Arlene M. Stone v. First Union Corporation , 371 F.3d 1305 ( 2004 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 3,, 2004
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 03-13128 CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 94-06932-CV-ASG
ARLENE M. STONE,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FIRST UNION CORPORATION, Charlotte, N.C.,
FIRST UNION CORPORATION OF FLORIDA,
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA,
WACHOVIA CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(JUNE 3, 2004)
Before BIRCH, KRAVITCH and OAKES*, Circuit Judges.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable James L. Oakes, United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, sitting
by designation.
Former bank employees attempted to bring a class action against First Union
National Bank of Florida (“First Union”) for age discrimination.1 The district court
initially certified the plaintiffs as an opt-in class, but later decertified the class. The
plaintiffs then sought to intervene in the named plaintiff’s individual suit against First
Union. The district court denied the motion to intervene and the plaintiffs now
appeal. We reverse.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Between 1991 and 1994, First Union acquired several banks, including
Southwest Bank of Florida, the bank that employed Arlene Stone as a branch
manager. After the acquisition in the fall of 1991, Stone was demoted to assistant
manager at another branch and informed that her position would be eliminated. She
applied for other positions with First Union but was not hired. Her employment was
terminated in October 1992. Stone sued First Union for age discrimination, alleging
that First Union instituted a plan whereby older employees were demoted or subject
1
First Union National Bank of Florida is wholly owned by First Union Corporation
through its subsidiary, First Union Corporation of Florida. The plaintiffs amended their
complaint to add Wachovia Corporation as a defendant after it merged with First Union
Corporation in September 2001.
2
to other adverse employment actions.2 Stone sought class action status for other First
Union employees, and the district court granted a preliminary and conditional class
certification, which allowed other employees allegedly injured by First Union’s
acquisitions to “opt-in” to Stone’s suit.3 One hundred and sixty employees
subsequently joined the suit. The district court, however, later decertified the class
because class members had different jobs within the bank and had a variety of claims
against First Union. This court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for permission to appeal
the decertification order.
After the class was decertified, the opt-in class members motioned to intervene
in Stone’s individual suit against First Union. The district court denied the motions
for intervention as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and permissive
intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The plaintiffs now appeal this denial.4
II. Jurisdiction
Orders denying a motion for intervention are not final orders. EEOC v. Eastern
2
Stone filed a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC in November 1992.
3
Plaintiffs suing under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) must use an
opt-in mechanism rather than the opt-out procedure allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Hipp v.
Liberty Nat’l Life Ins., 252 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001).
4
The named plaintiff’s suit against First Union was scheduled to go to trial, but those
proceedings have been stayed pending this appeal.
3
Airlines, 736 F.2d 635, 637 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1291 (stating that
circuit courts have jurisdiction to review final decisions of district courts).
Nonetheless, under the aptly-named “anomalous rule,” this court has provisional
jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of a motion to intervene based on
right. Eastern Airlines, 763 F.2d at 637; see also AAL High Yield Bond Fund v.
Deloitte & Touche LLP, 361 F.3d 1305, 1309 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004); FTC v. Am. Legal
Distrib. Inc., 890 F.2d 363, 364 (11th Cir. 1989). If the district court erred in denying
intervention based on right, this court has jurisdiction to correct the error. Eastern
Airlines, 763 F.2d at 637. If the district court did not err, however, then this court’s
jurisdiction “evaporates.” Id.
The court also has jurisdiction if the district court abused its discretion in
denying permissive intervention. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th
Cir. 1977) (holding that the court had jurisdiction to review the denial of permissive
intervention where the plaintiffs requested intervention based on right and
permission).5 In Davis v. Butts, this court appears to have revised the Monsanto rule,
holding that there is no appellate jurisdiction where the plaintiffs requested
permissive intervention alone. 290 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). The Davis
5
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to
the close of business on September 30, 1981.
4
decision, however, did not alter this court’s jurisdiction to review denials of
permissive intervention if the plaintiffs requested intervention based on right and
permission. Id. Here, the plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motion for intervention
based on right and permission, and, thus, we have jurisdiction to hear both claims.
III. Intervention Based on Right
Rule 24(a)(2) permits plaintiffs to intervene as a matter of right under certain
conditions:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action…(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). This court has interpreted this rule to require a party seeking
intervention of right to demonstrate that: “(1) his application to intervene is timely;
(2) he has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action; (3) he is so situated that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may
impede or impair his ability to protect that interest; and (4) his interest is represented
inadequately by the existing parties to the suit.” Worlds v. Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 929 F.2d 591, 593 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Chiles v. Thornburg,
5
865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Here, only the third and fourth elements are contested. Neither party contends
that the motion to intervene was untimely, and First Union concedes that the plaintiffs
have an interest in the litigation. The parties, however, disagree over the two
remaining elements of Rule 24(a)(2): (1) whether the opt-in plaintiffs’ interests are
impaired or impeded by Stone’s individual litigation, and (2) whether the opt-in
plaintiffs’ interests are adequately represented by Stone.
A. Impairment of Interest
The district court held that the plaintiffs’ interests were not impaired by the
litigation of Stone’s case for two reasons. First, the district court determined that any
rulings from the Stone litigation would not injure the remaining plaintiffs through
stare decisis. The court had decertified the class because the putative class members’
claims were not sufficiently similar. Consequently, the district court ruled that the
issues raised in litigation would not be sufficiently similar to create potential stare
decisis concerns.6
6
The district court stated:
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that the
application of stare decisis supports their impairment argument. The Court is not
provided with specific examples of similar issues of stare decisis present here. The
case cited by Plaintiffs in support of this argument, Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d
6Second, the district court determined that the opt-in plaintiffs would not be
injured by their inability to “piggyback” on Stone’s timely filed complaint with the
EEOC. The district court reasoned that the plaintiffs, who had failed to file EEOC
claims, were able to join the suit only because of the conditional class certification.
The district court, thus, determined that the inability to piggyback was not an
impairment because it simply withdrew a benefit that had been conditional on
keeping class status.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to intervene based on
right. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1996)).
We disagree with the district court that the plaintiffs in this case would not, as
106 (5th Cir. 1996), is inapposite. In Sierra Club, a suit was brought by farmers
seeking to intervene in a suit by an environmental group to enjoin an agency from
overpumping an aquifier. The court in that case concluded that the potential stare
decisis issues supported the impairment prong of intervention because a finding of
a threat would have affected contracts that farmers had in place regarding the
aquifier. In this case, however, the disposition of an individual age discrimination
case, which the Court has held by previous Order is not sufficiently related to
putative class members’ claims to support collective action, does not present similar
issues of stare decisis. In their Reply, Plaintiffs state that while other courts “would
not technically be bound by any decisions by this Court or this jury that go against
Ms. Stone . . . any such decisions would be considered persuasive and raise issues of
comity.” The Court disagrees with this statement, particularly when the facts
surrounding the Plaintiffs’ claims vary. Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiffs
themselves ultimately concede that other courts “would not be compelled to make the
same decision against any of the Opt-In Plaintiffs.”
Stone v. First Union Corp., 216 F.R.D. 540, 557 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
7
a practical matter, be impaired by the potential stare decisis effects of any rulings on
Stone’s suit against First Union. This court previously has found that the potential
for a negative stare decisis effect “may supply that practical disadvantage which
warrants intervention of right.” Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1214 (11th Cir.
1989). For instance, in Chiles, detainees in an INS facility in Dade County sought to
intervene in Senator Chiles’s lawsuit challenging the federal government’s operation
of the detention center. There, this court explained that the potential stare decisis
effects of Senator Chiles’s suit would impair the detainees’ attempts to challenge the
facility as well:
We think the detainees are so situated that the disposition of the lawsuit
will, as a practical matter, impair their ability to protect their interests.
As we have already discussed, the detainees are confined in the
institution whose operation is being challenged. There is therefore a
conjunction of a claim to and an interest in the very transaction which
is the subject of the main action, and the stare decisis effect of a decision
suggests the practical disadvantage requisite for intervention. Where a
party seeking to intervene in an action claims an interest in the very
property and very transaction that is the subject of the main action, the
potential stare decisis effect may supply that practical disadvantage
which warrants intervention as of right. Atlantis Development Corp. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir.1967). The detainees’ ability
to litigate the government's operation of Krome in a separate lawsuit
might be an exercise in futility if the instant lawsuit was decided in favor
of the government.
Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1214 (emphasis added); see also Georgia v. United States Army
8
Corp of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2003).7
Although the potential for negative stare decisis effects does not automatically
grant plaintiffs the right to intervene, the practical impairment the plaintiffs may face
here is significant. The plaintiffs are all alleging that the same First Union policy
violated the ADEA and led to their injury. Consequently, one court’s ruling on
whether the bank’s policy, as a matter of law, was in violation of the ADEA could
influence later suits. Although a district court would not be bound to follow any
other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive
effects. We find that these effects are sufficiently significant to warrant intervention.
On a related issue, we note that the plaintiffs may be allowed to piggyback onto
Stone’s timely filed EEOC complaint as they were when the class was conditionally
certified, although it is unrelated to the decision to allow them to intervene. ADEA
plaintiffs, who are denied class action status or denied the right to intervene in a
lawsuit, may nonetheless piggyback on a timely filed EEOC letter. In Calloway v.
Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993), this court determined that
7
In Georgia v. United States Army Corp of Engineers, Florida sought to intervene as a defendant
in Georgia’s suit to force the Army Corp of Engineers to release more water from Lake Lanier. 302 F.3d
at 1248. The suit would affect the water in the Apalachicola River, a major source of water for Florida.
Id. at 1252. Georgia argued that Florida’s interests were not impaired by Georgia’s suit because Florida
could always sue Georgia separately under the ACF Compact. Id. at 1253. This court rejected Georgia’s
argument and held that Florida was entitled to intervene. The ACF Compact is based on “equitable
allocation” principles that take into account the current allocation of water. Id. at 1255. Because
Georgia’s suit, if successful, would lead to a reallocation of water, the court found that Florida’s interest
could be impaired in later litigation. Id.
9
a plaintiff, who was not allowed to intervene in a lawsuit where another plaintiff had
a timely filed EEOC letter, was nonetheless permitted to piggyback on the EEOC
letter if (1) the letter was valid and (2) the discriminatory treatment was similar and
took place in the same time frame. There, the court stated that this “single-filing” rule
“comports with the purpose of the EEOC charge requirement by ensuring that the
settlement of grievances will be attempted first through the EEOC. Moreover, there
is no reason to distinguish between a plaintiff who successfully intervenes and one
who does not.” Id. at 450.
Calloway addressed a Title VII claim, but the single-filing rule has been
extended to ADEA suits. In Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d
554, 557 (11th Cir. 1997), this court stated:
In fashioning the ADEA statute of limitations, Congress carefully
balanced the interests of plaintiffs and the interests of employers. A
plaintiff who has not filed an individual EEOC charge may invoke the
single-filing rule where such plaintiff is similarly situated to the person
who actually filed an EEOC charge, and where the EEOC charge
actually filed gave the employer notice of the collective or class-wide
nature of the charge. In such circumstances, it is reasonable from the
perspective of the employer’s interests and the interests of economy of
administration within the agency to permit such a plaintiff to rely upon
the other claimant’s EEOC charge.8
8
In Gitlitz, the court went on to say that if the plaintiff had filed an EEOC letter himself
and then failed to file a timely suit, he could not piggyback on another employee’s timely filed
suit. 129 F.3d at 558. Thus, a plaintiff can only piggyback on a timely EEOC letter if he did not
receive his own letter. Here, there is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs would fall into this
category. If one did, however, he would not be allowed to piggyback as an intervener and, thus,
10
Consequently, here, the district court should consider whether the plaintiffs
should be allowed to piggyback on Stone’s claim as interveners.
B. Adequate Representation
To intervene based on right, the plaintiffs also must demonstrate that Stone
does not adequately represent their interests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). There is a
presumption of adequate representation where an existing party seeks the same
objectives as the interveners. Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458, 461 (11th Cir.
1999). This presumption is weak and can be overcome if the plaintiffs present some
evidence to the contrary. Id. If the interveners overcome this presumption, the court
“returns to the general rule that adequate representation exists ‘[1] if no collusion is
shown between the representative and an opposing party, [2] if the representative
does not have or represent an interest adverse to the proposed intervener, and [3] if
the representative does not fail in fulfillment of his duty.’” Id. Interveners need only
show that the current plaintiff’s representation “may be inadequate,” however, and
the burden for making such a showing is “minimal.” Id.On this issue, this court’s decision in Chiles is particularly instructive because
one group was allowed to intervene and another was not based on whether the current
his interests would not be impaired by a denial of intervention.
11
plaintiffs would adequately represent their interests. There, as stated above, Senator
Chiles brought a suit against the INS for its use of the Krome detention facility in
Dade County. The district court permitted Dade County and the Governor of Florida
to intervene in the suit, but denied the same request by two additional groups,
detainees being held at Krome and a Dade County homeowners’ association. On
appeal, this court permitted the detainees to intervene because Dade County did not
adequately represent their interests but denied the homeowners’ association’s motion
because Dade County adequately represented their interests. Chiles, 865 F.2d at
1214-15.
In Chiles, this court’s reasoning was based on the similarity of the interests
between would-be-interveners and the current plaintiffs. Id. This court decided that
the detainees had similar, but not identical interests, to the county, and, thus, the
county might not represent the detainees’ interests. For instance, we noted:
Dade County may decide not to emphasize the plight of the aliens held
at Krome but focus instead on the effect that Krome has on those who
live outside its walls. After all, Dade County is mainly concerned with
the expenditures that have to be made because of Krome. We conclude
that this possibility sufficiently demonstrates that the detainees’ interests
are not adequately represented.
Id. at 1215. By contrast, the homeowners’ association had identical interests to the
12
county, and, thus, the county provided adequate representation. We explained that
“[u]nlike the detainees, the homeowners and the Homeowners’ Association have an
interest which is identical to Dade County: the prevention of riots and escapes from
Krome and the protection of nearby residents. There is no indication whatsoever that
the representation rendered by Dade County would be inadequate.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, the district court has already held that Stone is not an adequate
representative plaintiff for class action purposes because the plaintiffs do not have
sufficiently similar claims against the bank. Although all of the plaintiffs allege to
have been subject to the same plan of age discrimination, the manner in which they
were discriminated against may not be identical. Thus, under Chiles, the plaintiffs
are permitted to intervene to represent their interests where different than Stone’s
interests. For instance, the plaintiffs may wish to emphasize different aspects of First
Union’s employment policies. We hold that the difference in interests is sufficient
to overcome the weak presumption of adequate representation.
For the above reasons, we reverse the district court and hold that the plaintiffs
can intervene as a matter of right.
REVERSED and REMANDED
13