USCA11 Case: 22-10295 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 12/06/2022 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10295
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PAUL RUBIN WHITE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00153-AW-GRJ
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10295 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 12/06/2022 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10295
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Paul Rubin White, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
peals the district court’s dismissal of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
corpus petition as an unauthorized second or successive petition.
Because White previously filed a § 2254 petition challenging the
same judgment that was dismissed as untimely and failed to obtain
authorization from this Court before filing his current petition in
district court, we affirm the dismissal.
I.
This case represents the third time White has filed a habeas
petition in federal court challenging his conviction for two counts
of sexual battery of a child and one count of lewd and lascivious
assault on a child. First, in 2009, he filed a habeas petition in federal
court challenging his conviction. The district court determined that
his petition was untimely and dismissed it with prejudice. In 2020,
White filed a second habeas petition in federal court, which the dis-
trict court also dismissed.
In 2021, White filed this petition in federal district court,
again challenging his conviction. Because White failed to obtain
prior authorization from this Court before filing his petition, the
magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss the
petition. White objected to the recommendation. After consider-
ing the objection, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
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22-10295 Opinion of the Court 3
recommendation and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
This is White’s appeal.
II.
“We review de novo whether a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is second or successive.” Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr.,
849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
III.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, requires that be-
fore a prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment can
file a “second or successive” federal habeas petition under § 2254,
he must “move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order au-
thorizing the district court to consider the application.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A). If a prisoner fails to obtain such prior authorization
before filing a second or successive application, the district court
must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Farris v. United
States,
333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
To determine whether a petition is second or successive, we
must look to whether the prisoner previously filed a federal habeas
petition challenging the same judgment. Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dept. of Corr.,
755 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014). When a habeas
petition is dismissed as untimely, any later petition challenging the
same judgment is considered second or successive. See Patterson,
849 F.3d at 1325 (treating new petition as secondary or successive
when initial petition was dismissed as untimely).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10295
White’s § 2254 petition in this case qualifies as a second or
successive habeas petition because he previously challenged the
same conviction in his first habeas petition, and that petition was
dismissed as untimely. See id. Because White failed to obtain leave
from our Court before filing the petition in this case, the district
court properly dismissed it. See Farris,
333 F.3d at 1216.
White nevertheless says that the district court erred in dis-
missing his petition because a district court may review a second
or successive petition when a prisoner brings an actual innocence
claim. Not so. We have held that AEDPA’s restrictions on second
or successive petitions apply even when a prisoner raises an actual
innocence claim. See Bowles v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
935 F.3d
1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal.
AFFIRMED.