Bennon L. Prine, Jr. v. Chailland Inc. , 402 F. App'x 469 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-11706
NOVEMBER 9, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00004-JTC
BENNON L. PRINE, JR.,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHAILLAND INC.,
HOSPITAL AMBULANCE LLC,
LUMBERMEN'S UNDERWRITING ALLIANCE,
DONALD WALTERS,
JOHN AND/OR JANE DOE, et al.,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(November 9, 2010)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bennon L. Prine, Jr. was a paramedic, working for a company (Chailland)
that provides paramedics for an ambulance service in Georgia (Hospital
Ambulance). Prine injured his wrist and shoulder while transporting an
overweight patient, requiring surgery. After receiving some temporary worker’s
compensation benefits, Prine became frustrated by the delay in receiving
additional benefits and the administrative process, and abandoned his
administrative recourse under Georgia law. Prine filed an action in the district
court against Chailland, Hospital Ambulance, their insurers and various other
executives with those companies asserting claims for worker’s compensation
benefits pursuant to Georgia law and claims under the federal Racketeer Influence
and Corruption Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the claims
for Georgia’s worker’s compensation benefits for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The court found
that the RICO claims were not ripe, and refused to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Prine’s remaining state law claims. Prine appeals.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, the briefs, the arguments by Prine
and the defendants’ counsel, and we are unable to find any error in the judgment
of the district court.
First, the district court correctly concluded that the administrative scheme
set up by Georgia’s Worker’s Compensation Act provided Prine his exclusive
remedy for claims arising out of his on-the-job injuries. Because the Georgia State
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Board of Worker’s Compensation (“SBWC”) has exclusive jurisdiction over
claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act, courts “[do] not have jurisdiction to
order the payment of workers’ compensation benefits.” Royal Indemnity Co. V.
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool, 644 S.E.2d 279, 280 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). We
have held that the exclusivity of a state workers’ compensation scheme deprives a
federal district court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that a state court
would decline to exercise jurisdiction over an employee’s work related claims.
See Connolly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 849 F.2d 525, 526–28 (11th Cir. 1988).
Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act provides benefits to employees who are
injured in accidents “arising out of and in the course of” their employment. Doss
v. Food Lion, Inc., 477 S.E.2d 577, 577 (Ga. 1996). When the workers’
compensation act applies, it provides an employee’s exclusive remedy against his
employer, as well as the employer’s worker’s compensation carrier. Id. at 578(employer); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Day, 221 S.E.2d 467, 469 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975) (insurance carrier).
Since Prine was provided some temporary payments, we note that where an
employer makes voluntary payments, the employer cannot controvert the
employee’s right to compensation unless (1) a notice to controvert is filed with the
State Board of Workers’ Compensation (“SBWC”) within 60 days of the due date
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of the first payment of compensation or (2) the notice to controvert is based on a
change in condition or newly discovered evidence. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h).
Thus, where the employer does not file a notice to controvert within 60 days of the
first payment’s due date, the employer is barred from controverting liability for the
employee’s claim unless it can show a change in condition or newly discovered
evidence. Carpet Transp., Inc. v. Pittman, 370 S.E.2d 651, 655 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that § 34-9-221(h) acts as “a 60-day statute of limitation, the
running of which protects the employee’s right to continued compensation from
attack by the employer’s/insurer’s ‘except’ on the specified grounds”). However,
the Workers’ Compensation Act also allows an employer to unilaterally suspend
benefits if (1) an employee’s treating physician releases him to return to work with
restrictions; (2) the employer proffers a suitable job; (3) the employee refuses to
attempt the proffered job; and (4) the employer files appropriate documentation
with the SBWC. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-240(b).
Here, the pleadings reflect that although Prine was contacted twice about
returning to work in a light-duty position, Prine declined to avail himself of this
opportunity. Under such a circumstance, his employer had the right to unilaterally
suspend benefit payments if it followed certain requirements under O.C.G.A. § 34-
9-240(b)(2). However, the extent of employer liability is within the exclusive
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jurisdiction of the SBWC. The SBWC must be afforded the opportunity to
determine the value, if any, of the worker’s compensation benefits owed to Prine.
Since the SBWC never resolved employer liability, we find that the district court
correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to order the employer to make
worker’s compensation benefit payments. Prine’s claims were dismissed without
prejudice, providing him an opportunity to return to the Georgia SBWC where he
can file a new Form WC-14, requesting an administrative hearing.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly found that it did
not have jurisdiction to order the defendants to pay Georgia workers’
compensation benefits because the SBWC has exclusive jurisdiction over claims
under Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act, and the workers’ compensation
scheme provides a remedy for the alleged intentional delay in making payments to
Prine.
Next, as to Prine’s argument that the district court applied the wrong
standard when evaluating the ripeness of his RICO claims, we similarly find no
error because it is clear that resolution of the RICO claims is dependent on the
resolution of the worker’s compensation claims. “The ripeness doctrine protects
federal courts from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the
review of potential or abstract disputes.” Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation,
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121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests
upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 1259
(1998) (quotation omitted). Because pursuing recovery through the SBWC could
mitigate any injury alleged by Prine such that his RICO damages cannot be
ascertained, or may not have occurred at all, Prine’s RICO claim was not ripe for
review. See Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530
F.3d 1339, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008).
Finally, Prine appears to contend that there was error in the dismissal of his
state law claims. Prine’s state law claims included allegations of unjust
enrichment, unfair deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, Prine asserts in a section
heading that the district court had jurisdiction over all of his claims, but he offers
no argument addressing the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims. Although we liberally construe pro se
pleadings, a pro se litigant abandons an issue where he does not brief it on appeal.
See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We doubt, in any
event, that there was any abuse of discretion arising from the district court’s
dismissal of the state-law claims, since 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) allows district
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courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.”
AFFIRMED.
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