Justus Peeler v. Comm'r of Social Security , 400 F. App'x 492 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                   FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-15596                  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCTOBER 15, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 08-61605-CV-WCT
    JUSTUS PEELER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Michael Astrue,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (October 15, 2010)
    Before BLACK, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Justus Peeler appeals the magistrate judge’s order affirming the
    administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of his application for supplemental
    security income (“SSI”) benefits, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1383
    (c)(3).1 After review, we
    affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In 2005, Peeler applied for SSI benefits due to back problems and a hip
    replacement. Peeler alleged that he was disabled as of March 15, 1990.
    After a hearing, the ALJ evaluated Peeler’s claim using the five-step
    sequential process. With regard to the first three steps, the ALJ found that Peeler:
    (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful employment in the past fifteen years; (2)
    had severe impairments of “status post left hip replacement,” “status post broken
    right ankle with internal fixation” and “status post left wrist internal fixation,” but
    that these impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed
    impairments in the regulations; and (3) had the residual functional capacity
    (“RFC”) to perform “a wide range of sedentary work activities.”2 With regard to
    Peeler’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Peeler (1) could stand and
    walk for less than two hours of an eight-hour day; (2) could sit for six to eight
    hours with the ability to alternate positions; (3) could occasionally use his left hand
    1
    The parties consented to proceeding before a magistrate judge.
    2
    Residual functional capacity, or RFC, is a medical assessment of what the claimant can
    do in a work setting despite any mental, physical or environmental limitations caused by the
    claimant’s impairments and related symptoms. 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.945
    (a).
    2
    for performing gross manipulation with no limitation on his capacity for fine
    dexterity or reaching; (4) could not climb, balance or crouch; (5) could
    occasionally twist, stoop and kneel; (6) could not be exposed to unprotected
    heights or hazardous machinery. At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Peeler had
    no past relevant work.
    As to the fifth step, the ALJ noted Peeler’s age of 41, which qualified him as
    a “younger individual” under the regulations, limited education, and RFC. The
    ALJ acknowledged that Peeler’s ability to perform the full range of sedentary work
    had been “impeded by additional limitations.” The ALJ nonetheless found that
    jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Peeler could
    perform.
    To this end, the ALJ relied upon the hearing testimony of Dr. Howard
    Feldman, a vocational expert (“VE”). In response to a hypothetical question from
    the ALJ, Dr. Feldman testified that a person of Peeler’s age, educational
    background and physical limitations (listed above) could perform some sedentary
    jobs. Dr. Feldman identified cashier II, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)
    § 211.462-010, of which there were 18,124 positions in the local economy and
    over 3 million in the national economy. Dr. Feldman explained that the cashier II
    job was listed as light work in the DOT, but in his opinion, “well over 50 percent
    3
    would be sedentary in nature.” Dr. Feldman explained that he relied on his own
    knowledge to determine the fifty percent figure and that the DOT did not describe
    individual jobs, but represented a “conglomeration of jobs.”
    Additionally, Dr. Feldman identified as sedentary, unskilled jobs someone
    like Peeler could perform: (1) ticket or toll taker, DOT § 211.462-038, of which
    there were 701 such jobs in the local economy and 100,000 in the national
    economy; and (2) bench assembler, DOT § 706.684-022,3 of which there were
    7,245 in the local economy and over a million in the national economy.
    The ALJ’s order stated that “[p]ursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational
    expert’s testimony is consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of
    Occupational Titles.” Based on Dr. Feldman’s testimony, the ALJ found that
    Peeler was not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation process. The
    Appeals Council denied review.
    Peeler filed this action in the district court. The case was referred to a
    magistrate judge, who granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
    and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Peeler filed this appeal.
    II. DISCUSSION
    3
    The hearing transcript states that Dr. Feldman identified the bench assembler job as
    DOT § 796.684-022, but the DOT section corresponding to that job is actually DOT § 706.684-
    022. This appears to be a either a typographical error or a misstatement by Dr. Feldman.
    4
    A. Sequential Evaluation
    Under the five-step sequential evaluation used to determine whether the
    claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in
    substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe
    impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe impairment meets or equals an
    impairment in the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4)
    if not, whether the claimant has the RFC to perform his past relevant work; and (5)
    if not, whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience,
    the claimant can “make an adjustment to other work” that exists in significant
    numbers in the national economy. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.920
    (a)(4), (c)-(g): see also
    Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). If the claimant proves
    that he cannot do his past relevant work at the fourth step, the burden shifts to the
    Commissioner to show, at the fifth step, that the claimant can make an adjustment
    to other work available in the economy. Jones v. Apfel, 
    190 F.3d 1224
    , 1228 (11th
    Cir. 1999).
    B.    Fifth Step – Existence of Work
    On appeal, Peeler does not challenge the ALJ’s findings as to the first four
    steps. Instead, Peeler argues that the ALJ committed legal error at the fifth step.
    Specifically, Peeler contends the ALJ could not rely on Dr. Feldman’s testimony as
    5
    to the number of sedentary, unskilled jobs in the national economy Peeler could
    perform because Dr. Feldman’s testimony conflicted with the DOT.4
    At the fifth step, the Commissioner shows that work exists in the national
    economy when “it exists in significant numbers either in the region where [the
    claimant] live[s] or in several other regions of the country.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.966
    (a). In determining whether unskilled, sedentary, light or medium work
    exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the ALJ can “take
    administrative notice of reliable job information available from various
    governmental and other publications,” such as the DOT, which is published by the
    Department of Labor. 
    Id.
     § 416.966(d)(1).5
    The ALJ can also use a VE. See id. § 416.966(e) (stating that the VE can be
    used to determine “whether [the claimant’s] work skills can be used in other work
    and the specific occupations in which they can be used,” as well as for other
    “similarly complex issue[s]”); see also Foote v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 1553
    , 1559 (11th
    Cir. 1995) (explaining that when the claimant has non-exertional impairments, the
    4
    We review de novo the legal principles underlying the Commissioner’s final decision,
    but review “the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial
    evidence.” Moore v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    , 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
    5
    Sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a time, with occasional
    lifting or carrying of articles such as docket files, ledgers or small tools, and occasional walking
    or standing. 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.967
    (a). Light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at
    a time, with frequent lifting and carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds, and a good deal
    of walking, standing or sitting and manipulating arm and leg controls. 
    Id.
     § 416.967(b). “These
    terms have the same meaning as they have in the [DOT].” 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.967
    .
    6
    Commissioner demonstrates that the claimant can perform other jobs through VE’s
    testimony); Allen v. Sullivan, 
    880 F.2d 1200
    , 1202 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining
    that the ALJ relies on VE testimony to show the existence of work in the economy
    when the claimant cannot perform a full range of work at a given level of exertion).
    While the DOT “provides occupational information on jobs in the national
    economy,” it “is not comprehensive” nor “the sole source of admissible
    information concerning jobs.” Jones, 
    190 F.3d at 1230
     (quotation marks omitted).
    Consequently, “the ALJ should supplement DOT data with local information
    detailing jobs in the regional community.” 
    Id.
     Furthermore, “when the VE’s
    testimony conflicts with the DOT, the VE’s testimony ‘trumps’ the DOT.” 
    Id. at 1229-30
    . If the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ contains all the claimant’s
    impairments, the VE’s testimony of other jobs the claimant can perform constitutes
    substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. 
    Id. at 1229
    .
    C.    Peeler’s Claim
    Here, Dr. Feldman described the jobs of toll collector, bench assembler and
    over fifty percent of cashier II jobs as sedentary. The DOT classifies these three
    jobs as light work. See Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles
    (“DOT”),§§ 211.462-010 (cashier II), 211.462-038 (toll collector), 706.684-022
    (bench assembler) (rev. 4th ed. 1991). The ALJ did not err in relying on Dr.
    7
    Feldman’s testimony even if it conflicted with information in the DOT because
    under our precedent Dr. Feldman’s testimony trumps the DOT. See Jones, 
    190 F.3d at 1229-30
    .
    Peeler points to Social Security Ruling 00-4p (“SSR 00-4p”), which
    provides that “[n]either the DOT nor the [VE’s testimony] automatically ‘trumps’”
    when there is a conflict between the two and instructs the ALJ to “elicit a
    reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE [testimony] . . . .”
    SSR 00-04p, 
    2000 WL 1898704
     (Dec. 4, 2004).
    However, as to cashier II jobs, ALJ complied with SSR 00-4p and obtained a
    reasonable explanation for any conflict with the DOT.6 When Dr. Feldman
    identified cashier II jobs as sedentary jobs Peeler could perform, the ALJ
    confirmed that Dr. Feldman’s testimony adhered to the descriptions in the DOT.
    Dr. Feldman then acknowledged that the jobs were “listed as light in the DOT” and
    explained that it was his opinion that over fifty percent of the cashier II jobs could
    be performed at the sedentary level. Dr. Feldman further explained that any
    discrepancy between his description and the DOT was based on his knowledge and
    6
    Our predecessor Court has concluded that Social Security Rulings are not binding on
    this Court. See B.B. v. Schweiker, 
    643 F.2d 1069
    , 1071 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981). We are
    bound by decisions issued by Unit B panels of the former Fifth Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Sec.,
    Inc., 
    667 F.2d 33
    , 34 (11th Cir. 1982). However, even in the absence of our Jones precedent, the
    ALJ did not err in relying on Dr. Feldman’s testimony because, as we explain, the ALJ complied
    with SSR 00-04p with regard to the cashier II jobs.
    8
    necessary because the DOT does not describe specific jobs, but conglomerations of
    jobs. Notably, SSR 00-4p supports Dr. Feldman’s explanation, stating that the
    DOT provides descriptions about occupations, not each of the numerous jobs
    represented in an occupation and that a VE “may be able to provide more specific
    information about jobs or occupations than the DOT.” SSR 00-4p.7
    The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to Dr. Feldman that included all of
    Peeler’s impairments. In response, Dr. Feldman identified work that existed in the
    national economy that someone like Peeler could perform. The ALJ did not
    commit legal error in relying upon Dr. Feldman’s testimony even if it conflicted
    with the DOT. Thus, Dr. Feldman’s testimony constituted substantial evidence
    that Peeler was not disabled. See Jones, 
    190 F.3d at 1229
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    Social security regulations permit the ALJ to rely on a VE for his expertise and
    knowledge. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.960
    (b)(2) (stating that the a VE “may offer relevant evidence
    within his or her expertise or knowledge”). Dr. Feldman’s resume indicates that he has
    experience as a vocational rehabilitation counselor and vocational evaluator. Peeler did not
    challenge Dr. Feldman’s qualifications as a VE at the administrative hearing.
    9