United States v. Steven Michael Johns ( 2015 )

Case: 14-11939 Date Filed: 01/21/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11939
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:91-cr-00018-WCO-JCF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN MICHAEL JOHNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(January 21, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Steven Michael Johns appeals his sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment,
imposed after the revocation of his supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e). On appeal, Johns argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court failed to consider the impact that his serious
health condition would have on his ability to commit future crimes. He further
argues that the district court failed to consider the impact that the federal detainer,
issued with respect to the revocation of his supervised release, had on the state
prison sentence that he was serving at that time.
We review the district court’s revocation of supervised release for an abuse
of discretion, and the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release
for reasonableness. United States v. Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir.
2008). We also review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591,
169 L. Ed. 2d 447 (2007). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden
to show that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), upon finding that the defendant violated a
condition of supervised release, a district court may revoke the term of supervised
release and impose a term of imprisonment after considering the specific factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Those factors include:
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(1) the nature and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to deter criminal
conduct; (3) public protection; (4) the need to provide the defendant with medical
care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (5) the applicable
guideline range; (6) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
(7) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (8) the need to
provide restitution to victims. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), and
(a)(4)-(7). When the felony that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class
C felony, 24 months is the maximum term of imprisonment the court may impose.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.
2007). A court can abuse its discretion when it: (1) fails to consider relevant
factors that were due significant weight; (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor
significant weight; or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the
proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc). However, a court is not required to explicitly state that it has
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or detail the weight accorded to each
factor. United States v. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 54 (2014); see also United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329
(11th Cir. 2005).
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Johns’s sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable
because the district court properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
Although Johns argues that the court’s concern with recidivism was
overemphasized because his poor health would impede his ability to commit future
crimes, it was within the court’s discretion to determine the proper weight to give
his extensive criminal history. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. Moreover, Johns’s
serious health condition and the availability of medical treatment at the prison
facility were proper sentencing factors for the court to consider. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(2)(D) and 3583(e). Finally, while Johns argues that the district court
failed to consider the purported effect of the federal detainer on his time in state
custody, the court need not explicitly discuss each factor on the record. See Garza-
Mendez, 735 F.3d at 1290.
Upon review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’ briefs,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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