Deters v. Commissioner of Social Security , 301 F. App'x 886 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 8, 2008
No. 08-13100 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00575-CV-T-MSS
RAY A. DETERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 8, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ray A. Deters appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of supplement security income and disability insurance
benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). He argues that the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred in (1) finding that his admitted alcohol use was a contributing
factor material to the disability determination, and (2) posing a hypothetical
question to the vocational expert (“VE”) that did not account for his memory and
concentration limitations.
We review the ALJ’s decision “to determine if it is supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm. of Social
Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion . . . . Even if the evidence preponderates
against the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 1158-59 (quotation and citation
omitted). In conducting this review, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the ALJ. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th
Cir. 1990). With respect to the Commissioner’s legal conclusions, however, our
review is de novo. Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002). With
these principles in hand, we address in order the two arguments Deters has
presented.
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I.
An applicant for social security benefits shall not be considered disabled “if
alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing factor material to the
Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(C). The key factor the Commissioner focuses on in deciding whether
an applicant’s alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of
disability “is whether [the Commissioner] would still find [the applicant] disabled
if [he] stopped using drugs or alcohol.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1). That is, the
Commissioner evaluates which of the applicant's physical and mental limitations
would remain if the applicant stopped using drugs or alcohol and then decides
whether any of those remaining limitations would be disabling.
Id. § 404.1535(b)(2). “[I]n disability determinations for which the medical record
indicates alcohol or drug abuse, the claimant bears the burden of proving that the
substance abuse is not a contributing factor material to the disability
determination . . .” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding that Deters’s alcohol use was a contributing factor material to his
pre-1999 disability, for Deters’s performance on memory tests improved after he
quit drinking in 1999.
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II.
“[O]nce a claimant proves that [he] can no longer perform [his] past relevant
work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the existence of other jobs in
the national economy which, given the claimant’s impairments, the claimant can
perform.” Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
omitted). To find that a claimant is able to perform alternate work, “[t]he ALJ
must articulate specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform, and this finding
must be supported by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.”
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002).
When a claimant has non-exertional impairments that significantly limit his
basic work skills, the “preferred method of demonstrating that the claimant can
perform other jobs is through the testimony of a VE.” Jones, 190 F.3d at 1229.
“[F[or a VE’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a
hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant's impairments.” Id.However, “[t[he ALJ [is] not required to include findings in the hypothetical that
the ALJ had properly rejected as unsupported.” Crawford v. Comm. of Social
Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004).
When the ALJ reviews a claimant’s medical picture, “the testimony of a
treating physician must be given substantial or considerable weight unless “good
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cause” is shown to the contrary.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th
Cir. 1997). Good cause may exist “where the doctor’s opinion was not bolstered
by the evidence, or where the evidence supported a contrary finding.” Id.In this case, although the evidence showed that Deters had memory and
concentration problems, the ALJ accounted for those limitations when he posed a
hypothetical question to the VE describing an individual who “could perform only
simple, repetitive-type tasks.” This description is supported by the objective
medical evidence; thus, the VE’s response to the hypothetical question constitutes
substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings at issue. The judgment of
the district court affirming the Commissioner’s decision is accordingly
AFFIRMED.
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