Eddie Lee Cotton v. G.S. Development ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-15830 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 2, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00116-CV-WLS-1
EDDIE LEE COTTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
G.S. DEVELOPMENT,
doing business as Fairfield Inn,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 2, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eddie Lee Cotton, an African-American male, appeals pro se the grant of
summary judgment to GS Development on his claims alleging wrongful demotion
and termination, failure to promote, and hostile work environment, all based on
race, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. After review, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Wrongful demotion, termination, and failure to promote
Cotton asserts the district court erred in finding he failed to show members
of an unprotected class were treated more favorably than him.1 He further
contends GS Development has failed to contradict evidence presented showing his
greater qualifications and experience compared to Morrison, the white female who
was promoted to general manager over him.
Where a plaintiff supports his Title VII claim with circumstantial evidence,
we analyze his claim using the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087
(11th Cir. 2004). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once a prima facie
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Cotton filed a bare bones “Memorandum of Law to Support Denying Defendant Motion
for Summary Judgment” on October 21, 2006. Despite the district court’s finding Cotton did not
properly respond to GS Development’s motion for summary judgment, the court reviewed “any
timely submissions” filed in connection with the motion for summary judgment. Thus, Cotton
was not prejudiced by the district court’s finding Cotton did not properly respond to the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
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case of discrimination is established, the burden shifts to the employer to state a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Combs v.
Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). If the employer
successfully does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason
offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Assuming, arguendo, that Cotton established a prima facie case of
discrimination, Cotton has not presented evidence demonstrating the legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason articulated by GS Development for demoting,
terminating, and not promoting him was merely a pretext for discrimination. See
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1301 (11th Cir.
2007) (stating an appeals court may affirm for any reason supported by the record
even if not relied upon by the district court). GS Development cited Cotton’s
deficient performance as a guest services supervisor as the reason for demoting,
terminating, and failing to promote Cotton. GS Development presented objective
evidence that Cotton performed poorly as a guest services supervisor as the guest
service score had dropped during Cotton’s time in that position. Because Cotton
has not shown that his employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment actions was merely a pretext for discrimination, the district
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court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to his wrongful
demotion, termination, and failure to promote claims.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Cotton contends he timely filed an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) charge concerning his hostile work environment claim
because he circled “wages” in his EEOC questionnaire. Administrative review of
any Title VII claim by the EEOC is a prerequisite to judicial review of such a
claim. See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000),
overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 n.52 (11th
Cir. 2003) (en banc). “EEOC regulations provide that charges should contain,
among other things, ‘[a] clear and concise statement of the facts, including
pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices.’” Id.
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3)). Although we liberally construe EEOC
charges that are prepared without the assistance of counsel, “a plaintiff’s judicial
complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably
be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of
Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).
It is clear from the face of the EEOC charge of discrimination that Cotton
failed to mention his hostile work environment claim and only discussed his failure
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to promote and wrongful demotion and termination claims. Because Cotton failed
to raise his hostile work environment claim in his EEOC charge, he did not exhaust
his remedies with the EEOC with respect to this claim. Consequently, the district
court did not err by granting summary judgment on this claim.
C. Motions for reconsideration
Cotton contends the district court erred in denying his motions to reconsider;
specifically, in finding A.T. Bragdon’s letter and Denise Webb’s affidavit not
sufficient to grant a motion for reconsideration because Cotton had not exercised
due diligence in obtaining these documents. We conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Cotton’s motions for reconsideration because
Cotton failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining Webb’s affidavit and
Bragdon’s letter. See Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir.
2007) (reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse
of discretion); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on
other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 n.52 (11th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (stating while pro se submissions should be liberally construed, “[l]iberal
construction does not mean liberal deadlines”).
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II. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and denial of Cotton’s motions for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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