United States v. Rodolfo Martinez , 412 F. App'x 189 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-16345 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 5, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-60309-CR-KAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RODOLFO MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 5, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rodolfo Martinez appeals his convictions for conspiracy to obstruct
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
conspiracy to use a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence and a
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o); use of a firearm during a
drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Martinez also challenges his 60-month consecutive sentence
for using a firearm during a crime of violence.
I.
Martinez argues that comments made by the prosecutor during closing
arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. We review de novo a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. United States v. Eckhardt,
466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). “To establish prosecutorial misconduct, (1)
the remarks must be improper, and (2) the remarks must prejudicially affect the
substantial rights of the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “A
defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected when a reasonable
probability arises that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have
been different.” Id. “When the record contains sufficient independent evidence of
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guilt, any error is harmless.” Id.Martinez asserts that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct
when the prosecutor said: “I don’t think there’s any question based on the evidence
you’ve seen, I don’t think there’s any reasonable doubt whatsoever. . . . I think
based on [the] evidence, as long as you keep your eye on the ball and don’t let the
defense lawyer distract you, which is his job.” Martinez argues that this statement
improperly injected the prosecutor’s personal opinion into the case and attacked
defense counsel’s character. We do not agree that this remark rises to the level of
prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor’s comment could also be characterized
as an attempt to argue the weight of the evidence. See United States v. Tisdale,
817 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that prosecutor’s remark—“I
believe the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt”—went to
the weight of the evidence and was not improper). In any event, any problem
regarding this comment was cured by the district court’s instruction to disregard
the prosecutor’s statement. See United States v. Gonzalez, 122 F.3d 1383,
1388–89 (11th Cir. 1997).
Martinez also asserts that it was improper for the prosecutor to say: “[I]f it
wasn’t a law enforcement investigation, who knows what might have happened.
Thank God it was a law enforcement investigation this time and that there wasn’t
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an actual victim.” He argues that the prosecutor’s statement improperly inflamed
the jury. We reject this argument as well. “The prosecutor, as an advocate, is
entitled to make a fair response to the arguments of defense counsel.” United
States v. Hiett, 581 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir. 1978).1 During his closing argument,
defense counsel encouraged the jury to acquit Martinez because the robbery was a
“fictional situation.” The prosecutor’s comment fairly responded to that argument.
II.
Martinez contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment based on outrageous government conduct. A motion to
dismiss the indictment on the basis of outrageous government conduct involves a
question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182,
1191 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Savage, 701 F.2d 867, 868 n.1 (11th Cir.
1983).
“Outrageous government conduct occurs when law enforcement obtains a
conviction for conduct beyond the defendant’s predisposition by employing
methods that fail to comport with due process guarantees.” United States v.
Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). “Under this standard, the
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
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conduct must be so outrageous that it is fundamentally unfair.” Id.; see also United
States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Whether outrageous
government conduct exists turns upon the totality of the circumstances with no
single factor controlling and the defense can only be invoked in the rarest and most
outrageous circumstances.” (quotation marks omitted)).
The government’s conduct in this case was within constitutionally permitted
limits. The evidence in the record shows that Martinez was a willing and active
participant in a scheme to rob a home believed to contain narcotics. The
government’s conduct in encouraging Martinez’s co-conspirators to keep him
involved in the scheme does not “violate[ ] fundamental fairness and shock[ ] the
universal cause of justice.” United States v. Costales, 5 F.3d 480, 487 (11th Cir.
1993) (quotation marks omitted). The district court did not err in denying
Martinez’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on outrageous government
conduct.
III.
Martinez also contends that the district court erred in refusing to give a jury
instruction on entrapment. “We review a district court’s refusal to give a particular
jury instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Yeager, 331 F.3d 1216,
1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
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Entrapment is an affirmative defense with two elements: “(1) government
inducement of the crime and (2) the defendant’s lack of predisposition to commit
the crime before the inducement.” United States v. Orisnord, 483 F.3d 1169, 1178
(11th Cir. 2007). Before an entrapment instruction may be presented to the jury,
the defendant must show “some evidence, more than a scintilla, that government
agents induced him to commit the offense.” United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d
1089, 1102 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1340 (11th Cir. 1983) ( “A defendant cannot avail himself of
an entrapment defense unless the initiator of his criminal activity is acting as an
agent of the government.”).
The record shows that Martinez was approached about the robbery by
Duhart, a co-conspirator, and not a government agent. Although government
agents encouraged Martinez’s co-conspirators to keep him involved in the robbery
scheme, there is no evidence in the record that he expressed reluctance to
participate and that the scheme had to be “pushed” on him. See Orisnord, 483 F.3d
at 1178. Because no evidence exists to support a claim of entrapment, the district
court properly denied Martinez’s request to give an entrapment instruction.
IV.
Martinez also argues that the district court erred in imposing a consecutive
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60-month sentence for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), because the plain
language of § 924(c) prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences when the
defendant is subject to a greater mandatory-minimum sentence for another offense.
Because Martinez raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review only for
plain error. See United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005). “To
establish plain error, [the defendant] must show that there was (1) error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects his substantial rights.” United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d
783, 815 (11th Cir. 2010). “If all three requirements are met, we may reverse only
if the error also seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Martinez’s argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Abbott v. United States, —U.S.— , 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010), holding that “a defendant
is subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for a § 924(c) conviction, and is
not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum
on a different count of conviction.” Id. at 23; see also United States v. Segarra,
582 F.3d 1269, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the plain language of §
924(c) requires consecutive sentences for a defendant convicted of a § 924(c)
offense and an underlying drug crime). No error occurred.
AFFIRMED.
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