United States v. Jesse Witherspoon , 405 F. App'x 369 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-12182         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar    DECEMBER 13, 2010
    ________________________        JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cr-60191-WPD-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JESSE WITHERSPOON,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                              Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 13, 2010)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Following a bench trial in the district court, appellant was convicted of
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1),
    and sentenced to prison for a term of 180 months. He now appeals his conviction,
    raising one issue: whether, following a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress
    evidence, i.e., the gun that led to appellant’s conviction, the district court clearly
    erred in crediting the testimony of Detective Gonzalez that appellant possessed a
    gun in his waistband and in denying the motion to suppress based on that
    testimony. Appellant contends that, because Gonzalez did not have reasonable
    suspicion, the district court should have suppressed the gun and ammunition found
    during the pat-down search. Appellant contends, moreover, that court clearly
    erred in its implicit decision not to credit consistent testimony from a second
    detective, Mazzola, and from appellant’s friend, Bien-Aime, which contradicted
    the officer’s testimony. Appellant says that Gonzalez stopped him based on a
    mere “hunch.” Accordingly, the court erred in denying the motion to suppress,
    and the conviction should be vacated.
    In determining whether the district court erred in denying the motion to
    suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and
    application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Epps, 
    613 F.3d 1093
    , 1097 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court’s credibility determinations are
    among the factual findings that we must accept unless they are “so inconsistent or
    2
    improbable on their face that no reasonable factfinder could accept them.” United
    States v. White, 
    593 F.3d 1199
    , 1203 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and brackets
    omitted).
    We analyze the legality of pat-down searches according to the principles of
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
     (1968), “under which the
    police may stop and briefly detain a person to investigate a reasonable suspicion
    that he is involved in criminal activity, even though probable cause is lacking.”
    Id. at 1202 (quotation omitted). A Terry stop is justified when the officer has a
    “reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts that the person has
    engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity.” Id. Furthermore, an
    officer may proceed with a pat-down search of a person he has detained “if he has
    reason to believe that his own safety or the safety of others is at risk.” Id.
    However, “[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
    armed” in order to justify a pat-down search. Id. (quoting Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 27
    ,
    
    88 S.Ct. at 1883
    ) (emphasis in original). Rather, the issue is whether a reasonably
    prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in believing that his safety
    or the safety of others was in danger. 
    Id.
    In this case, the district court’s determination that Detective Gonzalez’s
    testimony was credible was not clearly erroneous. Nothing in the record shows
    3
    the testimony “so inconsistent or improbable on [its] face that no reasonable
    factfinder could accept” it. The court considered the credibility of the witnesses,
    and even though it found that Bien-Aime was a credible witness “in a lot of
    respects[,]” its decision to credit Gonzalez’s testimony, to the extent that it
    differed from Bien-Aime’s, was not clearly erroneous.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-12182

Citation Numbers: 405 F. App'x 369

Judges: Tjoflat, Carnes, Fay

Filed Date: 12/13/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024