Brandon Jamal Ryles v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections ( 2022 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13934
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
BRANDON JAMAL RYLES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
WARDEN EASTERLING CF,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13934
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-00569-ECM-SMD
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JORDAN and NEWSOM,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Ryles, a state prisoner, appeals pro se the denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Ryles ar-
gued that the State violated his right to due process by withholding
a recording of a telephone conversation between Ryles, his code-
fendant, and his codefendant’s girlfriend about exonerating him for
the murders of Mark Adams and Carla Smilie. See Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Because the decision of the state court rejecting Ryles’s argument
is not contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We divide the background into two parts. First, we describe
Ryles’s trial and direct appeal. Second, we describe Ryles’s federal
habeas corpus proceeding.
A. Ryles’s Trial and Direct Appeal
On April 4, 2011, Adams and Smilie were shot and stabbed
inside Adams’s mobile home. The perpetrators also stole two
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firearms and a BB gun from Adams’s home. The investigation re-
vealed that at least two different guns were used during the mur-
ders. Investigators identified John Foster as a suspect. Foster con-
fessed and named others, including his cousin Marquisse McClaney
and Ryles, as accomplices.
A grand jury in Alabama indicted Ryles, Foster, and
McClaney for two counts of capital murder for killing during a rob-
bery, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(2), and one count of capital murder
for killing two or more persons during one course of conduct, id.
§ 13A-5-40(a)(10). After his arrest, McClaney denied any
knowledge of the crime. But after further interrogation, McClaney
implicated Foster and Ryles.
McClaney told police that Ryles drove McClaney and Foster
to Adams’s home. Foster went inside to “holler at” Adams and then
returned to Ryles’s car to report that Adams and Smilie were “get-
ting f***ed up.” After Ryles urged Foster to rob the couple, Foster
grabbed a shotgun from the back of Ryles’s car and entered the
home with Ryles. While McClaney served as lookout, he heard a
gunshot, peered through the front door, and saw Ryles stabbing
Smilie. McClaney blamed Ryles for “all the stabbing and cutting”
and blamed Foster for shooting Adams and Smilie multiple times.
McClaney also recalled seeing Ryles pull Adams’s body from a
chair and search his pants for a wallet.
Ryles blamed Foster for the murders. Ryles told police that
he “was just the driver and that was it” and he was unaware of Fos-
ter’s plan when the group arrived at Adams’s home. Ryles stated
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that Foster took Ryles’s shotgun from the car and remarked, “I’m
about to go up there . . . [and] get what’s mine.” Ryles and
McClaney heard gunshots while waiting at the car and ran to Ad-
ams’s front door. McClaney told Ryles that someone had been
shot. Ryles denied entering Adams’s home.
McClaney changed his story. McClaney wrote a letter in jail
to “who ever that matter” blaming Foster for the two murders and
denying that Ryles ever left the car. Later, McClaney repeated that
version of events when deposed by Ryles’s attorneys. But
McClaney pleaded guilty to two counts of the lesser-included of-
fense of felony murder, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3), and he agreed
to serve as a state witness at Ryles’s trial.
On August 31, 2014, while at Kilby Correctional Facility
awaiting Ryles’s trial the following week, McClaney telephoned his
girlfriend, Vangela. Before the call connected, an automated voice
advised the couple that they were sharing a “prepaid call” using an
“account balance of $3.15” and that “this call is being recorded and
subject to monitoring at any time.” After discussing personal mat-
ters, Vangela said she knew Ryles’s “lawyer went up there and
talked to [McClaney] because they called [her]” and that he “ha[d]
to take back what [he] said.” Vangela said “the lawyers” told her
“the only way they can help [McClaney] is if [he] back[ed] out of
it.” She repeated that “they going to try to get you out. They said
as soon as they get Brandon [Ryles] out, they gonna get you out,
but they can’t help you if you don’t take it back.” Vangela ex-
pressed frustration with McClaney’s mom, who “was telling them,
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she was, like, well, they said Brandon [Ryles] did it.” Vangela re-
counted telling McClaney’s mother that she “talked to Brandon
[Ryles]’s lawyer and . . . we going to try to get [McClaney] out of
here. He got to keep his mouth shut.” McClaney said that the dis-
trict attorney had “tried to scare us and stuff,” that his attorney and
his mother had “bribed” him to accept a plea deal, and that he had
“told [Ryles and his lawyer] the truth.”
Vangela asked McClaney to “[h]old on” to “see if [she] could
get Brandon [Ryles] on here for these last few minutes.” After Ryles
joined the call, he told McClaney, “Hey Buddy. You better do the
right thing, but we coming to get you now.” McClaney assured
Ryles that he did not plan to testify against him. As the call ended,
Ryles stated, “you’re going to deal with them, you deal with me.”
At trial, McClaney testified that Foster shot Adams and Smi-
lie and described seeing Ryles stab Smilie. McClaney testified that
Foster instructed him to “put it on [Ryles].” McClaney stated that
he wrote the letter blaming Foster at Ryles’s behest while the two
were in the same jail and that he blamed Foster because Ryles
threatened him and he feared Ryles. McClaney testified that, after
being transferred to Kilby Correctional Center, he talked to Ryles
over the telephone. McClaney stated that, during a phone call with
Ryles after entering his plea, Ryles told him to“[d]o the right thing,”
which he took as a threat. McClaney stated that he lied to Ryles’s
attorneys during his deposition because he was “trying to look out
for a friend,” meaning Ryles.
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After Ryles decided to testify, the prosecutor referred to
Ryles “receiv[ing] a phone call as of a week before jury selection”
from McClaney. Defense counsel remarked that he had not re-
ceived a copy of the recording despite a standing order for open file
discovery, and the prosecutor responded that he had obtained the
recording only two days earlier from the Department of Correc-
tions. The trial court ruled that the parties could not “get into those
areas” unless defense counsel opened the door in some way and
that Ryles taking the stand did not alone open that door. The trial
court urged the parties to request a sidebar before introducing de-
batable evidence.
Ryles testified that he was unaware that Foster had armed
himself before entering Adams’s home. Ryles recalled that Foster
returned to the car with firearms he received as collateral for
money he was owed. Ryles denied entering Adams’s home or hear-
ing a gunshot and insisted that he learned of Adams’s and Smilie’s
deaths two days later. Ryles maintained that the statement he gave
after his arrest “was false.” He admitted on cross-examination that
he told McClaney to “do the right thing” while McClaney was at
Kilby Correctional, but denied threatening to come after
McClaney. The prosecutor did not attempt to introduce a record-
ing of the telephone call or a transcript of the conversation, and
defense counsel did not object to the line of questioning. Later, the
prosecutor successfully sought a jury instruction on witness intim-
idation based on McClaney’s testimony that Ryles had threatened
him.
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The jury found Ryles guilty of two counts of felony murder,
as lesser-included offenses of his capital murder charges. The trial
court sentenced Ryles to two consecutive terms of imprisonment
for life.
Ryles moved for the State to produce the recording of the
three-way telephone call. Ryles argued that the State had violated
Alabama Rule of Evidence 613, which requires that, “[i]n examin-
ing a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness,
. . . on request the [statement] shall be shown or disclosed to op-
posing counsel,” ALA. R. EVID. 613(a), and that the nondisclosure
was prejudicial because the State suggested that he had intimidated
McClaney and the trial court later gave a jury instruction on wit-
ness intimidation. The State responded that, because it learned of
the recorded telephone conversation on the second day of trial, it
asked McClaney and Ryles about conversations they had while in-
carcerated instead of introducing the recording into evidence. The
State attested that it was providing Ryles the recording along with
its response. The record does not reflect a ruling on Ryles’s motion.
Ryles also moved for a new trial and argued that withhold-
ing the recording violated his right to due process. He argued that
the recording contained statements suggesting that the district at-
torney had influenced McClaney to provide untruthful testimony.
Ryles’s motion for a new trial was denied by operation of law when
the trial court failed to act before the deadline to rule on the motion
expired. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 24.4.
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On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Ryles’s motion for a new trial. It mentioned that Ryles had partici-
pated in the recorded conversation, defense counsel could have in-
dependently discovered the recording had Ryles told counsel of the
conversation, and defense counsel was informed of the recording
during trial yet did not request a continuance to review and deter-
mine whether the recording was useful to Ryles’s case. It declined
to address whether the State suppressed the recording and ruled
that Ryles suffered no due process violation because the statements
McClaney made during the conversation were not material and
were cumulative to evidence that he was untruthful because he
changed his story repeatedly. It reasoned that “[f]urther corrobora-
tion of McClaney’s lack of veracity would not have changed the
outcome of Ryles’s trial” because the jury must have discredited
McClaney’s version of events to find Ryles guilty of felony murder
instead of capital murder. It also reasoned that the jury could have
disregarded McClaney’s testimony altogether and relied on other
evidence, including Ryles’s admissions to driving Foster to Adams’s
house, to convict Ryles of the lesser-included crimes.
Ryles moved the appellate court to rehear the case, and he
petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari.
But both courts denied Ryles relief summarily.
B. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding
Ryles, through counsel, petitioned for a federal writ of ha-
beas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleged that, in determining that
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he could not establish materiality under Brady, the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals incorrectly analyzed whether the outcome of his trial
would have been different. He argued that the decision of the state
court was contrary to Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016), and
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), because the state court incor-
rectly considered whether introducing the recording would have
resulted in acquittal and whether sufficient evidence existed, absent
McClaney’s testimony, to convict Ryles. After the State responded,
the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the
district court deny Ryles’s petition because the state court’s deci-
sion was not an unreasonable application of clearly established fed-
eral law.
The district court denied Ryles’s petition. The district court
sustained one of Ryles’s objections to a single factual error in the
report and recommendation and adopted the modified recommen-
dation. The district court ruled that the state court cited the correct
materiality standard for Brady error articulated in United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), and the fact that it omitted the precise
“undermining confidence in the outcome” language from its deci-
sion did not mean that it applied the wrong standard. The district
court rejected Ryles’s argument that the recording was material
and concluded that the state court’s determination that the record-
ing was merely cumulative to other testimony before the jury and
evidence of his guilt was not an unreasonable application of the Su-
preme Court’s materiality standard.
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We granted Ryles a certificate of appealability to address his
claim under Brady. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the grant or denial of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 767 F.3d
1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating
state-court rulings.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.
766, 773 (2010)). A state prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas cor-
pus only if the state court reached a decision that “involved an un-
reasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). That is, the state court must have “identifie[d]
the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Reed, 767 F.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks
omitted and alterations adopted). “[A]n unreasonable application
of . . . [a Supreme Court decision] must be objectively unreasona-
ble, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” White v.
Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The prisoner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the
claim . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possi-
bility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
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III. DISCUSSION
Ryles maintains that the State violated his right to due pro-
cess under Brady by withholding the recording containing
McClaney’s exculpatory statements. He argues that he was preju-
diced because the trial court charged the jury on witness intimida-
tion based on McClaney’s testimony that Ryles threatened him,
which was not supported by the withheld recording. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, after the record on appeal was filed,
but before briefing was complete, the State moved to correct the
record. Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C) (allowing appellate courts to
certify and forward a supplement record if “anything material to
either party is omitted from . . . the record by error or accident”).
The State attached approximately 150 pages of McClaney’s trial
testimony that was not transmitted to the district court and ex-
plained that this omission likely was due to an uploading error. Be-
cause the State avers and our review confirms that the testimony
in the supplemental exhibit was part of the record before the adju-
dicating state court, see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181-82
(2011), we supplement the record on appeal with this testimony.
To establish a Brady violation, Ryles had to establish that the
evidence was favorable to him, either because it was exculpatory
or impeaching, the prosecution willfully or inadvertently sup-
pressed the evidence, and the suppression of the evidence preju-
diced him. Rimmer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1039, 1054
(11th Cir. 2017). To establish prejudice, Ryles had to prove that the
suppressed evidence was material. Id. Evidence is material “only if
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there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added). A “reasonable
probability” means “a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome,” viewed in the light of the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 682-83. In other words, we must evaluate the
withheld evidence “in the context of the entire record.” Turner v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017). And a defendant need
not prove that he more likely than not would have been acquitted
had the suppressed evidence been admitted. Wearry, 577 U.S. at
392; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
The district court did not err in denying Ryles relief on his
Brady claim. Even assuming that it was exculpatory and sup-
pressed, the recording was not material. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
McClaney’s recorded statements to Vangela about having told
Ryles’s attorneys the “truth” was cumulative of other testimony
that he would change his story to suit his audience, including Ryles.
The jury first heard McClaney testify that he wrote the letter exon-
erating Ryles because Ryles threatened him and he was afraid of
Ryles. The jury then heard McClaney admit to lying under oath to
Ryles’s attorneys at his deposition because he was “trying to look
out for a friend.” Defense counsel cross-examined McClaney exten-
sively about his previous lies and motives, and McClaney main-
tained that he saw Ryles stab Smilie and denied lying to protect his
plea. Viewed in the context of the full record, McClaney’s recorded
statements to Vangela, who was trying to convince McClaney to
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retract his statement against Ryles to give both men a better chance
avoiding punishment, and to Ryles, whom he admitted to being
afraid of and threatened by, were cumulative of what the jury al-
ready knew about McClaney’s credibility and would not have re-
sulted in a different outcome. Id.We also reject Ryles’s argument that his case is nearly iden-
tical to Wearry, in which the Supreme Court reversed a death-sen-
tenced prisoner’s conviction based on Brady errors involving nu-
merous pieces of undisclosed material information, including state-
ments by the state’s key witness that he wanted to make sure
Wearry got “the needle.” Wearry, 577 U.S. at 387-92. Unlike the
evidence in Wearry, the recording here is cumulative of
McClaney’s testimony before the jury that his 25-year plea deal de-
pended on testifying truthfully at trial. And he bluntly stated that if
he did not testify, he would be put on trial and the State would seek
to “put a needle in [his] arm.” The jury, after hearing that testifying
was McClaney’s only way to avoid his own capital trial, acquitted
Ryles of capital murder and instead convicted him of the lesser-in-
cluded offenses. Viewed in the context of the entire trial record, the
recording does not undermine our confidence in the outcome.
Turner, 137 S. Ct. at 1893.
Insofar as Ryles raised it in his petition before the district
court, the record also does not support a Giglio claim. Giglio error
occurs “when ‘the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prose-
cution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.’” Trepal v.
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Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1107 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Ventura v. Att’y Gen., 419 F.3d 1269, 1276-77 (11th Cir.
2005)). To establish a Giglio error, Ryles had to prove that the pros-
ecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct what
he later learned was false testimony and that the use of the perjured
testimony was material. Id. at 1107-08. The materiality standard for
Giglio violations imposes a lighter burden on defendants to prove
“any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have af-
fected the jury’s judgment.” Id. at 1108 & n.22 (emphasis added).
Because of this lower materiality standard, a Giglio error, unlike a
Brady error, can be harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993). Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1113.
Ryles failed to satisfy either requirement under Giglio.
McClaney’s recorded statements to Vangela that he had told the
truth to Ryles’s attorneys and to Ryles that he did not plan to testify
against him do not prove that his trial testimony was false or per-
jured. At trial, McClaney admitted that he had lied several times
for various reasons. The recording underscored what was clear
from the start—McClaney would change his story to appease his
audience. At trial, he testified under oath, subject to cross-exami-
nation, that he saw Ryles stab Smilie on the night of the murders,
and the jury heard testimony that this account was consistent with
the story McClaney gave police shortly after his arrest. More im-
portantly, Ryles did not allege or present any evidence that the
prosecutor knew or should have known that McClaney’s
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testimony was false. And even if he made these showings, he did
not establish harm under Brecht. Id.
Ryles did not challenge the witness intimidation instruction
on direct appeal, and the state court did not address it. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). But even if exhausted, his argument still fails be-
cause the instruction was supported by McClaney’s testimony that
Ryles threatened him into writing the to “who ever that matter”
letter exonerating Ryles and blaming Foster.
IV. CONCLUSION
We GRANT the State’s motion to correct the record and
AFFIRM the denial of Ryles’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.