Frank Battle, Sr. v. J. Ronnie Webb , 298 F. App'x 882 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 31, 2008
No. 08-12696 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00097-CV-WCO-2
FRANK BATTLE, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
J. RONNIE WEBB,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 31, 2008)
Before BIRCH, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Frank Battle, Sr. appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights
action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a thorough review of the
record, we affirm.
Battle filed his civil action against J. Ronnie Webb, a member of the
Enforcement Division of the Georgia State Board of Workers’ Compensation,
alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment in connection with the August 29,
2001, search of his insurance business and the seizure of various files.1 Webb
obtained a search warrant, but the warrant did not specify the place to be searched
or the items to be seized. Instead, the warrant incorporated Webb’s attached
affidavit, which identified the place to be searched as Battle’s office and listed the
documents and other evidence to be seized. When Webb executed the warrant, he
left a copy of the warrant and inventory of the items seized, but he did not leave a
copy of the affidavit, and no affidavit was attached to the warrant at that time.
Webb later explained that he did not supply a copy of the supporting affidavit
because he did not want to risk divulging confidential information of the
investigation.
In 2002, as a result of the search, Battle was indicted by a DeKalb County
grand jury. Battle filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized. After conducting
1
In 2000, the State Board of Workers Compensation began investigating Battle in
connection with an insurance fraud scheme, in which Battle would collect premiums to purchase
insurance policies but instead of purchasing the policies, Battle allegedly converted the
premiums for his own purposes. As part of this investigation, Webb conducted a search of
Battle’s office. It is the events surrounding this search that led to the instant civil action.
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several hearings, the state court denied the motion to suppress. Following an
interlocutory appeal, in which the decision was affirmed, the state supreme court
granted certiorari review and remanded the issue in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d
1068 (2004). On remand, the state court granted the motion to suppress because
the failure to leave a copy of the affidavit with Battle at the time of the search
rendered the search and seizure illegal. See Battle v. State, 275 S.E.2d 506, 507
(Ga. 2005).
Nevertheless, while the case was pending, Nationwide Insurance cancelled
its contract with Battle, resulting in significant financial and business damages to
Battle.2 Thereafter, in 2005, the prosecutor dismissed the case against Battle. On
August 27, 2007, Battle filed the instant complaint.
Webb moved to dismiss, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), alleging that the complaint was
barred by the statute of limitations and, alternatively, that he was entitled to
qualified immunity. Without addressing the timeliness of the action, the district
court granted the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The district
court first concluded that there was no constitutional violation even though the
2
Battle alleges that Nationwide Insurance cancelled the contract after it apparently
learned of the allegations. However, the evidence submitted does not indicate Nationwide
Insurance’s reasons for canceling the contract.
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affidavit was not attached to the copy of the warrant given to Battle at the time of
the search. In addition, the court concluded that, even if there was a constitutional
violation, the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation. The
court noted that Groh was not decided until 2004, three years after the search
occurred. This appeal followed.3
Battle urges us to reverse the dismissal because the search warrant was
facially invalid under Groh, and the constitutional right under the Fourth
Amendment was clearly established by the terms of the amendment itself.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint
on qualified immunity grounds. Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir.
2007). In determining whether the complaint alleges the violation of a clearly
established right, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Id. We first ask whether
a constitutional violation occurred; we then ask whether the violation was already
clearly established by the law at the time. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736,
122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). “[D]etermining whether a
3
To the extent that Battle alleged a claim of malicious prosecution, that claim fails, as
Battle has not named the prosecutor who was responsible for obtaining an indictment. Eubanks
v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1994).
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constitutional right was clearly established ‘must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Vinyard v.
Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
The Supreme Court has variously defined the relevant, dispositive inquiry as
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, and “whether the state of the
law ... gave [the officer] fair warning” that his actions were unconstitutional, Hope,
536 U.S. at 741. In most cases, fact-specific precedents are necessary to give an
officer fair warning of the applicable law. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351-1352.
To demonstrate that the law at the time clearly established that Webb’s
conduct would violate the Constitution, Battle should point to either (1) earlier case
law from the Supreme Court, this court, or the highest court of Georgia that is
materially similar to the current case and therefore provided clear notice of the
violation or (2) general rules of law from a federal constitutional or statutory
provision or earlier case law that applied with “obvious clarity” to the
circumstances, establishing clearly the unlawfulness of Webb’s conduct. See
Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1031-1033 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc);
Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301-1303 (11th Cir. 2003); Vinyard,
311 F.3d at 1349-53. Thus, to avoid dismissal on qualified immunity grounds,
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Battle has the burden of demonstrating that Webb-at the pertinent time and given
the specific circumstances of this case-had fair notice that his conduct would
violate clear federal law. Long, 508 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).
Battle cannot meet this burden. The Fourth Amendment provides,
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Here, Battle cannot show a Fourth Amendment violation.
As this court has held, a warrant may satisfy the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment through incorporation. United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343(11th Cir. 1982). In that case, an IRS agent requested a search warrant in which he
identified eleven categories of records he was seeking. One of the categories listed
called for “the receipt and disbursement of kickback funds.” In support of the
warrant, the agent submitted an affidavit detailing the kickbacks he believed had
been paid and received. 683 F.2d at 1349-1351. The defendant challenged the
sufficiency of the warrant for failure to state with particularity the items to be
seized. After the district court denied the motion to suppress, this court concluded
that an affidavit incorporated into a warrant application could cure a defect or
ambiguity in the application if the affidavit was attached to the application. Id. at
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1351 n.6. This court further acknowledged that, in some circumstances, it could be
permissible to leave a copy of the warrant without the supporting affidavit at the
time of the search due to the need for confidentiality in an investigation. Id.Because Webb’s affidavit was incorporated into the warrant and specified
the places to be searched and the items to be seized, Battle cannot show any
constitutional violation.
Even if we were to conclude that there was a constitutional violation and the
warrant was facially invalid, the law was not clearly established at the time of the
search.
In Groh, the Supreme Court considered the legality of a search premised on
a warrant that failed to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the
items to be seized. 540 U.S. at 554. The application specified the items agents
sought, and in an accompanying affidavit, the agent explained the basis for his
belief the items would be found during a search. However, the application did not
specify the items to be seized and did not incorporate the affidavit. Id. at 554-555.
Upon review, the Court concluded that the warrant was facially invalid because the
Fourth Amendment required particularity of the items to be seized. Id. at 557. The
Court further stated that the amendment required particularity in the warrant and
not the supporting documents. Id. at 557. The Court explained, however, that it
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was not deciding whether a warrant could incorporate or cross-reference other
documents, and it expressly recognized that many circuits have held that a court
may consider a warrant with reference to supporting affidavits “if the warrant uses
appropriate words of incorporation and if the supporting document accompanies
the warrant.” Id. at 557-558. Because the warrant application in Groh did not
incorporate, and neither the application nor the affidavit accompanied the warrant,
the court did not address the issue of incorporation further. Id. at 558. The Court
then concluded that there could be no qualified immunity because the text of the
Fourth Amendment specifically required particularity and, thus, the right was
clearly established and the officer should have known that the warrant was
deficient. Id. at 563-564.
The Groh decision issued in 2004. Prior to that date, the case law of this
circuit did not clearly establish that Webb’s conduct was improper. See
Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982).
Thus, at the time Webb searched Battle’s business, the existing case law
arguably permitted Webb’s conduct. The warrant in Battle’s case incorporated
Webb’s affidavit and Webb explained that he did not leave a copy of the affidavit
at the time of the search due to confidentiality concerns. In light of the case law at
the time of the search, we cannot conclude that the rights were clearly established.
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Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.
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