Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher ( 1995 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    Nos. 94-5138, 94-5231 and 94-5234.
    CUBAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Cuban Legal Alliance, Inc.,
    Due Process, Inc., Lizbet Martinez, Arianna Gonzalez Nobaez, Arniel
    Del Campo Gonzalez, on behalf of themselves and all others
    similarly situated, Jovani Miguel Fiffe Pino, Nestor Rodriguez
    Labori, Nelson Torres Pulido, Maritza Exposito, David Buzzi,
    Alberto Rodriguez Garcia, on behalf of themselves and all others
    similarly situated, Leydis Milagros Ruiz Mendez, on behalf of
    herself and all others similarly situated, Elena Pino, Virginia
    Perez, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.; Garry Joseph, Paulomme Edmond,
    Pierre Onel Antoine, Voidieu Jean Louis, Bergeline Jean Louis,
    Padeci Jean Louis, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
    situated, Provisional Intervenors,
    v.
    Warren CHRISTOPHER, Secretary of State, William J. Perry,
    Secretary of Defense, Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and
    Naturalization Service, Janet Reno, Attorney General, Immigration
    and Naturalization Service, Brigadier General Michael Williams,
    Commander Joint Task Force, Defendants-Appellants.
    CUBAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Cuban Legal Alliance, Inc.,
    Due Process, Inc., Lizbet Martinez, Arianna Gonzalez Nobaez, Arniel
    Del Campo Gonzalez, on behalf of themselves and all others
    similarly situated, Jovani Miguel Feffe Pino, Nestor Rodriguez
    Labori, Nelson Torres Pulido, Maritza Exposito, David Buzzi,
    Alberto Rodriguez Garcia, on behalf of themselves and all others
    similarly situated, Leydis Milagros Ruiz Mendez, on behalf of
    herself and all others similarly situated, Elena Pino, Virginia
    Perez, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs,
    Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.; Garry Joseph, Paulomme Edmond,
    Pierre Onel Antoine, Voidieu Jean Louis, Bergeline Jean Louis,
    Padeci Jean Louis, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
    situated, Provisional Intervenors-Appellees,
    v.
    Warren CHRISTOPHER, Secretary of State, William J. Perry,
    Secretary of Defense, Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and
    Naturalization Service, Janet Reno, Attorney General, Immigration
    and Naturalization Service, Brigadier General Michael Williams,
    Commander Joint Task Force, Defendants-Appellants.
    Jan. 18, 1995.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Florida. (No. 94-2183-CV-CCA), C. Clyde Atkins, Judge.
    Before KRAVITCH, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
    This case requires us to address the following issues:    (1)
    whether Cuban and Haitian migrants temporarily provided safe haven
    at the United States' naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at
    the United States' military installations in Panama, may assert
    rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 1951 United
    Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Cuban
    Adjustment Act, the Cuban Democracy Act and the Constitution of the
    United States;   (2) whether legal organizations can sustain First
    Amendment claims of freedom of speech and association with these
    migrants;   and (3) whether the First Amendment or the Equal
    Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment dictates that the United
    States government must furnish a list of Haitian migrants who are
    residing at Guantanamo Bay to the Haitian Refugee Center, a legal
    service organization.   The district court has entered preliminary
    injunctions granting attorneys for the Cuban migrants access to all
    Cuban migrants provided safe haven prior to voluntary repatriation
    and attorneys for Haitian migrants access to their clients and any
    other Haitian migrants who request counsel in writing, barring the
    government from repatriating any Cuban migrants prior to the
    migrant's consultation with a lawyer, directing the United States
    Attorney General to parole unaccompanied minor Haitian migrants
    into the United States on the same terms that unaccompanied minor
    Cuban migrants have been or may be paroled, and requiring the
    government to release the names of all Haitian migrants to the
    Haitian Refugee Center. After thorough review of authority in this
    circuit and the Supreme Court, we VACATE the district court's order
    and REMAND to the district court with direction to dismiss the
    plaintiffs' claims.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Factual Background
    1. Cuban Migration
    On August 8, 1994, Fidel Castro, announced that the Cuban
    government would no longer forcibly prevent emigration from Cuba by
    boat.    Castro's new policy encouraged thousands of Cubans to board
    makeshift rafts and boats to escape Cuba and head for the shores of
    the United States. While many were lost at sea, approximately 8000
    Cubans arrived in the United States safely.
    In an effort to quell this influx of migrants and to save the
    rafters' lives, on August 19, 1994, the President of the United
    States    ordered    the   United    States   Coast    Guard    to   intercept
    watercraft carrying persons fleeing from Cuba and bound for the
    United   States'     border   and   to   transport    these   persons   to   the
    American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.              The United States
    leases its military base at Guantanamo Bay from sovereign Cuba
    under a lease agreement negotiated in 1903.1
    1
    The Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands
    in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba,
    art. III, T.S. No. 418, reprinted in, 6 Bevans 1113-15
    [hereinafter Lease Agreement], provides that the United States
    has "control and jurisdiction" over the leased land, but that
    Cuba retains sovereignty over the land. The lease states in
    pertinent part:
    While on the one hand the United States recognizes
    In     August,   1994,   the   United    States   government      began
    negotiating with the Cuban government to halt the flow of migrants
    to the United States.     These diplomatic negotiations culminated on
    September 9, 1994, in an accord with the Cuban government.          In this
    accord, the United States agreed it would only allow Cuban migrants
    to enter the United States by applying for immigrant visas or
    refugee admittance at the United States Interests Section in
    Havana, Cuba.     A minimum of 20,000 persons are to be allowed to
    migrate legally to the United States each year, not including
    immediate relatives of United States citizens who are under no
    numerical    restrictions.      However,     in   conjunction   with    this
    international agreement, the Attorney General also ordered that no
    Cuban who had accepted safe haven in Guantanamo Bay or Panama would
    be allowed to apply for a visa or for asylum in the United States
    from safe haven.2
    Currently, Cuban migrants have three options with respect to
    their residence:      (1) they may remain in safe haven, (2) they may
    repatriate to sovereign Cuba voluntarily;         or (3) they may travel
    the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the
    Republic of Cuba over the [leased] areas of land and
    water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents
    that during the period of the occupation by the United
    States of said areas under the terms of this agreement
    the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction
    and control over and within said areas....
    Lease Agreement, art. III.
    2
    According to Michael Skol, Principal Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the Department
    of State, this policy was implemented "to deter further dangerous
    migration from Cuba, and to provide Cubans seeking entry into the
    United States a safe alternative to boat departures...." Skol
    Decl. ¶ 9.
    to a third country willing to accept them.      While more than 1000
    Cubans have requested voluntarily to be returned to Cuba, the Cuban
    government has restricted the return of Cuban nationals and has
    delayed the voluntary repatriation process. Persons who repatriate
    to Cuba voluntarily may then apply for asylum through the regular
    channels commencing at the United States Special Interests Section
    in Havana, Cuba.
    The United States government's expressed desire is not to
    maintain these migrants for an indefinite period of time or against
    their will.   The government's position is that it could return the
    migrants to Cuba legally without a migrant's request. However, the
    government has offered the Cuban migrants safe haven for as long as
    the migrants wished. All Cuban migrants volunteering to repatriate
    execute a form approved by the United Nations High Commissioner for
    Refugees ("UNHCR") and meet with a representative from UNHCR before
    returning.
    UNHCR is an agency of the United Nations specializing in the
    care and well-being of refugees worldwide.     UNHCR was established
    by the United Nations general assembly on January 1, 1951, "to
    provide international protection to refugees and to seek permanent
    solutions for their problems."    UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies §
    2.2(1) (1982).     The UNHCR "aim[s] ... to secure treatment in
    accordance with universally recognized humanitarian principles not
    directly linked to the status [as refugees] of those in need."   
    Id. § 2.1(4);
       see also 
    id. § 2.2(1).
      UNHCR has participated with the
    United States government in ensuring that any return to Cuba was
    made on a voluntary basis.
    In addition to UNHCR, humanitarian groups such as Amnesty
    International, Inc., the U.S. Committee for Refugees, and Church
    World Service (Immigration and Refugee Service) as well as legal
    organizations such as the Ad Hoc group of Cuban-American Attorneys,
    have been allowed to visit the migrants at the base.               However, as
    the numbers of migrants and the length of the stay in safe haven
    have increased, problems have erupted.            Many Cuban migrants have
    climbed over barbed wire and jumped from treacherous cliffs into
    the bay in attempts to swim the mile or so back to sovereign Cuba.
    Still others have scaled fences and braved a mine field in order to
    reach their homeland.        During early December, 1994, many were
    injured during riots at the camps, particularly in Panama.                 The
    risk of violence and danger, both to the migrants and the military
    personnel charged with their care, has grown.              While the United
    States   has    begun   negotiating    with    other   countries    to   accept
    migrants from the safe haven and has continued with the voluntary
    repatriation program, problems continue.
    Since consummation of the accord, the Attorney General has
    exercised her discretion to parole into the United States Cuban
    migrants who have sponsors in the United States and are (1) over
    the age of 70;      (2) who are ill;          or (3) who are unaccompanied
    minors (under the age of 13).         She has also begun to consider, on
    a case-by-case basis, the possible parole of other Cuban children
    at Guantanamo Bay who are accompanied, but who may suffer severe
    hardship   if   they    remain   in   safe    haven.    Over   20,000    Cubans
    currently remain in safe haven at Guantanamo Bay 3 and at military
    installations in Panama.
    2. Haitian Migration
    In 1991, Haiti's elected leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was
    ousted from power.        As a result, thousands of Haitians departed
    Haiti and attempted to reach the United States. Between May, 1992,
    and June, 1994, the United States Coast Guard interdicted on the
    high seas Haitians bound for the United States and returned them
    directly to Haiti.       In June, 1994, the government began processing
    some migrants for asylum in the United States.                However, in July,
    1994, the United States began offering safe haven at Guantanamo Bay
    to the migrant Haitians;           the government was not allowing the
    Haitian migrants to enter the United States, but was not returning
    them directly to Haiti.         At the peak of emigration in 1994, over
    16,800    Haitian       migrants    were     housed      at    Guantanamo     Bay
    simultaneously.4
    On   September      19,   1994,   the   United   States     led   a   United
    Nations-authorized military intervention in Haiti.               Through these
    efforts, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was returned to
    power    on   October    15,   1994.       After   his    reinstallation,     an
    ever-increasing number of Haitians in safe haven have volunteered
    3
    The base at Guantanamo Bay is divided up into various camps
    housing families, single men, single women and unaccompanied
    children. There are two special camps, Camps November I and II,
    where migrants who have voluntarily requested to be repatriated
    are housed for their safety.
    4
    Haitian migrants are only being housed at Guantanamo Bay;
    no Haitians are in safe haven in Panama. The camp divisions are
    similar to those maintained for Cuban migrants; however, there
    are no special camps for those migrants who have requested
    repatriation.
    to repatriate.         Approximately 8000 Haitians remained at Guantanamo
    Bay on December 19, 1994.
    B. Procedural Background
    1. The Cuban Migrants' Case
    On October 23, 1994, plaintiffs-appellees, Cuban American Bar
    Association, Inc., Cuban Legal Alliance, Inc., and Due Process,
    Inc.       (collectively    "Cuban     Legal    Organizations"),     some   Cuban
    individuals being held on Guantanamo Bay, and some individuals with
    family       members    being   held    on     Guantanamo    Bay   (collectively
    "individual Cuban plaintiffs") filed a class action complaint
    requesting declaratory and injunctive relief under, inter alia, the
    First and Fifth Amendments, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a),
    and Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, [hereinafter
    the    Refugee        Convention]5.      Specifically,       the   Cuban    Legal
    Organizations and the individual Cuban plaintiffs requested that
    the        district    court    enter    an     injunction     preventing     the
    defendants-appellants ("the government") from denying the Cuban
    Legal Organizations reasonable access to and communication with
    their Guantanamo Bay clients for legal consultation relative to the
    Cuban migrants' putative rights regarding asylum petitions and
    5
    The United States acceded to the United Nation Protocol
    Relating to the Status of Refugees on November 6, 1968. The
    Protocol bound the United States to comply with Articles 2
    through 34 of the Refugee Convention. Protocol Relating to the
    Status of Refugees, opened for accession, Jan. 31, 1967, art. I,
    § 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223. The United States agreed to the Protocol
    with the following reservation, "[a]s to any such provision, the
    United States will accord to refugees lawfully staying in its
    territory treatment no less favorable than is accorded aliens
    generally in the same circumstances." 19 U.S.T. at 6257.
    parole decisions, and an injunction prohibiting the government from
    "encouraging or coercing, directly or indirectly, the repatriation
    to Cuba of, and repatriating, any [Cuban migrant] currently being
    detained by the United States Government."   Class Action Compl. at
    59, Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, No. 94-2183 (S.D.Fla. Oct.
    24, 1994) [hereinafter CABA I ].
    On October 25, 1994, upon learning that at 11:30 a.m. that day
    the government would return to Cuba, by plane, twenty-three Cuban
    migrants who had previously volunteered for repatriation, the Cuban
    Legal Organizations and the individual Cuban plaintiffs filed an
    emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and request for
    an emergency hearing to block the repatriation.   Approximately one
    minute before the plane was to take off, the district court
    verbally ordered the government to halt the repatriation of these
    migrants.
    The district court further considered the arguments of the
    parties, and on October 31, 1994, the court granted the Cuban Legal
    Organizations' and the individual Cuban plaintiffs' motion for an
    emergency   "temporary   restraining   order."     Order   Granting
    Plaintiffs' Emergency Mot. for T.R.O., CABA I, (Oct. 31, 1994)
    [hereinafter October 31 Order].    The district court specifically
    granted the Cuban Legal Organizations and the individual Cuban
    plaintiffs the following relief:
    (a) [The government] shall refrain from denying [Cuban
    Legal Organizations] and other counsel reasonable and
    meaningful access to the [Cuban migrants in safe haven]; and
    (b) [The government] shall refrain from repatriating any
    [Cuban migrants in safe haven], including those twenty-three
    (23) persons who were the subject of the temporary restraining
    Order entered October 25, 1994, without permitting them access
    to counsel and receipt of full information so as to assure an
    informed and voluntary decision to seek repatriation.
    
    Id. at 13
    (emphasis added).           The October 31 Order was put into
    effect "until further order of the court."              
    Id. On November
    1, 1994, the government filed a notice of appeal
    and a motion requesting the district court to stay its own order.
    The district court failed to grant this request and the government,
    on November 2, 1994, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), filed a
    motion   for    summary   reversal,    or   in    the   alternative,      for   an
    emergency stay pending appeal in this court.               On November 3, 1994,
    we granted that request in part, staying that portion of the
    district court's October 31 Order which prevented repatriation of
    Cuban migrants who had requested in writing to be returned.                   Cuban
    Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, No. 94-5138 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 1994)
    [hereinafter CABA II ] [hereinafter November 3 Order]. On November
    4, 1994, we heard oral argument on an expedited basis and that day
    modified our November 3 Order verbally. We entered a written order
    on November 7, 1994, confirming our verbal order.                  CABA II, (Nov.
    7,   1994)     [hereinafter   November      7    Order].      We    granted     the
    government's motion in part and denied it in part.                 Specifically,
    we instructed the government to allow the Cuban Legal Organizations
    reasonable access to their clients and any other Cuban migrants
    who, in writing, requested legal counsel.                  We also stayed that
    portion of the district court's order that prevented the government
    from arranging repatriation of Cuban migrants in Camp November, who
    "expressed a desire, by written declaration, to be returned to
    sovereign      Cuba";     however,    we    barred      the   government      from
    repatriating any Cuban migrant who did not "express, by written
    declaration, a desire to be returned to sovereign Cuba."             November
    7 Order at 2.      After our November 7 Order but prior to oral
    argument over 241 Cubans were repatriated.
    2. The Haitian Migrants' Case
    On October 31, 1994, the Haitian Refugee Center ("HRC") and
    some individual Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay filed a motion
    to intervene and a motion for temporary restraining order.                HRC
    requested a temporary restraining order instructing the government
    to afford HRC access to all Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay,
    barring the government from denying parole to unaccompanied Haitian
    minors, and ordering the disclosure of the identities of all
    Haitian migrants in safe haven.
    The district court issued two orders granting in part the
    relief   HRC   requested    in   its   original   motion   for   a   temporary
    restraining order.6        The district court issued its preliminary
    6
    Prior to the district court's ruling on the original motion
    for a temporary restraining order, on November 1, 1994, the
    district court heard an oral motion by HRC for a temporary
    restraining order blocking the government from repatriating
    fourteen Haitians at Guantanamo Bay who were scheduled for
    imminent repatriation. The government agreed to delay
    repatriation until November 3, 1994. The government was planning
    to repatriate a total of fifty-four Haitians; forty of those
    were returning to seek medical attention and the remaining
    fourteen were the subject of the district court's order. The day
    after oral argument, November 2, 1994, the district court
    provisionally granted the HRC's motion to intervene and entered a
    temporary restraining order preventing the government's scheduled
    repatriation of the fourteen Haitians. Corrected Order on Mot.
    to Intervene and Mot. for T.R.O., CABA I, (Nov. 2, 1994).
    HRC then requested that the district court bar the
    government from repatriating Haitians who were scheduled to
    return to Haiti on November 20, 1994. On November 18, the
    district court ordered that repatriation could occur as
    planned under the condition that all Haitians repatriated
    had requested repatriation in writing. Order on Haitian
    Refugee Ctr.'s Emergency Mot. for T.R.O. and Request for
    order on November 22, 1994, granting HRC access to named plaintiffs
    and any other Haitian migrants who requested counsel in writing,
    ordering    the     Attorney   General     to     parole     from     safe    haven
    unaccompanied Haitian minors in the same manner as unaccompanied
    Cuban minors, and directing the government to release the names of
    all Haitian migrants to HRC.          Order on Provisional Intervenors'
    Mot. for T.R.O., CABA I (Nov. 22, 1994) [hereinafter November 22
    Order].    Upon the government's motion, the district court granted
    a stay of the November 22 Order as it applied to parole of the
    minor Haitians and the release of the names of migrants, but
    continued in force the order allowing HRC access to detained
    Haitians who requested legal counsel.           Omnibus Order, CABA I (Nov.
    28, 1994) [hereinafter November 28 Order].
    Appeals from these orders were filed and on December 1, 1994,
    the cases filed by the Cuban Legal Organizations and the individual
    Cuban plaintiffs (No. 94-5138) and HRC and the individual Haitian
    migrants    (Nos.    94-5231   and    94-5234)      were     consolidated       for
    consideration by this court.          On December 19, 1994, after oral
    argument on the issues presented, we dissolved our November 7 Order
    and stayed all the relief granted by the district court in its
    October    31   Order,   November    22   Order    and     November    28    Order.
    Furthermore, by our December 19 Order, we stayed all further
    proceedings in the district court, including discovery.
    3. Issues on Appeal
    We now consider the following issues on appeal:
    Emergency Hr'g, CABA I (Nov. 18, 1994).               That repatriation
    took place as scheduled.
    1. Whether the Cuban or Haitian migrants in safe haven outside the
    physical borders of the United States have any cognizable
    statutory or constitutional rights.
    2. Whether the Cuban Legal Organizations or HRC have a First
    Amendment right to associate with migrants held in safe haven
    outside the physical borders of the United States for the
    purposes of engaging in political speech and if so, whether
    the   government    engages   in    impermissible   viewpoint
    discrimination violative of any First Amendment rights of the
    individual migrants or the Cuban Legal Organizations or HRC by
    restricting the legal organizations' access to the migrants
    for the purposes of legal consultation.
    3. Whether the government must disclose to HRC the names of all
    Haitian migrants in safe haven.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Jurisdiction
    1. Appealability of Temporary Restraining Orders
    While temporary restraining orders are not generally subject
    to appellate review, Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 
    950 F.2d 685
    , 686 (11th Cir.1991) [hereinafter "HRC I "];               McDougald v.
    Jenson, 
    786 F.2d 1465
    , 1472 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    479 U.S. 860
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 207
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 137
    (1986), "where the order has the
    effect of a preliminary injunction this court has jurisdiction to
    review   the   order   and   is   not   bound   by   the   district   court's
    designation of the order."        HRC 
    I, 950 F.2d at 686
    .      To determine
    whether an order denominated as a temporary restraining order is
    actually a preliminary injunction, we review the duration of the
    order;   "whether it was issued after notice and a hearing";              the
    extent of evidence submitted to the district court;                   and the
    continuing safeguards installed by the district court.           
    McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1472
    .      After review of the district court's orders, we
    conclude that they are in fact appealable preliminary injunctions.
    See November 3 Order. With respect to the district court's October
    31    Order,    the   court   explicitly    referred   to   the   order   as
    "preliminary injunctive relief." October 31 Order at 4. Moreover,
    the order is of indefinite duration;          it was issued after notice
    and   a    hearing;    the    court   received   evidence   and   considered
    declarations from both parties (commenting that no further factual
    development need be made before ruling);           and the court required
    the parties to report jointly to it every thirty days regarding the
    status under its order.        We conclude that the characteristics of
    this October 31 Order belie the district court's label as a
    temporary restraining order;          it is in all respects an appealable
    preliminary injunction.7 Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),
    we have jurisdiction over an appeal from that order.
    With respect to the district court's November 22 Order and
    November 28 Order granting HRC and the individual Haitian parties
    relief, but staying portions of that relief during appeal, the
    district court specifically stated that "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1292(b), the court finds that this Order involves controlling
    questions of law regarding the rights of [migrants] in Guantanamo
    Bay which are subject to a difference of opinion and that an
    7
    In Sampson v. Murray, 
    415 U.S. 61
    , 
    94 S. Ct. 937
    , 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 166
    (1974), the Supreme Court observed:
    A district court, if it were able to shield its orders
    from appellate review merely by designating them as
    temporary restraining orders, rather than as
    preliminary injunctions, would have virtually unlimited
    authority over the parties in an injunctive proceeding.
    In this case, where an adversary hearing has been held,
    and the court's basis for issuing the order strongly
    challenged, classification of the potentially unlimited
    order as a temporary restraining order seems
    particularly unjustified.
    
    Id. at 86-87,
    94 S.Ct. at 951.        Such is the case here.
    immediate appeal may advance the ultimate termination of this
    case."   November 22 Order at 2.      On December 1, 1994, we exercised
    our    discretion   and   permitted   appeal     from   these   orders,   and
    accordingly, we take jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
    1292(b).
    2. Standing
    In its appeal to this court for emergency relief from the
    district court's October 31 order, the government raised a question
    regarding the standing of the Cuban Legal Organizations and the
    individual Cuban plaintiffs relative to the putative injuries to
    parties not before the court, specifically all those migrants who
    expressed a written desire to be repatriated. Appellants' Mot. for
    Summ. Reversal, or, in the Alternative for An Emergency Stay
    Pending Appeal (or a Writ of Mandamus), CABA II, at 22 n. 65 (filed
    Nov. 2, 1994).      These migrants were prevented from returning to
    Cuba by the district court's oral order on October 25, 1994, and by
    the October 31 Order.     After our November 7 Order, repatriation of
    those who had expressed in writing a desire to return to sovereign
    Cuba    was   continued   as   arranged   with    the   Cuban   government.
    Appellant's Brief at 6 n. 2.     But for our stay, the remaining Cuban
    migrants in Camp November who had requested to be returned to Cuba
    would be affected by the district court's order barring their
    repatriation.
    The principle of standing is "derive[d] from the Article III
    limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts." Jackson v. Okaloosa
    County, 
    21 F.3d 1531
    , 1536 (11th Cir.1994).
    Before rendering a decision ... every federal court
    operates under an independent obligation to ensure it is
    presented with the kind of concrete controversy upon which its
    constitutional grant of authority is based;          and this
    obligation on the court to examine its own jurisdiction
    continues at each stage of the proceedings, even if no party
    raises the jurisdictional issue and both parties are prepared
    to concede it.
    Hallandale     Professional       Fire    Fighters      Local   2238     v.    City   of
    Hallandale, 
    922 F.2d 756
    , 759 (11th Cir.1991).                   We recognize two
    components to the standing doctrine:              the minimum constitutional
    requirements of Article III and the prudential considerations of
    judicial self-government.              Harris v. Evans, 
    20 F.3d 1118
    , 1121
    (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    115 S. Ct. 641
    ,
    --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1994);          F.D.I.C. v. Morley, 
    867 F.2d 1381
    , 1386
    (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    493 U.S. 819
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 75
    , 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 41
      (1989).       To   meet     the    irreducible      minimum    constitutional
    requirements, the plaintiff must show "(1) that he has suffered an
    actual   or    threatened       injury,    (2)   that    the    injury    is    fairly
    traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that
    the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling."
    
    Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121
    ;          accord Valley Forge Christian College v.
    Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
    454 U.S. 464
    , 472, 
    102 S. Ct. 752
    , 758, 
    70 L. Ed. 2d 700
    (1982);                     
    Jackson, 21 F.3d at 1537
    ;      
    Morley, 867 F.2d at 1386
    .            The party must also show
    that prudential considerations do not weigh against consideration
    of the claims.     
    Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121
    ;           
    Morley, 867 F.2d at 1386
    .
    We have identified three particular situations in which we will
    decline to address a party's claim for prudential reasons:                        "(1)
    assertion     of   a    third    party's    [putative]      rights     rather     than
    individual legal rights; (2) allegation of a generalized grievance
    rather than an injury peculiar to such litigant;                   or (3) assertion
    of an injury outside the statute's or constitutional provision's
    zone of interests."      
    Morley, 867 F.2d at 1386
    .
    For each claim stated in a complaint, there must be a
    plaintiff who will achieve some redress by the court's actions.
    
    Jackson, 21 F.3d at 1536
    .       As of this interlocutory appeal, the
    classes sought have not been certified;          neither the Cuban Legal
    Organizations nor the individual Cuban plaintiffs represent the
    approximate 1000 Cuban residents of Camp November who expressed
    their desire in writing to be returned to sovereign Cuba as soon as
    possible.     "Inclusion of class action allegations in a complaint
    does not relieve a plaintiff of himself meeting the requirements
    for constitutional standing, even if the persons described in the
    class definition would have standing themselves to sue."        Brown v.
    Sibley, 
    650 F.2d 760
    , 771 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981);               accord
    Church v. City of Huntsville, 
    30 F.3d 1332
    , 1340 (11th Cir.1994)
    ("[U]nless ... one of the named plaintiffs is in real and immediate
    danger of being personally injured ... the plaintiff class lacks
    standing....");      Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 
    977 F.2d 527
    , 531 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a party may only represent
    a class to "the extent that he has standing to bring individual
    claims"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    113 S. Ct. 2932
    , 
    124 L. Ed. 2d 682
    (1993).      We conclude that the plaintiffs in this case are not
    suffering any real or threatened injury by the repatriation of any
    migrant who has expressed, in writing, his or her desire to be
    returned    to   sovereign   Cuba.   None   of    the   individual   Cuban
    plaintiffs claims to have requested repatriation and are therefore,
    outside the group who is being affected directly by the district
    court's    October   31    Order   barring       repatriation   without   prior
    consultation with a lawyer. However, the individual Cuban migrants
    may properly challenge the United States' repatriation policies to
    the extent that they allege that they may suffer imminent injury by
    being coerced in the future into signing declarations of desire to
    repatriate or being wrongly repatriated to sovereign Cuba, whether
    or not they may succeed on the merits of those claims.             See 
    Morley, 867 F.2d at 1387
    (holding that standing is determined without
    considering the party's likelihood of ultimately succeeding on the
    merits of their claims).
    B. Standard of Review
    "Ordinarily,      the   grant   of   a    preliminary   injunction   is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion;                however, if the trial court
    misapplies the law we will review and correct the error without
    deference to that court's determination."              Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
    Inc. v. Baker, 
    949 F.2d 1109
    , 1110 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam)
    [hereinafter "Baker "], cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    112 S. Ct. 1245
    , 
    117 L. Ed. 2d 477
    (1992).           As discussed below, the district
    court misapplied the law governing the issues presented in this
    case.     Thus, we accord no deference to the district court's
    determinations in granting the preliminary injunctions in this
    case.
    C. The Merits
    A preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief. 
    Church, 30 F.3d at 1342
    .    Because of the nature of a preliminary injunction,
    before relief can be granted, the party requesting the injunction
    must show: "(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
    (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) its own injury
    outweighs the injury to the nonmovant;         and (4) the injunction
    would not disserve the public interest."       
    Baker, 949 F.2d at 1110
    (emphasis added);   accord 
    Church, 30 F.3d at 1342
    .       The district
    court misapplied the law in this case;             thus, we accord no
    deference to the court's decision. 8       Under the precedent of this
    circuit and the Supreme Court,9 we conclude that the Cuban Legal
    Organizations,   HRC,   the   individual   Cuban   plaintiffs   and   the
    individual Haitian migrants cannot meet the first prerequisite to
    8
    Despite controlling precedent in this circuit, the district
    court relied upon Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 
    823 F. Supp. 1028
    (E.D.N.Y.1993) vacated by Stipulated Order Approving
    Class Action Settlement Agreement (Feb. 22, 1994) [hereinafter
    HCC ], to support its grant of the preliminary injunction as to
    the Cuban migrants. Whatever may be the effect in the Eastern
    District of New York of this now vacated district court decision
    in HCC, it has no precedential value in this circuit. Much of
    the reasoning in that decision is contrary to binding precedent
    in this circuit.
    9
    We are bound by precedent established by this court, by the
    Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981, and by the Supreme Court
    of the United States. See C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Director, Office
    of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
    31 F.3d 1112
    , 1115 n. 8 (11th
    Cir.1994) ("Only the en banc court or the Supreme Court may
    overrule the settled law of this circuit."); Bonner v. City of
    Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209, 1210 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc)
    (adopting the decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down on or
    before September 30, 1981, as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit,
    reasoning that "[s]tability and predictability are essential
    factors in the proper operation of the rule of law."). We
    recognize no other legally binding precedent. While other
    circuit and district courts may have considered similar issues,
    it is the case law of this circuit which governs our decisions.
    Specifically, Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 
    953 F.2d 1498
    (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    112 S. Ct. 1245
    , 
    117 L. Ed. 2d 477
    (1992) [hereinafter HRC II ], Jean v.
    Nelson, 
    727 F.2d 957
    (11th Cir.1984) (en banc) [hereinafter Jean
    I], aff'd on other grounds, 
    472 U.S. 846
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 2992
    , 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 664
    (1985) [hereinafter Jean II ], and the Supreme
    Court's decision in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., --- U.S.
    ----, 
    113 S. Ct. 2549
    , 
    125 L. Ed. 2d 128
    (1993), guide and bind us
    here.
    the grant of a preliminary injunction, a showing of "substantial
    likelihood of success on the merits [of their claims]," and thus,
    are not entitled to injunctive relief.             See 
    Church, 30 F.3d at 1342
    .
    1. Statutory and Constitutional Rights of Migrants in Safe Haven
    The Cuban migrants and the Haitian migrants are asserting
    statutory rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
    U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 ("INA") and the Refugee Convention.                    The
    individual Cuban plaintiffs in safe haven also assert rights under
    the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, and the Cuban
    Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010.              The individual Haitian
    unaccompanied minor plaintiffs assert rights against discriminatory
    parole   decisions   under   8   U.S.C.   §    1182.      Additionally,    the
    individual Cuban plaintiffs advance claims to Fifth Amendment
    rights of due process and the individual Haitian migrants are
    asserting   Fifth    Amendment   rights       to   due   process   and   equal
    protection of the laws.
    a. Status of Guantanamo Bay
    The district court in this case relied upon Haitian Ctrs.
    Council, Inc. v. Sale, 
    823 F. Supp. 1028
    (E.D.N.Y.1993), vacated by
    Stipulated Order Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement (Feb.
    22, 1994) [hereinafter HCC ], in entering its order granting the
    Cuban migrants meetings with lawyers upon request and barring
    repatriation of migrants without prior legal consultation.               In the
    HCC case, the New York district court found that lawyers had a
    First Amendment right to free speech and association for engaging
    in legal consultation 10 at Guantanamo Bay because it was a naval
    base    over    which      the    United    States    has   "complete    control    and
    jurisdiction" and "where the government exercises complete control
    over all means of delivering communication."                    
    Id. at 1040.
           The
    district court here erred in concluding that Guantanamo Bay was a
    "United States territory."                 October 31 Order at 9.        We disagree
    that "control and jurisdiction" is equivalent to sovereignty.                       See
    Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for
    Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 26, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418
    (distinguishing between sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over
    the leased land and the "control and jurisdiction" granted the
    United States), reprinted in 6 Bevans 1113-15;                     cf. United States
    v. Spelar, 
    338 U.S. 217
    , 221-22, 
    70 S. Ct. 10
    , 12, 94 L.Ed.3 (1949)
    (construing the Federal Tort Claims Act not to apply to an American
    military       air   base    in    Newfoundland       because   the   lease    between
    Newfoundland         and   the    United     States    "effected    no   transfer    of
    sovereignty with respect to the military bases concerned").
    The Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC attempt to circumvent
    precedent in this circuit by arguing that Haitian Refugee Ctr.,
    Inc. v. Baker, 
    953 F.2d 1498
    (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
    denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    112 S. Ct. 1245
    , 
    117 L. Ed. 2d 477
    (1992)
    [hereinafter "HRC II "], in contrast with the instant case, dealt
    solely with Haitians who were interdicted on the high seas and
    returned to Haiti by United States Coast Guard cutters.                       However,
    we also addressed the claims of Haitians who were interdicted on
    10
    The Eastern District of New York declined to decide
    whether the migrants at Guantanamo Bay themselves had any First
    Amendment rights. 
    HCC, 823 F. Supp. at 1041
    .
    the high seas and then transported to Guantanamo Bay.         See HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1514
    ;           
    id. at 1516-17
    (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
    Based upon our holding in HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1510
    , we again reject
    the argument that our leased military bases abroad which continue
    under the sovereignty of foreign nations, hostile or friendly, are
    "functional[ly] equivalent" to being land borders or ports of entry
    of the United States or otherwise within the United States.11
    Therefore, any statutory or constitutional claim made by the
    individual Cuban plaintiffs and the individual Haitian migrants
    must be based upon an extraterritorial application of that statute
    or constitutional provision.
    b. Extraterritorial Application of Legislation and the Constitution
    If the migrants have been provided rights by statute, 12 we
    need    not   reach   the    constitutional   questions   urged   upon   us.
    However, because the Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC struggle to
    re-assert statutory claims foreclosed by HRC II and Sale v. Haitian
    Ctrs. Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 
    113 S. Ct. 2549
    , 
    125 L. Ed. 2d 128
    (1993), and fail to assert new meritorious statutory claims, we
    reach the constitutional issues as well.
    11
    Panama regained sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone and
    the area where the United States maintains military installations
    by the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977. Panama Canal Treaty, Sept.
    7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., art. III, § 1, art. IV, § 2, 33 U.S.T. 39;
    Panama Canal Treaty, Implementation of Article IV, Sept. 7, 1977,
    U.S.-Pan., art. I, annex A, 33 U.S.T. 307.
    12
    Domestic legislation is not presumed to apply
    extraterritorially absent express Congressional authorization.
    See Sale, --- U.S. at ----, ----, 
    ----, 113 S. Ct. at 2561
    , 2562,
    2567 ("Acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial
    application unless such an intent is clearly manifested. That
    presumption has special force when we are construing treaty and
    statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military
    affairs for which the President has responsibility.").
    We decided in HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1510
    , and the Supreme Court
    agreed in Sale, --- U.S. at ----, 
    ----, 113 S. Ct. at 2557-58
    , 2563,
    that the very same statutes and treaties regarding repatriation,
    Article 33 of the Refugee Convention,13 and the INA, specifically,
    8   U.S.C.     §   1253(h)14    and   8   U.S.C.   §   1158(a)15   do   not   apply
    extraterritorially.        In    HRC II, we unequivocally held that the
    13
    Article 33 of the Refugee Convention states in pertinent
    part that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
    ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
    of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
    account of his race, religion, nationality ... or political
    opinion." Refugee Convention, supra, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276.
    We have held that this article is not self-executing, but must be
    given force by enactment of domestic legislation. 
    Baker, 949 F.2d at 1110
    .
    14
    Section 1253(h)(1), the domestic legislation implementing
    Article 33, provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall not
    deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney
    General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
    threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
    nationality ... or political opinion." Nothing in this statute
    extends its application "beyond the borders of the United
    States." HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1509-10
    .
    The individual Cuban plaintiffs also assert rights
    under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157(c), 1182, 1225, 1226,
    and 1362; however, because these provisions merely
    supplement rather than address the questions presented to
    us, we consider their claims as being made under § 1253(h)
    and § 1158(a).
    15
    Section 1158(a) provides that:
    The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an
    alien physically present in the United States or at a
    land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
    alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may
    be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney
    General if the Attorney General determines that such
    alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
    1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
    § 1158(a). We have found that the "clear meaning of this
    language" is that persons interdicted before reaching the
    United States cannot base a right to asylum or asylum
    processing on this provision. HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1510
    .
    interdicted Haitians could not claim any rights under sections
    1253(h) or 1158(a).   We further concluded that:
    the interdicted Haitians [on Coast Guard cutters and at
    Guantanamo Bay] have none of the substantive rights—under ...
    the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
    Refugees,   the  Immigration   and   Naturalization   Service
    Guidelines, the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration and
    Nationality Act, or international law—that they claim for
    themselves or that the HRC claims for them.
    HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1513
    n. 8 (emphasis added).    These laws, which
    govern repatriation of refugees, bind the government only when the
    refugees are at or within the borders of the United States.     See
    
    id. at 1509-10.
      Therefore, the claims asserted by the migrants
    under the INA and under Article 33 continue to be untenable.
    The individual Cuban plaintiffs attempt to utilize the Cuban
    Refugee Adjustment Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, and the Cuban Democracy
    Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010, to assert the right of the Cuban
    migrants to seek parole and asylum in the United States.      While
    these acts acknowledge the political climate in Cuba, provide for
    economic sanctions for dealing with Cuba, and allow for certain
    rights for Cubans who reach the United States, they do not address
    the rights of Cuban migrants to enter or to seek entry to the
    United States initially, nor do they confer directly any rights
    upon the Cuban migrants outside the United States.   Hence, neither
    of these acts can be relied upon by the individual Cuban plaintiffs
    to assert a right against repatriation or to seek parole or asylum
    in the United States from safe haven.
    Right to Counsel
    The individual Cuban plaintiffs and the individual Haitian
    migrants claim a due process right to obtain and communicate with
    legal counsel of their choice regarding asylum application or
    parole in order to protect an interest against being wrongly
    repatriated from safe haven.      In order for the migrants to have a
    right to counsel, they must first have a protectable liberty or
    property interest.     See Board of Regents v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    ,
    569-572, 
    92 S. Ct. 2701
    , 2705-06, 
    33 L. Ed. 2d 548
    (1972).                 The
    Executive   Branch   has   made   the   policy   decision   not   to   offer
    preliminary refugee determination interviews, or "screening"16 to
    the Cuban or Haitian migrants.      In previous Haitian migrant cases,
    migrants who have been held to have a liberty interest to which due
    process could attach had been "screened-in" by the government. See
    
    HCC, 823 F. Supp. at 1042
    ;     Haitians Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary,
    
    969 F.2d 1326
    , 1345 (2d Cir.1992), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v.
    Haitians Centers Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 
    113 S. Ct. 3028
    , 
    125 L. Ed. 2d 716
    (1993).    In this case we need not decide whether any
    such putative liberty interest arises from being "screened-in." As
    discussed below, no such procedure was undertaken.
    The individual Cuban and Haitian plaintiffs have argued that
    the processing which occurs when the migrants are brought into safe
    haven is similar to the screening procedure which takes place when
    the government attempts to discern if a migrant is a refugee.
    16
    "Screening" is a preliminary process during which a
    determination may be made that the migrant has a well-founded
    fear of persecution if repatriated. See Haitian Ctrs. Council,
    Inc. v. McNary, 
    969 F.2d 1326
    , 1345 (2d Cir.1992), vacated as
    moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----,
    
    113 S. Ct. 3028
    , 
    125 L. Ed. 2d 716
    (1993). If the migrant is
    preliminarily ascertained to have a well-founded fear of
    persecution if repatriated, the migrant is "screened-in." See
    
    id. If after
    an interview, the determination is made that the
    migrant does not have such a fear, then the migrant is
    "screened-out" and repatriated.
    However,    providing          safe    haven    residency          is     a    gratuitous
    humanitarian act which does not in any way create even the putative
    liberty interest in securing asylum processing that the Second
    Circuit found that initial screening creates. See 
    McNary, 969 F.2d at 1345
    ("By these humanitarian actions alone [ (rescuing the
    migrants from the sea and bringing them to Guantanamo Bay) ], it
    does not appear that the legal status of the aliens was altered.
    However, once the interdicted persons have been "screened in' the
    appellants[    ]   ...    can    fairly    be    said    to   have       established     a
    reasonable expectation in the "screened in' plaintiffs in not being
    wrongly repatriated....").             We also note that the district court
    mistakenly relied upon the HCC case, because that case addressed
    only the plight of Haitian migrants who had been "screened in" as
    possible refugees.        
    HCC, 823 F. Supp. at 1041
    ("Here, the Haitian
    Service    Organizations        have   been     retained      by    the       Screened   In
    Plaintiffs and have asserted a right to speak with their clients,
    the screened-in Haitians."             (emphasis added)).               The migrants in
    this case have not been "screened in" or otherwise processed for
    asylum. By bringing the migrants to safe haven, the government has
    not created any protectable liberty or property interest against
    being wrongly repatriated and the migrants may not rest a claim of
    right of counsel and information on the due process clause.
    Unaccompanied Minor Haitians' Right to Parole
    The individual unaccompanied minor Haitian migrants are
    asserting statutory and constitutional equal protection claims to
    be   paroled   into      the    United    States    on     the      same      basis   that
    unaccompanied minor Cubans have been or may be paroled into the
    United States.17      The unaccompanied minor Haitian migrants claim
    that the Attorney General has abused her discretion under the INA,
    8 U.S.C. § 1182,18 by paroling in Cuban unaccompanied minors but not
    Haitian unaccompanied minors.        While this claim is not dependent
    upon the extraterritorial application of the statute, it fails
    nonetheless.     We agree with our en banc court's statement in Jean
    v. Nelson,      
    727 F.2d 957
    ,   981-82   (11th   Cir.1984)   (en   banc)
    [hereinafter "Jean I "], aff'd on other grounds, 
    472 U.S. 846
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 2992
    , 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 664
    (1985) [hereinafter "Jean II "], that
    "there is little question that the Executive has the power to draw
    distinctions among aliens based on nationality."          Jean 
    I, 727 F.2d at 978
    n. 30;     see generally, Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed.Reg.
    13,897 (1990), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1157.               This authority
    extends both to the President of the United States and the Attorney
    General.19     Jean 
    I, 727 F.2d at 978
    .       Aliens may be excluded or
    17
    "Parole is an act of extraordinary sovereign generosity,
    since it grants temporary admission into our society to an alien
    who has no legal right to enter...." Jean 
    I, 727 F.2d at 972
    .
    18
    Section 1182(d)(5)(A) provides in part:
    The Attorney General may ... in his discretion parole
    into the United States temporarily under such
    conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
    for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any
    alien applying for admission into the United States....
    § 1182(d)(5)(A).
    19
    We note, however, that in the Supreme Court's affirmance
    of Jean I, its holding was limited to whether " "low-level ...
    government officials [may] act in such a manner which is contrary
    to federal statutes ... and the directions of the President and
    the Attorney General, both of whom provided for a policy of
    non-discriminatory enforcement.' " Jean 
    II, 472 U.S. at 853
    , 105
    S.Ct. at 2996 (first omission added) (quoting Brief for Pet'rs at
    37). While we held in Jean I that lower-level Immigration and
    Naturalization Service officials could not disregard the orders
    denied parole on grounds that might be "suspect in the context of
    domestic legislation," because "there are apparently no limitations
    on the power of the federal government to determine what classes of
    aliens will be permitted to enter the United States or what
    procedures will be used to determine their admissibility."    
    Id. at 965
    n. 5.   Here, the Attorney General has exercised her discretion
    on the legitimate basis of the very different political climates in
    Haiti, under the newly restored democratic President Jean-Bertrand
    Aristide on the one hand, and in Cuba, under the regime of Fidel
    Castro on the other.   See Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 
    766 F.2d 1478
    , 1492
    (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (holding Attorney General need only
    assert a " "facially legitimate and bona fide' " reason for a
    parole decision (quoting Jean 
    I, 727 F.2d at 977
    )), cert. denied,
    
    475 U.S. 1022
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 1213
    , 
    89 L. Ed. 2d 325
    (1986).     Thus, we
    hold that the statutory claims made by the unaccompanied minor
    Haitian migrants are without merit and cannot justify an injunction
    directing the government to parole them into the United States.
    Because we conclude that the statute alleged does not protect the
    unaccompanied Haitian minors, we address their constitutional equal
    protection claim.
    In Jean I, we held that unadmitted and excludable aliens
    "cannot claim equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment,
    even with regard to challenging the Executive's exercise of its
    of their superiors, here we are faced with the extensive
    authority of the Attorney General and the President to make
    distinctions on the basis of citizenship and the political
    climate of the alien's homeland.
    20
    parole discretion. 
    " 727 F.2d at 970
    (emphasis added).                 The
    plaintiffs in       Jean   I   could   not   "challenge    the   decisions    of
    executive      officials   with    regard    to   their    applications      for
    admission, asylum, or parole, on the basis of the rights guaranteed
    by the United States Constitution," 
    id. at 984,
    because they had
    "no constitutional rights with regard to their applications," 
    id. at 968;
        accord Landon v. Plasencia, 
    459 U.S. 21
    , 32, 
    103 S. Ct. 321
    , 329, 
    74 L. Ed. 2d 21
    (1982) ("[T]he power to admit or exclude
    aliens    is   a   sovereign prerogative.");         cf.     Perez-Perez      v.
    Hanberry, 
    781 F.2d 1477
    , 1479 (11th Cir.1986) ("The world is not
    entitled to enter the United States as a matter of right.").                 The
    individual unaccompanied Haitian migrants here, who are outside the
    borders of the United States, can have no greater rights than
    aliens in Jean I who were physically present in the United States.
    See 
    Landon, 459 U.S. at 32
    , 103 S.Ct. at 329 ("[H]owever, once an
    alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties
    that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes
    accordingly.").
    In HRC II, we concluded that the interdicted Haitians on Coast
    20
    Although the Supreme Court held that we should not have
    reached the constitutional issue in that case because "the
    current statutes and regulations provide petitioners with
    nondiscriminatory parole consideration—which is all they seek to
    obtain by virtue of their constitutional argument," Jean 
    II, 472 U.S. at 854-55
    , 105 S.Ct. at 2997, our en banc holding in that
    case regarding the constitutional issue remains viable as the
    Supreme Court did not vacate the opinion but affirmed and
    remanded on alternative grounds. See also Perez-Perez v.
    Hanberry, 
    781 F.2d 1477
    , 1479 (11th Cir.1986) (dictum); Garcia-
    Mir v. Smith, 
    766 F.2d 1478
    , 1484 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam)
    (dictum); Jean v. Nelson, 
    863 F.2d 759
    , 770 (11th Cir.1988)
    (dictum), aff'd, 
    496 U.S. 154
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 2316
    , 
    110 L. Ed. 2d 134
    (1990).
    Guard cutters and at Guantanamo Bay did not possess any of the
    statutory    rights   they    claimed     under   the   INA    and   the    Refugee
    Convention, or the constitutional rights they claimed under the due
    process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the First Amendment.
    HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1503
    , 1511 n. 6 (agreeing with the district
    court that the Haitian migrants had no "correlative First Amendment
    rights of their own").        Our decision that the Cuban and Haitian
    migrants have no First Amendment or Fifth Amendment rights which
    they can assert is supported by the Supreme Court's decisions
    declining to apply extraterritorially either the Fourth Amendment,
    United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
    494 U.S. 259
    , 274-75, 
    110 S. Ct. 1056
    , 1066, 
    108 L. Ed. 2d 222
    (1990) (rejecting Fourth Amendment
    limits to search and seizure of property owned by a non-resident
    alien conducted in Mexico by United States agents), or the Fifth
    Amendment, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
    339 U.S. 763
    , 784, 
    70 S. Ct. 936
    ,
    947, 
    94 L. Ed. 1255
    (1950) (rejecting claim that aliens outside the
    sovereign territory of the United States are entitled to Fifth
    Amendment rights).     Cf. Reid v. Covert, 
    354 U.S. 1
    , 
    77 S. Ct. 1222
    ,
    
    1 L. Ed. 2d 1148
    (1957) (plurality opinion) (holding the right to a
    jury trial applies to an American citizen abroad being tried by a
    United    States   military       court   (narrowest    holding)).         Clearly,
    aliens, outside the United States, cannot claim rights to enter or
    be paroled into the United States based on the Constitution.
    Therefore, any right to equal protection of the laws, due
    process, or rights under the INA or the Refugee Convention now
    asserted by the Haitian and Cuban migrants are not cognizable.
    Thus,    neither   group     of    migrants    could    have    a    "substantial
    likelihood of success on the merits" which is a necessary predicate
    to the grant of injunctive relief.             The district court erred in
    granting relief to the individual Cuban and Haitian migrants.
    2. First Amendment Rights of the Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC
    Both the Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC claim a First
    Amendment right to freedom of association with the migrants and
    free speech such that the government must provide the lawyers
    access to clients and any other migrants who request counsel.                In
    HRC   II,    we   held   that   the   two   primary    First   Amendment   cases
    recognizing a First Amendment right for a lawyer to solicit a
    client for the purpose of engaging in litigation as a form of
    political expression, NAACP v. Button, 
    371 U.S. 415
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 328
    ,
    
    9 L. Ed. 2d 405
    (1963), and In re Primus, 
    436 U.S. 412
    , 
    98 S. Ct. 1893
    , 
    56 L. Ed. 2d 417
    (1978), "recognize a narrow First Amendment
    right to associate for the purpose of engaging in litigation as a
    form of political expression."          HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1513
    (emphasis
    added).      However, we concluded that "[t]his right is predicated
    upon the existence of an underlying legal claim that may be
    asserted by the potential litigant...."               
    Id. (emphasis added).21
    Neither the Cuban nor the Haitian migrants have any of the
    statutory or constitutional rights claimed here which might sustain
    21
    Button and In re Primus "do not recognize a right of
    access to persons properly in government custody," HRC 
    II, 953 F.2d at 1512
    , which is what the Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC
    have requested. The lawyers' claims under the First Amendment do
    not require that the government assist it in communicating with
    clients or potential clients in safe haven. 
    Id. at 1513.
    Although the attorneys argue that they require no financial
    assistance or transportation from the government, for the lawyers
    to meet with their clients, assistance is necessarily required in
    providing access to the base, meeting areas, accommodations and
    security.
    the attorneys' claims to right of association, and "associational
    freedom in no way implies a right to compel the Government to
    provide access to those with whom one wishes to associate."             
    Id. Hence, it
    would not only be improper, but also "nonsensical," for
    us to hold today that attorneys for either migrant group suddenly
    possess "a right of access to the interdicted [migrants] for the
    purpose of advising them of their legal rights."           
    Id. Because under
    precedent of this circuit, neither the migrants
    nor the lawyers may assert First Amendment rights of association
    and speech in this context, we need not determine whether the
    government engaged in any viewpoint-based discrimination in denying
    the   Cuban   Legal   Organizations   and   HRC   access   while   granting
    humanitarian    organizations    access.          Providing   humanitarian
    organizations access to the migrants does not, without more, create
    a First Amendment right to that access for those humanitarian
    organizations or for the Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC. If the
    First Amendment does not apply to the migrants or to the lawyers at
    Guantanamo Bay, the government cannot be engaging in impermissible
    viewpoint-based discrimination by restricting association between
    the migrants and counsel.       Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
    Educators' Ass'n, 
    460 U.S. 37
    , 44, 46, 
    103 S. Ct. 948
    , 954, 955, 
    74 L. Ed. 2d 794
    (1983) (holding first that the First Amendment applied
    to teachers' mailboxes in a public school, but that the " "First
    Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it
    is owned or controlled by the government,' " and that there was no
    First Amendment right to access to the mailboxes (quoting            United
    States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 
    453 U.S. 114
    , 129, 
    101 S. Ct. 2676
    , 2684, 
    69 L. Ed. 2d 517
    (1981))).22   For the
    above reasons, an injunction requiring the government to provide
    reasonable and meaningful access of legal counsel to the migrants
    in the safe haven, based on First Amendment rights of the attorneys
    is not justified.
    3. Disclosure of Haitian Migrants' Identities
    HRC contends that the government's refusal to disclose the
    identities of Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay violates HRC's
    First Amendment rights to freedom of association and violates the
    Haitian migrants' rights to equal protection of the laws and rights
    under the INA and international law.   The district court, without
    stating its reasons, ordered that the government provide HRC a list
    of all Haitian migrants in safe haven.      As decided above, the
    22
    We recognize that the HCC court found that "First
    Amendment [is] applicable to U.S. conduct on a military 
    base." 823 F. Supp. at 1040
    . The court cited Flower v. United States,
    
    407 U.S. 197
    , 198-99, 
    92 S. Ct. 1842
    , 1843-44, 
    32 L. Ed. 2d 653
    (1972) (per curiam) for this proposition. From our reading of
    Flower we find it is clearly distinguishable. The military base
    in question in Flower was Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas;
    not Guantanamo Bay or an installation in Panama. There, a
    civilian (an American citizen) was arrested for distributing
    leaflets on an road within the fort. The Supreme Court found
    that the road was essentially a public one as there was "no
    sentry post or guard at either entrance or anywhere along the
    route," 
    Flower, 407 U.S. at 198
    , 92 S.Ct. at 1843 (quoting United
    States v. Flower, 
    452 F.2d 80
    , 90 (5th Cir.1972) (Simpson, J.
    dissenting)), and more than 15,000 cars travelled through the
    fort each day via this road. These are facts not remotely
    analogous to the access policies at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or
    presumably at the installations in Panama. Moreover, the Supreme
    Court has recognized the limited nature of its holding in Flower.
    See Greer v. Spock, 
    424 U.S. 828
    , 835, 
    96 S. Ct. 1211
    , 1216, 
    47 L. Ed. 2d 505
    (1976); U.S. v. Albertini, 
    472 U.S. 675
    , 684-86, 
    105 S. Ct. 2897
    , 2904-05, 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 536
    (1985); see also M.N.C. of
    Hinesville, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 
    791 F.2d 1466
    , 1473 n.
    3 (11th Cir.1986). Hence, we are of the opinion that this case
    does not stand for the proposition that the First Amendment
    necessarily applies at American military bases located in foreign
    countries.
    Haitian   migrants     in    safe    haven   cannot    claim    the    rights    and
    privileges of the statutes enumerated or of the Constitution with
    respect to a right to counsel, their repatriation or parole into
    the United States.          Thus, they cannot succeed on any claim that
    they have rights which are being violated by failure to disclose
    their identities to HRC.            What remains then is a request by HRC
    that the government release information. Such a claim is typically
    made under the Freedom of Information Act;              however, no claim has
    been    made   under    the    Act     here.     Instead,       this     claim   is
    constitutional in nature. The Supreme Court has held that there is
    "no discernible basis for a constitutional duty [on the government]
    to disclose, or for standards governing disclosure of or access to
    information."    Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
    438 U.S. 1
    , 14, 
    98 S. Ct. 2588
    , 2596, 
    57 L. Ed. 2d 553
    (1978) (plurality opinion). "This Court
    has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of access to all
    sources of information within government control."                    
    Id. at 9,
    98
    S.Ct. at 2593-94.      Because there is no authority for us to compel
    disclosure of the Haitian migrants' identities, we cannot force the
    government to provide HRC with access to the list of Haitian
    migrants in safe haven.         See 
    id. III. CONCLUSION
    While we have determined that these migrants are without legal
    rights that are cognizable in the courts of the United States, we
    observe that they are nonetheless beneficiaries of the American
    tradition of humanitarian concern and conduct.                 In the context of
    the refugees' world of today (e.g., Bosnia and Rwanda) this is
    significant.      While      these    migrants   are   faced     with    difficult
    conditions, the demonstrated concern of groups like the Cuban Legal
    Organizations and HRC and the goodwill of their military rescuers
    and caretakers will hopefully sustain and reassure them in their
    quest for a better life.
    Nevertheless, we cannot contravene the law of this circuit and
    of the Supreme Court of the United States in order to frame a legal
    answer to what is traditionally and properly a problem to be
    addressed    by    the    legislative     and   executive    branches   of    our
    government.       See 
    Perez-Perez, 781 F.2d at 1479
    .             "Although the
    human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be found in a
    judicial remedy."         Sale, --- U.S. at 
    ----, 113 S. Ct. at 2567
    (quoting    Haitian      Refugee   Ctr.   v.    Gracey,   
    809 F.2d 794
    ,   841
    (D.C.Cir.1987) (Edwards, J., concurring)).                  For the foregoing
    reasons, the preliminary injunctions issued by the district court
    and dated October 31, 1994, November 22, 1994, and November 28,
    1994, together with our December 19 Order, are hereby DISSOLVED and
    these cases are REMANDED to the district court with direction to
    dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 94-5138, 94-5231 and 94-5234

Judges: Kravitch, Birch, Carnes

Filed Date: 1/18/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (28)

Johnson v. Eisentrager ( 1950 )

In Re Primus ( 1978 )

angelique-jackson-and-ethel-musgrove-on-behalf-of-themselves-and-all ( 1994 )

Houchins v. KQED, Inc. ( 1978 )

United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic ... ( 1981 )

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for ... ( 1982 )

Moises Garcia-Mir v. William French Smith ( 1985 )

haitian-refugee-center-inc-v-james-baker-iii-secretary-of-state ( 1991 )

Haitian Refugee Center v. James S. Gracey, Admiral/... ( 1987 )

C.G. Willis, Inc., and Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. ... ( 1994 )

haitian-centers-council-inc-national-coalition-for-haitian-refugees ( 1992 )

marie-lucie-jean-lucien-louis-plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants ( 1984 )

United States v. Spelar ( 1949 )

National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. ... ( 1963 )

M.N.C. Of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Department of ... ( 1986 )

ben-jones-john-issac-harvey-echols-jim-thornton-sherman-jones-henry ( 1992 )

Marie Lucie Jean v. Alan C. Nelson ( 1988 )

haitian-refugee-center-inc-v-james-baker-iii-secretary-of-state ( 1991 )

Landon v. Plasencia ( 1982 )

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez ( 1990 )

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