 motion within
one year of that date, on 1 June 2009, his motion met the one-year filing deadline.
Compare id. at 360, 125 S. Ct. at 2483 (concluding that § 2255 motion filed in
April 2001 was untimely because it was filed more than one year after the Supreme
Court decided the relevant case in June 1999). Weeks must still demonstrate that
Santos retroactively applies to a case on collateral review, however. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(3).
In general, Supreme Court decisions that result in a new substantive rule
retroactively apply to final convictions. See Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
351, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004); see also United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709,
711 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“Decisions of the Supreme Court construing
substantive federal criminal statutes must be given retroactive effect.”). New
substantive rules “include[] decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by
interpreting its terms.” Schiro, 542 U.S. at 351, 124 S. Ct. at 2522. As the
Supreme Court explained in Schiro, retroactive application is warranted because
such rules “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of
an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law
cannot impose upon him.” Id. at 352, 124 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (quotation marks and
6
citation omitted).
The Supreme Court did not expressly state that its holding in Santos was
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, and we have not yet decided
this issue in a published opinion. In United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232,
1241-42 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 421 (2009), we
addressed Santos’ application to a money laundering conviction on direct appeal.
We noted that “Santos has limited precedential value” because it was a plurality
opinion, and thus its holding was limited to the position that garnered five votes.
Id. at 1242. “The narrow holding in Santos, at most, was that the gross receipts of
an unlicensed gambling operation were not ‘proceeds’ under section 1956.” Id.Because Demarest had laundered funds from the proceeds of an illegal drug
trafficking enterprise, rather than gross receipts of an illegal gambling operation,
we concluded that Santos did not undermine his conviction. Id.More recently, we determined in an unpublished opinion that Santos does
retroactively apply to a case on collateral review. See King v. Keller, No. 09-
15357, 2010 WL 1337701, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (per curiam)
(unpublished). The petitioner, King, had filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus
petition under the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), challenging his
convictions for conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
7
§ 1956. See id. at *1. King asserted that Santos had decriminalized the conduct
for which he had been convicted because the government had relied on “gross
receipts,” whereas Santos limited “proceeds” to “profits.” Id. In order for King to
obtain relief under the savings clause of § 2255(e), he had to first demonstrate that
his claim was based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision. See id.
at *2. We concluded that he had satisfied this requirement. Citing our decision in
Peter, we explained that “[t]he Santos opinion clearly construed a substantive
federal criminal statute” by defining the meaning of the term “proceeds” in § 1956.
Id. at *3. Accordingly, Santos retroactively applied to King’s case on collateral
review. See id.
Although King is not binding precedent, we find its reasoning persuasive.
See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding
precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). A violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956 occurs when a person knowingly conducts or attempts to conduct a
financial transaction involving “the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2009). Santos narrowed the scope of the money laundering
statute by interpreting the term “proceeds” to mean “profits” rather than “receipts.”
Santos, 523 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2025.1 By construing the statute in this way,
1
Since Santos, Congress has amended § 1956 to include a definition of “proceeds” that
explicitly encompasses the “gross receipts” of unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2010).
8
Santos resulted in a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review because it carries “a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal.” Schiro, 542 U.S. at 352,
124 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Weeks’ § 2255 motion would be
considered timely under § 2255(f)(3) and that the district court erred in failing to
consider the timeliness of the motion under this subsection.
B. Whether Weeks’ Motion was Successive
We also conclude that the district court erred in denying Weeks’ § 2255
motion as successive. We review the district court’s dismissal of the motion on
this basis de novo. See McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir.
2002). A federal prisoner seeking to file a second or successive § 2255 motion
must first obtain certification from the appropriate court of appeals in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2009). However, “[w]hen an
earlier habeas corpus petition was dismissed without prejudice, a later petition is
not ‘second or successive’ for purposes of § 2244(b).” Dunn v. Singletary, 168
F.3d 440, 441 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
As the government correctly recognizes, Weeks’ § 2255 motion is not
successive under § 2244(b) because his first and only other § 2255 motion was
9
dismissed without prejudice. See id. Consequently, Weeks did not need to obtain
authorization to file a second or successive motion. Indeed, we previously denied
as unnecessary Weeks’ application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255
motion for this very reason. The district court therefore erred in denying Weeks’
§ 2255 motion as successive.
C. Whether Weeks is Entitled to Relief Under Santos
Although the government concedes that Weeks’ § 2255 motion was timely
and not successive, it urges us to affirm the district court’s order denying relief
based on the merits of his Santos claim. Specifically, the government argues that
Santos does not apply, under our rationale in Demarest, because Weeks was
involved in a complex Ponzi scheme, not in an illegal gambling operation.
We may not examine this issue, however, because our review is limited to
the issues specified in the COA. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251
(11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Our COA did not include the underlying merits of
Weeks’ Santos claim. Furthermore, because the district court dismissed Weeks’
§ 2255 motion on purely procedural grounds, the COA could not have properly
included the merits of the underlying claim. See Ross v. Moore, 246 F.3d 1299,
1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“When a district court dismisses a petition as
time-barred, it is inappropriate to grant a COA on the constitutional claim e.g., the
10
due process claim in this case.”). Thus, Weeks’ entitlement to substantive relief
based on Santos and Demarest is not at issue in this appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude the district court erred in denying Weeks’ § 2255 motion as
time-barred and in denying his motion as a successive filing. Accordingly, we
REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
11