United States v. Thomas Neal Lynn, Jr. , 385 F. App'x 962 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14205 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 8, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00537-CR-RDP-TMP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
THOMAS NEAL LYNN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 8, 2010)
Before BARKETT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Neal Lynn, Jr., appeals his 78-month sentence for bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Lynn was originally sentenced as a career
offender to 151 months’ imprisonment based upon a plea agreement that included
an appeal waiver, which waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his
conviction or sentence. We dismissed Lynn’s direct appeal of his original
sentence, affirming his guilty plea and finding his appeal waiver knowing and
voluntary. Lynn subsequently filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under
18 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and that he should not have been
sentenced as a career offender. The district court granted the motion in part, ruling
that Lynn was improperly sentenced as a career offender, but that he was not
entitled to further relief. The district court re-sentenced Lynn to 78 months’
imprisonment, the high end of the new guidelines range applicable to Lynn as a
non-career offender.
Lynn raises two issues in this direct appeal of his new sentence: (1) that the
government breached his plea agreement by requesting a sentence above the low
end of the guidelines range at re-sentencing and (2) that his 78-month sentence is
unreasonable.1
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Lynn also raises a third issue on appeal: whether a certificate of appealibility
(“COA”) is required to perfect the appeal of the district court’s partial denial of his § 2255
petition. However, despite Lynn’s representation that he intends to appeal the denial of his §
2255 petition and acknowledgment that to do so requires our grant of a COA, he concedes that
there has been no “substantial showing of the violation of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. §
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I. Breach of Plea Agreement
Whether the government has breached a plea agreement is a question of law
that we review de novo. United States v. Mahique, 150 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir.
1998). However, if the defendant did not object to the alleged breach below, then
we review only for plain error. Puckett v. United States, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.
1423, 1428–29 (2009). Lynn concedes that plain error review should apply here.
Plain error requires the defendant to show: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that
affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d
1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). For an error to affect substantial rights, it must be
prejudicial. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778
(1993). In the context of an alleged governmental breach of a plea agreement, the
question of prejudice does not relate to whether the defendant would have entered
into the plea, but rather, whether his sentence was affected by the government’s
breach. Puckett, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. at 1432–34 & n.4.
Lynn argues that the government breached his plea agreement by
recommending a sentence at the high end of the guidelines at re-sentencing. Lynn
2253(c)(2), and recommends that we refuse to grant his COA. Because Lynn did not proffer any
basis for our granting a COA in his case, we adopt his recommendation and decline to issue him
one. Therefore, we need not address the government’s argument that Lynn’s notice of appeal
was insufficient to evidence his intent to appeal the district court’s order partially denying his §
2255 relief.
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asserts that he had a reasonable expectation that the government would take the
same position at re-sentencing as it had at his original sentencing hearing and
recommend a sentence at the low end of the guidelines. According to Lynn, this
breach affected his substantial rights because he would have received a more
favorable sentence but for the government’s sentencing arguments before the
district court.
“The government is bound by any material promises it makes to a defendant
as part of a plea agreement that induces the defendant to plead guilty.” United
States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 370 (11th Cir.1996). “Whether the government
violated the agreement is judged according to the defendant's reasonable
understanding at the time he entered his plea.” United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d
1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992). As part of Lynn’s plea agreement, the government
agreed to recommend a sentence “at the low end of the guidelines range” though
reserving “the full right of allocution.” At re-sentencing, the government reminded
the district court that it was obligated by the plea agreement to recommend a
sentence at the low end of the guidelines range, but nonetheless argued that (1) the
non-career-offender guidelines range in the PSI did not reflect an adequate or
reasonable sentence for someone who had committed four bank robberies, (2) that
the court should consider this inadequacy as a § 3553(a) sentencing factor, and (3)
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that although the prosecutor was not asking for Lynn to be sentenced as a career
offender, it was requesting the court to impose a reasonable sentence in light of
Lynn’s criminal history.
It was entirely reasonable for Lynn to understand the government’s promise
to recommend a low-end-of-the-guidelines sentence as including a promise that the
government would not advocate reasons for departing from that recommendation.
See Taylor, 77 F.3d at 370. The government’s comments at sentencing may breach
the promises contained in a plea agreement even when the prosecutor’s words do
not explicitly call for the forbidden result. See id. at 370 (“Advocacy of a position
requiring a greater sentence is flatly inconsistent with recommendation of a lesser
sentence.”); United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 987–88 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the prosecutor’s arguments suggesting a harsh sentence breached the
government’s promise in the plea agreement “not to recommend what sentence
should be imposed”). Moreover, merely paying “lip service” to a plea agreement
does not satisfy the government’s obligation under a plea agreement to make a
particular sentencing recommendation. Taylor, 77 F.3d at 371. By advocating for
a higher sentence based on Lynn’s criminal history, in contradiction to its promise
to recommend a low-end-of-the-guidelines sentence, the government was merely
paying lip service to the plea agreement, resulting in the breach of its sentencing
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contract with Lynn.
However, Lynn cannot establish that this breach affected his substantial
rights and thus cannot satisfy the third and fourth prongs of our circuit’s plain-error
review. The record reflects that, in its order setting Lynn’s re-sentencing hearing,
the district court gave notice to Lynn and the government of its intent to consider
an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines based on the inadequacy of
Lynn’s criminal history without the career offender enhancement. And at re-
sentencing, the district court acknowledged its understanding that the government
had recommended a sentence at the low-end of the guidelines but concluded that
this case was not a low-end-of-the-guidelines case. In light of the record evidence
that the district court, in its own discretion, viewed this case as warranting a
sentence above the low-end of the modified guidelines, Lynn has not shown that
but for the government’s arguments he would have received a more favorable
sentence. See Puckett, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. at 1432–34 & n.4. Accordingly, we
affirm Lynn’s sentence on this ground.
II. Reasonableness of Sentence
Despite our Court’s prior finding that Lynn’s appeal waiver was knowingly
and voluntarily made, he attempts to appeal to our Court for review of the
reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351
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(11th Cir. 1993) (“for a waiver to be effective it must be knowing and voluntary”).
Lynn argues that because he was originally improperly sentenced, an ambiguity
exists regarding whether the appeal waiver has been waived or severed from the
plea agreement. According to Lynn, this ambiguity should be construed in his
favor to allow him to challenge the reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the
district court at re-sentencing. In light of our prior resolution of the validity of
Lynn’s appeal waiver, the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits our reconsideration of
this issue.
Under the law of the case doctrine, we are bound by findings of fact and
conclusions of law that we made in a prior appeal of the same case unless one of
the following exceptions applies: (1) new evidence is presented, (2) there has been
an intervening change in controlling law, or (3) the prior appellate decision is
clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice if implemented. Litman v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Lynn
cannot show that any of these exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine apply so
as to permit our reconsideration of the validity of his sentence-appeal waiver. We
have recognized that a valid appeal waiver even waives the right to appeal
“difficult or debatable issues or even blatant error.” United States v. Frye, 402
F.3d 1123, 1129 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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Therefore, Lynn’s appeal waiver precludes him from challenging the
reasonableness of his sentence. Accordingly, with respect to Lynn’s challenge to
the reasonableness of his sentence, we dismiss his appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
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