Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. QBE Insurance , 395 F. App'x 659 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________   ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    SEPT 14, 2010
    No. 09-13247                         JOHN LEY
    ________________________                     CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 07-22988-CV-RWG
    BUCKLEY TOWERS CONDOMINIUM, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee-
    Cross-Appellant,
    versus
    QBE INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellant-
    Cross-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (September 14, 2010)
    Before BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and HOOD,* District Judge.
    *
    Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Kentucky, sitting by designation.
    MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
    Appellee/cross-appellant Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. (Buckley
    Towers), the owner of a pair of condominium buildings in Miami-Dade County,
    Florida, purchased hurricane insurance from appellant/cross-appellee QBE
    Insurance Corp. (QBE), but when Hurricane Wilma struck South Florida in
    October 2005, QBE did not pay. Buckley Towers sued and, after trial in federal
    district court, a jury awarded it nearly $20 million in damages. At issue in this case
    is whether the district court erred in denying QBE’s post-trial motion for judgment
    as a matter of law, motion to amend or alter the judgment, and motion for a new
    trial.
    The insurance contract clearly required that Buckley Towers make actual
    repairs before seeking Replacement Cost Value (RCV) and law and ordinance
    damages. Although Buckley Towers made no such repairs, the district court held
    that the doctrine of prevention of performance permitted Buckley Towers to
    recover RCV and law and ordinance damages. QBE asserts that this was reversible
    error under Florida law. We agree, and hold that Buckley Towers had no right to
    recover these damages under the policy. We also agree with QBE that the contract
    between these parties did not allow for the provision of prejudgment interest, and
    hold that it was error for the district court to award it as well.
    2
    QBE further claims that it was error for the district court to allow Actual
    Cost Value (ACV) damages, because there was no evidence that Buckley Towers
    ever submitted a proper claim for ACV damages. As we read the trial record,
    however, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s award as to ACV
    damages. Moreover, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny
    QBE’s motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. Accordingly, we
    reverse the district court’s judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand in part for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I.
    Hurricane Wilma hit South Florida in October 2005, badly damaging
    Buckley Towers, a pair of condominium buildings in Miami-Dade County.
    Buckley Towers first contacted QBE about the loss it sustained in February 2006,
    four months after the hurricane hit.            Buckley’s public adjuster, Denise
    Valderamma, sent a letter to QBE asking for an “advance payment due to the
    amount of major and structure damage the property suffered due to Hurricane
    Wilma accordingly [sic] to the policy provisions and endorsements.”
    Buckley submitted its first Sworn Proof of Loss in April 2006. When QBE
    rejected the first claim due to various errors, Buckley Towers in June 2006
    submitted a second Sworn Proof of Loss, consisting of a form that contained
    3
    information applicable to both RCV damages and ACV damages. Buckley Towers
    designated the “Full Cost of Repair or Replacement” as $5,187,388.03, the
    “Applicable Depreciation” as $12,503.43, and the “Actual Cash Value Loss” as
    $5,174,885.50.    Buckley Towers designated the “Net Amount Claimed” as
    $4,238,708.50. QBE never paid the claim, nor fully rejected it, construing it to be
    a demand for RCV damages and, therefore, not due until repairs were complete.
    After determining that QBE was unlikely to pay its claim, Buckley Towers
    sued QBE in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
    invoking its diversity jurisdiction and seeking ACV damages, RCV damages, law
    and ordinance damages, and a declaratory judgment. Buckley Towers conceded
    that it had not completed repairs before requesting damages and that repair was
    required under the contract before claiming RCV damages. Nevertheless, the trial
    court instructed the jury that QBE may be obliged to pay RCV damages if it found
    that QBE had prevented Buckley Towers’ performance under the RCV provision
    of the contract by denying ACV damages.
    After trial, the jury found that Buckley Towers had submitted a request for
    ACV damages and awarded the building $11,395,665 in ACV damages. Pursuant
    to the trial court’s prevention of performance instruction, the jury also awarded
    Buckley Towers $18,708,608 for RCV damages. The jury also awarded Buckley
    4
    Towers $803,500,000 in law and ordinance damages per building. The district
    court entered final judgment for Buckley Towers in the amount of $19,379,431, the
    sum of RCV damages and law and ordinance damages. After Buckley Towers
    moved for an amended judgment to add prejudgment interest, the district court
    added $5,607,319.87 in interest to the jury award, amounting to a final award of
    $24,986,750.87.   QBE moved for a judgment as a matter of law as to RCV
    damages, ACV damages, and law and ordinance damages, moved for a new trial
    on the basis of juror misconduct, and moved to alter or amend the judgment to
    remove the prejudgment interest. The district court denied all of QBE’s motions
    and this timely appeal ensued.
    II.
    QBE argues that the district court’s most fundamental error was applying the
    doctrine of prevention of performance, thereby allowing Buckley Towers to claim
    RCV damages, even though, under the express terms of the contract, Buckley
    Towers had failed to repair or replace the damaged property.   Under Florida law,
    the doctrine of prevention of performance may be applied when one party to a
    contract prevents another from performing its obligations under a contract; it bars
    the preventing party from availing himself of the other party’s nonperformance.
    Knowles v. Henderson, 
    22 So. 2d 384
    , 385-86 (Fla. 1945). However, we think the
    5
    district court erred in applying prevention of performance in this case for several
    reasons.
    In the first place, the insurance contract unambiguously requires the insured
    to repair its property before receiving RCV damages.       The insurance contract
    specifically provides that QBE “will not pay on a replacement cost basis for any
    loss or damage (1) Until the lost or damaged property is actually repaired or
    replaced; and (2) Unless the repairs or replacement are made as soon as reasonably
    possible after the loss or damage.” Condominium Association Coverage Form,
    provision G(3)(d). [DX-1, p. 13-14 out of 14] The insurance contract contains no
    allowances for advance payments to fund repairs.      Both parties agree, and the
    record undeniably establishes, that Buckley Towers never completed repairs and,
    thus, would be barred from recovering RCV damages under the plain terms of the
    contract.   We must accept the unambiguous terms of this contract because
    “[i]nsurance contracts are construed in accordance with the plain language of the
    policies as bargained for by the parties.” Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
    Swindal, 
    622 So. 2d 467
    , 470 (Fla. 1993).
    Applying the doctrine of prevention of performance in this case would
    impermissibly rewrite the insurance contract on the equitable theory that it would
    be too costly for Buckley Towers to comply with the terms of the agreement.
    6
    Under Florida’s binding law, however, courts are not free to rewrite the terms of an
    insurance contract and where a policy provision “is clear and unambiguous, it
    should be enforced according to its terms.” Acosta, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
    Co., 
    39 So. 3d 565
    , 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citation and quotation marks
    omitted). Allowing Buckley Towers to claim RCV damages without repairing or
    replacing entirely removes the plaintiff’s obligations under the Replacement Cost
    Value section of the contract. The parties freely negotiated for that contractual
    provision and it is not the place of a court to red-line that obligation from the
    contract.
    Nor is it a defense to say that it would be costly for Buckley Towers to
    comply with the insurance contract as written.      “Inconvenience or the cost of
    compliance [with contractual terms], though they might make compliance a
    hardship, cannot excuse a party from the performance of an absolute and
    unqualified undertaking to do a thing that is possible and lawful.” N. Am. Van
    Lines v. Collyer, 
    616 So. 2d 177
    , 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).         Although
    Buckley Towers may be unable to receive the full range of benefits of their
    contract without an advance payment under Florida law, that cost and
    inconvenience may not relieve them of repairing the building prior to claiming
    RCV damages.
    7
    Indeed, the Florida courts have upheld similar contracts that expressly
    require repair before claiming RCV damages. The Florida Supreme Court has
    explained that, with contracts such as the one in this case, replacement cost
    damages do not “arise until the repair or replacement has been completed.”
    Ceballo v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 
    967 So. 2d 811
    , 815 (Fla. 2007) (citation and
    quotation marks omitted). See also State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Patrick, 
    647 So. 2d 983
    , 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam). And, by example, the
    First District Court of Appeal recently held that a trial court had erred by allowing
    an insured homeowner who had chosen to sell his property rather than repair the
    structures appurtenant to the house to claim RCV damages instead of ACV
    damages for the structures. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, -- So. 3d --, No.
    1D09-4128, 
    2010 WL 2671808
    , *8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 7, 2010).
    Buckley Towers has been unable to cite us to any Florida case in a first-
    party insurance action that has employed the doctrine of prevention of performance
    to vitiate a plaintiff’s contractual obligation to repair or replace damaged property
    before applying for RCV damages. The doctrine of prevention of performance
    applies, generally, when a party to a contract is ready, willing and able to perform,
    but the other party prevents him from performing by imposing obstacles not
    contemplated within the contract. See, e.g., Walker v. Chancey, 
    117 So. 705
    , 707-
    8
    08 (Fla. 1928) (applying the doctrine of prevention of performance where an owner
    sold a house on which a broker had secured another “ready, willing and able”
    buyer, preventing the broker from collecting the commission); Crane v. Barnett
    Bank of Palm Beach County, 
    698 So. 2d 902
    , 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
    (explaining that “the bank prevented the borrower’s performance by refusing the
    borrower’s payments (on advice of counsel) until the borrower’s wife signed
    mortgage modification documents although she was not legally obligated to do
    so”). But there is no indication that Florida courts would apply the doctrine to
    change the basic terms of the underlying contract. And it is not the role of a
    federal court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, and bound by the command of Erie
    Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    (1938), to do so without some palpable
    foundation in the law of Florida.
    Buckley Towers suggests, however, that two suretyship cases might provide
    the necessary precedent for employing prevention of performance in this case:
    Continental Casualty Co. v. Reddick, 
    196 So. 2d 239
    (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
    and Allied Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Scott, 
    516 So. 2d 315
    (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
    1987).1 We are not persuaded that these cases apply. In the two suretyship cases
    1
    Buckley Towers also says that Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 
    363 So. 2d 166
    (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), provides precedent for the application of the doctrine of prevention of
    performance in an insurance contract. However, Kovarnik is not an application of prevention of
    performance, but rather another equitable doctrine. In Kovarnik, the insurer denied coverage.
    9
    cited to us, the plaintiffs had prevented the “ready, willing and able” defendant,
    
    Reddick, 196 So. 2d at 241
    , from performing under the contract by imposing
    obstacles outside of the scope of the parties’ agreement. See 
    id. at 240
    (plaintiff
    prevented defendant from performing unless he first secured a $50,000 bond,
    something he was not obligated to do under the contract); 
    Scott, 516 So. 2d at 317
    (plaintiff prevented defendant from performing by removing files from his office).
    In sharp contrast, here, QBE was enforcing its express rights under the contract.
    Whatever obstacles the language of this policy created, the obstacles were not
    imposed on account of conduct falling outside the scope of the parties’ agreement
    itself. The insurance contract clearly provides for the possibility of a lawsuit to
    determine the right to payment. What’s more, the insurance contract provides for
    another means of seeking reimbursement for hurricane damage, without any need
    to repair or replace anything -- the requirement of the insurer to honor a properly
    made ACV claim. But nothing in this insurance contract, or in Florida law for that
    matter, requires QBE to fund the repairs before the building claims RCV damages.
    In short, as we read Florida law, the doctrine of prevention of performance may not
    The insured then settled with the third-party tortfeasor, without first informing the insurer.
    When the insurer sought to rely upon that failure to notify in a subsequent suit between the
    insurer and insured, the court held that the insurer was estopped from benefitting from the
    insured’s noncompliance with the terms of the insurance contract after the insurer’s denial of her
    claim. 
    Id. at 169.
    But the insurer’s denial of the claim did not prevent the insured from
    complying with a condition precedent in the contract: the denial did not prevent the insured from
    telling the insurer about the settlement.
    10
    be wielded as a sword in a case like this one where the insured is required first to
    meet its obligations to repair under the policy provision.
    In the absence of any square Florida precedent to the contrary, we hold that
    it was error for the district court to instruct the jury that they could award Buckley
    Towers RCV damages notwithstanding the clear terms of the insurance contract
    under the doctrine of prevention of performance. QBE was entitled to a grant of its
    motion for judgment as a matter of law on replacement cost value damages.
    III.
    Having held that the doctrine of prevention of performance cannot excuse
    Buckley Towers from its obligation to repair to obtain RCV damages, it follows
    that Buckley Towers’ award of law and ordinance damages must also be reversed.
    Under the terms of the insurance contract, Buckley Towers is not entitled to law
    and ordinance damages unless “such damage results in enforcement of the
    ordinance or law.” Ordinance or Law Coverage, Provision B.2. [DX-1].
    Nevertheless, the district court denied QBE’s motion for a judgment as a matter of
    law, again on the theory that QBE had prevented Buckley Towers from repairing
    by failing to provide ACV damages. However, under Florida law and under the
    terms of the contract, Buckley Towers is not entitled to law and ordinance damages
    because it never repaired the property and never actually incurred increased
    11
    damages due to the enforcement of laws or ordinances. 
    Ceballo, 967 So. 2d at 815
    (holding that an insured was required by the insurance company to repair property
    and “incur[] an additional loss in order to recover” law and ordinance damages);
    Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Ceballo, 
    934 So. 2d 536
    , 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
    (same). For the reasons we have already explained, the doctrine of prevention of
    performance provides no excuse from Buckley Towers’ obligation to perform its
    duties under the contract.2
    IV.
    It was also error to award Buckley Towers prejudgment interest contrary to
    the express terms of the insurance contract. Although the district court’s factual
    findings in calculating damages are ordinarily reviewed for clear error, where the
    error inheres in the court’s interpretation of the insurance policy, we review the
    calculation of damages de novo. Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds
    Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 
    117 F.3d 1328
    , 1339 (11th Cir. 1997).
    Under Florida law, “for the purpose of assessing prejudgment interest, a
    claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of prejudgment interest when a verdict
    2
    Our holdings on RCV damages and law and ordinance damages dispose of two other
    grounds for appeal that QBE has raised. First, we need no longer answer whether the law and
    ordinance damages are duplicative of RCV damages. Neither has been sustained. Second, we
    need not address whether the district court’s jury instruction about prevention of performance
    entitled QBE to a new trial. The jury instruction was limited to RCV and law and ordinance
    damages; it did not infect the remainder of the jury verdict.
    12
    has the effect of fixing damages as of a prior date.” Taylor v. N.H. Ins. Co. of
    Manchester, 
    489 So. 2d 207
    , 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Not surprisingly,
    Florida law holds that prejudgment interest is governed by the terms of the
    insurance contract. Columbia Cas. Co. v. Southern Flapjacks, Inc., 
    868 F.2d 1217
    ,
    1219-20 (11th Cir. 1989). This insurance contract provides that damages are only
    due either “(1) 20 days after [QBE] receives the sworn proof of loss, and [QBE]
    has reached agreement with [Buckley Towers]” on the amount of loss, or (2)
    “within 30 days after [QBE] receive[s] a sworn proof of loss and [t]here is an entry
    of a final judgment.” Florida Changes, Provision D. [DX-1]. Because neither of
    those conditions were satisfied until final judgment, Buckley Towers is not entitled
    to prejudgment interest under Florida law.        Citizens Property Ins. Corp v.
    Hamilton, -- So. 3d --, No. 1D09-4128, 
    2010 WL 2671808
    , *9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
    July 7, 2010) (holding that the trial court had erred in awarding prejudgment
    interest where the contract allowed “the insurer 60 days from the date a judgment
    is entered to make a loss payment”).
    V.
    As for ACV damages, however, we conclude that the jury had sufficient
    evidence from which to reasonably find that Buckley Towers had made an ACV
    damages request, and that it was entitled to ACV damages. According to QBE, the
    13
    district court erred in denying its motion for a judgment as a matter of law
    concerning the ACV damages because Buckley Towers’ paperwork showed that
    they were actually claiming RCV damages. QBE first points to Valderamma’s
    February letter, asking for an “advance payment.” Because ACV damages are due
    before repair, the term “advance” implies, the appellant argues, that Buckley
    Towers were seeking damages not yet due, that is, RCV damages. QBE also says
    that the second Sworn Proof of Loss was inadequate as an ACV claim because
    Buckley Towers had entered a sum on the Proof of Loss form in the category “Full
    Cost of Repair or Replacement,” a category only relevant to RCV claims. Finally,
    QBE claims that the absence of any appropriate depreciation on the second Sworn
    Proof of Loss indicated that the proof of loss was actually an RCV claim.
    We review the denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law de novo
    and apply the same standard as the district court. Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
    
    608 F.3d 1202
    , 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2010). “The motion should be denied only if
    reasonable and fair-minded persons exercising impartial judgment might reach
    different conclusions.” 
    Id. at 1211.
    Although QBE has shown that Buckley Towers may have submitted an
    inartfully drafted claim for damages, we think the jury could have found on this
    record that Buckley Towers sought ACV damages. In the first place, even if we
    14
    read the letter to be a demand for “advance” RCV damages, the jury was not
    precluded from finding that the second Sworn Proof of Loss -- the legally operative
    document -- was a demand for ACV damages.
    Second, even though depreciation is necessarily part of actual cash value
    damages, Goff v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 
    999 So. 2d 684
    , 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
    2008), the insurance contract does not affirmatively obligate the insured to include
    depreciation in its initial proof of loss. Instead, depreciation may be calculated as
    part of the appraisal process. Am. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Perez, 
    689 So. 2d 290
    , 292
    (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“The dollar amount of value, cost, and depreciation are
    all factors to be considered through accepted appraisal practices.”). Nor did the
    insurance contract clearly explain that depreciation was an element of actual cash
    value; nowhere did it define the term “actual cash value.” Imposing on Buckley
    Towers the affirmative obligation to set forth depreciation in the Sworn Proof of
    Loss would add a new term to the insurance contract, which we are not free to do.
    Royal Ins. Co. v. Latin Am. Aviation Servs., Inc., 
    210 F.3d 1348
    , 1351 (11th Cir.
    2000).
    Moreover, and most significantly, Buckley Towers’ second Sworn Proof of
    Loss included a typewritten entry for cash value loss in the amount of
    $5,174,885.50 next to the category “Actual Cash Value Loss,” arguably putting the
    15
    insurance company on notice that the insured was seeking actual cash value from
    QBE. In short, a jury could find, as it plainly did, that Buckley Towers made an
    ACV claim. The district court properly denied QBE’s motion for judgment as a
    matter of law on that theory of damages.
    VI.
    QBE also claims that the trial court erred in denying a new trial on the
    ground of juror misconduct, because a juror failed to reveal potentially relevant
    information during voir dire on his employment, insurance claims, litigation
    history and condominium ownership. We review the district court’s denial of a
    motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst.,
    P.A. v. Sanderson, 
    573 F.3d 1186
    , 1200 n.16 (11th Cir. 2009), and its factual
    findings for clear error.      Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military
    Healthcare Servs., Inc., 
    601 F.3d 1159
    , 1169 (11th Cir. 2010). We find no abuse
    of discretion here.
    After trial, QBE investigated the juror and moved for a new trial on the basis
    of alleged misconduct.      The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to
    investigate the allegations. At that hearing, in response to the judge’s questions,
    the juror explained under oath various omissions and alleged inconsistencies found
    in his voir dire.     After observing the juror, the district court concluded that the
    16
    juror had made honest mistakes and omissions because he misunderstood some of
    the questions and others were not stated with sufficient clarity. The district court
    also found that none of the responses, had they been given in a more fulsome
    manner at voir dire, would have been grounds to excuse the juror. On this record,
    we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in fact-finding or abused its
    considerable discretion in denying QBE’s motion for a new trial. See, e.g., United
    States v. Carpa, 
    271 F.3d 962
    , 967 (11th Cir. 2001) (“To obtain a new trial for
    juror misconduct during voir dire, a party must: 1) demonstrate that a juror failed
    to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then 2) show that a correct
    response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”).3
    VII.
    In sum, we reverse the district court’s denial of QBE’s motion for judgment
    as a matter of law as to Replacement Cost Value damages and law and ordinance
    damages, but affirm its denial of QBE’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as
    to Actual Cash Value Damages.              We also hold that the district court erred in
    3
    Buckley Towers raises two issues on cross-appeal. First, it claims that the district court
    erred by dismissing Buckley Towers’ claim that QBE breached an implied warranty of good
    faith and fair dealing. Second, it says that the district court erred by dismissing the part of its
    declaratory judgment claim pertaining to QBE’s violation of Fla. Stat. § 627.701(4)(a), a law
    that regulates the typeface and type size required for the hurricane deductibles in insurance
    policies. However, another panel of this Court has already certified both of these questions to
    the Florida Supreme Court, Chalfonte Condominium Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp.,
    
    561 F.3d 1267
    , 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2009), and we reserve judgment on them until the Florida
    Supreme Court has definitively answered the questions.
    17
    applying prejudgment interest in the amended final judgment.       We affirm the
    district court’s denial of QBE’s motion for a new trial and reserve judgment on the
    two issues raised on cross-appeal.
    REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED in part for
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-13247

Citation Numbers: 395 F. App'x 659

Judges: Barkett, Marcus, Hood

Filed Date: 9/14/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (20)

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Patrick , 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 12177 ( 1994 )

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CAS. v. Swindal , 622 So. 2d 467 ( 1993 )

St. Luke's Cataract & Laser Institute. P.A. v. Sanderson , 573 F.3d 1186 ( 2009 )

North American Van Lines v. Collyer , 616 So. 2d 177 ( 1993 )

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins , 58 S. Ct. 817 ( 1938 )

Taylor v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. of Manchester , 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1244 ( 1986 )

Ceballo v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp. , 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 566 ( 2007 )

Sacred Heart Health Systems, Inc. v. Humana Military ... , 601 F.3d 1159 ( 2010 )

Knowles v. Henderson , 156 Fla. 31 ( 1945 )

Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. , 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 16463 ( 1978 )

Chalfonte Condominium Apartment Assoc., Inc. v. QBE Ins. ... , 561 F.3d 1267 ( 2009 )

columbia-casualty-company-plaintiff-counter-defendant-appellant-v , 868 F.2d 1217 ( 1989 )

CITIZENS PROPERTY INS. CORP. v. Ceballo , 934 So. 2d 536 ( 2006 )

United States v. Carpa , 271 F.3d 962 ( 2001 )

Acosta, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. , 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11109 ( 2010 )

Crane v. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County , 698 So. 2d 902 ( 1997 )

Walker and McClelland v. Chancey , 96 Fla. 82 ( 1928 )

MEE INDUSTRIES v. Dow Chemical Co. , 608 F.3d 1202 ( 2010 )

Goff v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co. , 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 18606 ( 2008 )

American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Perez , 689 So. 2d 290 ( 1997 )

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