Kenneth Wade Long v. Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 18-11117   Date Filed: 10/19/2018   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-11117
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00847-WC
    KENNETH WADE LONG,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (October 19, 2018)
    Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-11117     Date Filed: 10/19/2018    Page: 2 of 7
    Kenneth Long appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
    Administration’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits,
    pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). First, Long argues that the
    administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in determining that he was able to perform
    his past relevant work as a textile supervisor. Second, Long argues that the ALJ
    erred by giving his treating physician’s opinion minimal evidentiary weight
    without good cause.
    I.
    Long first argues that the ALJ’s determination that he can perform his past
    work as a textile supervisor was not supported by substantial evidence, as the ALJ
    failed to consider the physical requirements and demands of his past work, and
    evaluate his ability to perform those duties despite his impairments.
    This Court reviews a denial of disability insurance benefits for substantial
    evidence, and application of the law de novo. Moore v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    ,
    1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence that a
    reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Lewis v.
    Callahan, 
    125 F.3d 1436
    , 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). If, in light of the record as a
    whole, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, we will not
    disturb it. 
    Id. at 1439.
    The claimant bears the burden of proving that he is
    disabled. Ellison v. Barnhart, 
    355 F.3d 1272
    , 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
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    Social Security Regulations prescribe a five-step process for ascertaining a
    claimant’s disability status. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–
    (v). The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial
    gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has a severe impairment or combination of
    impairments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments,
    meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P; (4) if not,
    whether he can perform his past relevant work in light of his residual functional
    capacity; and (5) if not, whether, based on his age, education, and work experience,
    he can perform other work found in the national economy. Id.; Winschel
    v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
    Under step four, the claimant’s benefits must be terminated if he is once
    again able to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(7),
    416.994(b)(5)(vi). The claimant bears the burden of demonstrating inability to
    perform his past kind of work, not merely inability to perform a specific past job.
    Jackson v. Bowen, 
    801 F.2d 1291
    , 1293–94 (11th Cir. 1986). In making this
    determination, the ALJ must consider all the duties of the claimant’s past work and
    evaluate his ability to perform them in spite of his impairments. Lucas v. Sullivan,
    
    918 F.2d 1567
    , 1574 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). The ALJ may rely on a vocational
    expert’s testimony regarding the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s
    past work, and may also consider the job descriptions set forth in the Dictionary of
    3
    Case: 18-11117     Date Filed: 10/19/2018   Page: 4 of 7
    Occupational Titles (DOT). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2). A
    vocational expert is “an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual can perform
    based on his or her capacity and impairments.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    , 1240 (11th Cir. 1999). When there is no evidence of the physical
    requirements and demands or the required duties of past work, the ALJ cannot
    properly determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
    perform past relevant work. Cannon v. Bowen, 
    858 F.2d 1541
    , 1545–46 (11th Cir.
    1988).
    Social Security Ruling 82-61 permits a finding that a claimant can perform
    the work or past job as generally performed in the national economy. See SSR 82-
    61. First, the Commissioner will consider whether the claimant has the residual
    functional capacity to perform the functional demands and duties of a past job as
    actually performed by the claimant. 
    Id. If so,
    the claimant is not disabled. If not,
    the Commissioner will consider whether the claimant can perform the functional
    demands and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employers
    throughout the national economy. 
    Id. There is
    substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Long could
    perform his past relevant work as a textile supervisor. A reasonable person would
    accept as adequate Long’s own description of his duties in his Work History
    Report and at the disability hearing, testimony from the vocational expert, and the
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    Case: 18-11117       Date Filed: 10/19/2018      Page: 5 of 7
    DOT job description.1 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2). Relying upon
    this evidence, the ALJ properly determined that Long was capable of performing
    his past relevant work by comparing his residual functional capacity to the physical
    requirements and job demands of a textile supervisor. In making this
    determination, the ALJ referred to the DOT identification number for this position
    and the vocational expert’s testimony. The vocational expert presented
    unchallenged testimony that a hypothetical person with Long’s residual functional
    capacity could perform his past duties as a textile supervisor, both as actually
    performed by Long and as generally performed in the national economy. Long
    does not point to any discrepancy between his residual functional capacity and the
    duties of a textile supervisor. 
    Lucas, 918 F.2d at 1571
    . Using this evidence, and
    comparing Long’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ properly determined that
    Long was capable of performing his past relevant work as a textile supervisor.
    The ALJ alternatively denied Long’s application under step five, based on
    an independent determination that Long could perform other work available in the
    national economy. Under this step, an ALJ may appropriately deny disability
    insurance benefits when a claimant, given his limitations, is capable of performing
    other jobs in the national economy. See Jones v. Apfel, 
    190 F.3d 1224
    , 1229 (11th
    1
    Moreover, the ALJ rejected the DOT’s light-duty categorization and instead categorized the
    position as light-duty with occasional medium duties, demonstrating that the ALJ was mindful of
    the position’s duties and physical requirements.
    5
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    Cir. 1999). After the ALJ identifies specific jobs that Long can perform, Long has
    the burden to prove that he is unable to perform those jobs in order to be found
    disabled. See 
    id. at 1229–30.
    Long’s failure to challenge that alternative
    independent determination on appeal requires affirmance. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
    Floridian Ins. Co., 
    739 F.3d 678
    , 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
    II.
    Long next argues that the ALJ improperly discredited the testimony of his
    treating physician, Dr. Dolores Victoria. The testimony of a treating physician
    must be given substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the
    contrary. 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179
    . Good cause exists when (1) the treating
    physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, (2) the evidence supported
    a contrary finding, or (3) the treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or
    inconsistent with the physician’s own medical records. 
    Id. When the
    ALJ
    articulates specific reasons for failing to give the opinion of a treating physician
    controlling weight and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is
    no reversible error. See Moore v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    , 1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Long asserts that Dr. Victoria’s opinion should have been given substantial
    weight because the ALJ failed to show good cause to the contrary. Dr. Victoria
    opined that Long suffered severe pain and would need to take constant rest periods
    and miss a number of workdays per month. The medical records from Long’s
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    visits to Dr. Victoria, however, indicate that Long was not in pain and had normal
    range of motion, strength, gait, and stability in all extremities. Moreover, the ALJ
    also noted that x-rays of Long’s spine came back negative. Because substantial
    evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Victoria’s opinion was against
    the totality of the evidence and was inconsistent with her own medical records,
    there is no reversible error. 
    Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212
    ; 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179
    ;
    Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    808 F.3d 818
    , 823 (11th Cir. 2015).
    AFFIRMED.
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