Lesia D. Wilcox v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15521 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:09-cv-00167-MTT
LESIA D WILCOX,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(September 21, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lesia D. Wilcox appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Administration Commissioner’s denial of disability, disability insurance
benefits, and supplemental security income under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, we determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence, and we seek to ensure that was based on the
proper legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158
(11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the ALJ denies
benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of the ALJ’s decision, we review
the decision of the ALJ as the Commissioner’s final decision. Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In our review, “[w]e may not decide facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II. DISCUSSION
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The Social Security Administration applies the following five-step,
sequential analysis to determine whether an applicant is entitled to disability
benefits. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged
in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If not, at the second
step, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment or combination of
impairments from which the claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” Id. If there is
no severe impairment, the claimant is not deemed to be disabled, and the claim is
denied. Id. At the third step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s severe
impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Id. If so, the fourth step
requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and
whether she can perform her “past relevant work.” Id. If she cannot perform her
past relevant work, then the ALJ moves to the fifth step, considering whether, in
light of the claimant’s disability, she can perform other work. Id.Wilcox’s appeal concerns the third and fourth steps. See id. Specifically,
Wilcox argues that the ALJ erred by (1) giving greater weight to the medical
opinion of a non-treating specialist than to her own physician, and (2) failing to
credit her subjective experience of pain.
A. Weight Given to Physician Opinions
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Social security regulations provide guidelines for the ALJ in evaluating
medical opinion evidence. See id. § 404.1527. The ALJ may consider many
factors when weighing medical evidence, including the claimant’s relationship
with the examining or treating physician, whether a medical opinion is well-
supported, whether a medical opinion is consistent with the claimant’s record, and
a doctor’s specialization. See id. § 404.1527(d). Generally, the opinions of
examining or treating physicians are given more weight than non-examining or
non-treating physicians unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. See id.
§ 404.1527(d)(1), (2); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
We have found “good cause” where the opinion was conclusory or inconsistent
with the physician’s own medical records or where the evidence supported a
contrary finding. See Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Finally, the opinions of specialists
regarding medical issues related to his area of specialty generally are given more
weight than the opinions of non-specialists. See id. § 404.1527(d)(5).
As our limited review precludes us from reweighing the evidence, we will
find no reversible error when the ALJ has articulated specific reasons for failing to
give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight, if those reasons are
supported by substantial evidence. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Additionally, the ultimate issue of disability is left
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to the determination of the Commissioner, and, thus, a statement by a medical
source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not binding on the ALJ.
§ 404.1527(e)(1).
Here, we are satisfied that the ALJ’s articulated reasons for failing to accord
controlling weight to Dr. Jones’s opinion are supported by substantial evidence.
We cannot reweigh the evidence related to Wilcox’s claim anew; thus, we
conclude that the ALJ did not err by giving greater weight to the medical opinion
of a non-treating specialist than to Wilcox’s own treating physician.
B. Assessment of Wilcox’s Credibility
A three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant attempts to establish
disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The
standard requires the court to review (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition, and (2) either objective medical evidence that confirms (a) the severity
of the alleged pain arising from that condition, or (b) that the objectively
determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably
expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Id. A “claimant’s subjective testimony
supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself sufficient to
support a finding of disability.” Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir.
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1991). “Indeed, in certain situations, pain alone can be disabling, even when its
existence is unsupported by objective evidence.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553,
1561 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). But if the ALJ decides not to credit such
testimony, he must discredit it explicitly, and articulate adequate reasons for doing
so. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225.
Here, we conclude that the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by
substantial evidence and that the ALJ articulated adequate reasons for discrediting
Wilcox’s subjective testimony. The ALJ found that her impairments reasonably
could be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that her statements on the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not entirely
credible. In support of this finding, the ALJ considered Wilcox’s testimony
together with all of the medical evidence in the record. Thus, we affirm the ALJ’s
credibility determination.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon a thorough review of the entire record on appeal, and after
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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