USCA11 Case: 22-11839 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11839
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
RODNEY LEE LYON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF OF LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
BRET RUTZEBECK,
individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11839
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00438-SDM-PRL
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Lee Lyon appeals the district court’s order granting
Lake County Sheriff’s Deputy Bret Rutzebeck’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on Lyon’s claim for malicious prosecution under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Lyon argues that the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment for Deputy Rutzebeck on his malicious
prosecution claim. As Lyon was never meaningfully seized under
the Fourth Amendment, we cannot hold he was maliciously pros-
ecuted. Accordingly, we affirm.
On June 1, 2016, Deputy Rutzebeck responded to a report
that Lyon had neglected to treat the hooves of Lyon’s eighteen-
year-old horse. After meeting at Lyon’s property, Deputy Rutze-
beck noticed that the horse’s hooves had overgrown and curled
“like an elf’s shoe.” Lyon informed Deputy Rutzebeck that Lyon
had hired a veterinarian to trim the horse’s hooves.
Two days later, the veterinarian and Deputy Rutzebeck ob-
served the trimming of the horse’s hooves. This process revealed
1 The district court’s order also granted summary judgment in favor of the
current and former sheriffs of Lake County on Lyon’s claim against them for
“violation of civil rights” under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lyon does not appeal this
decision.
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22-11839 Opinion of the Court 3
that the hooves would inevitably detach from the horse’s feet,
which required the immediate euthanasia of the horse. The veteri-
narian told Deputy Rutzebeck that Lyon’s failure to trim the
horse’s hooves caused irreversible damage. Deputy Rutzebeck de-
termined that this failure amounted to neglect.
Deputy Rutzebeck met with Lyon at a barbeque restaurant
and informed Lyon that he intended to recommend a charge of an-
imal neglect. Deputy Rutzebeck forwarded a report to the state
prosecutor’s office concluding that Lyon’s failure to furnish regular
farrier care for the horse amounted to animal neglect under state
law. The prosecutor charged Lyon with misdemeanor animal ne-
glect. Lyon was never arrested or detained. He appeared once in
court to plead not guilty to the charge. Two months later, the pros-
ecutor dropped the charges.
In granting Deputy Rutzebeck’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court held that Lyon was never seized under the
Fourth Amendment and therefore he could not succeed on his ma-
licious prosecution claim as a matter of law. The district court also
noted that even if Lyon had been seized, Rutzebeck would be enti-
tled to qualified immunity as there was arguable probable cause to
refer Lyon for prosecution. We need not reach the issue of whether
Deputy Rutzebeck was entitled to qualified immunity because
Lyon was never seized.
We review a district court’s granting of a motion for sum-
mary judgment de novo, “applying the same legal standards as
those that control the district court.” Jackson v. State of Ala. State
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11839
Tenure Comm’n,
405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (2005). To succeed on a sum-
mary judgment motion, the movant must establish he is entitled to
prevail on questions of law, and “there are no genuine issues of
material fact pertinent to those questions of law.” Rich v. Dollar,
841 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).
Malicious prosecution under Section 1983 requires that a
plaintiff demonstrate (1) each element of malicious prosecution un-
der relevant state law and (2) that the malicious prosecution re-
sulted in a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Kingsland v. City
of Miami,
382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). Lyon cannot satisfy
the second element because he was never detained or arrested. The
sole seizure that Lyon contends occurred is the requirement he ap-
pear in court to plead not guilty.
Under our precedents, Lyon was not seized merely because
he was required to appear in court. In Kingsland, we held that a
plaintiff was not seized when she was released on bond subject to
a pretrial release program. In doing so, we held that without a “sig-
nificant deprivation of liberty . . . a seizure [cannot be] violative of
the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 1236 (citing Myers v. Shaver,
245
F. Supp. 2d 805, 812 (W.D. Va. 2003)). Here, Lyon merely appeared
in court to plead not guilty. The restrictions in Kingsland—posting
bond as part of a pretrial release program—are certainly more sub-
stantial than merely appearing in court for a plea hearing. See Al-
bright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 278–79 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the restrictions of liberty as-
sociated with pretrial release). Under our precedents, we cannot
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22-11839 Opinion of the Court 5
conclude that Lyon was seized under the Fourth Amendment by
being compelled to appear in court a single time. Deputy Rutze-
beck was thus entitled to summary judgment on Lyon’s malicious
prosecution claim. Rich,
841 F.2d at 1562.
Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.
